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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is a study of the development of investigatory select committees of the 
House of Commons during the twentieth century, with a particular emphasis on the 
period between 1960 and 1990. Synthesising existing analysis as well as presenting 
new evidence, it describes the early origins of such committees as an integral part of 
the work of the House, and then considers the House’s apparent loss of interest in 
select committees between 1920 and 1960. The thesis next discusses the reasons 
behind the introduction of new select committees in the mid-1960s, and traces further 
changes to committees during the 1970s.  These developments are set in the political 
context of the period, and in particular the growth of backbench dissent in both major 
parties during the 1970s. The thesis then analyses the process by which 
departmentally-related select committees came to be established in 1979. Finally it 
assesses the quantitative and qualitative evidence about the activity and impact of the 
new departmental select committees in their first decade up to 1990, relating them 
closely to the political environment created by the government of Margaret Thatcher.  
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Introduction 
 
The public reputation of the House of Commons suffered many setbacks during the 
late twentieth century. Speeches in the House no longer shaped political careers as 
they once had; performances in TV and radio studios became more important to the 
ambitious MP. The ‘cash for questions’ scandal suggested that some Members of 
Parliament could not be trusted to represent the interests of their constituents with 
integrity.1 The media took less and less notice of serious Commons debates, 
increasingly reporting instead on the partisan noisiness of Prime Minister’s Questions. 
But there was one bright spot in this otherwise sombre parliamentary landscape: select 
committees. 
This thesis explores the reasons why House of Commons select committees came to 
be seen as something of a success. In particular it examines the development of 
investigatory select committees in the twentieth century, with a special focus on the 
period between 1960 and 1990. But the thesis first sets the scene by assessing some 
key developments in select committees throughout parliamentary history, 
demonstrating that they were important from an early date.  
A major theme of the thesis is the significance of the establishment in 1979 of a 
number of select committees, each responsible for scrutiny of a government 
                                                          
1
 See Standards in Public Life, First Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, Chairman 
Lord Nolan, 1995, Cm 2850, pp. 19-45  
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department.  This has been widely judged to be a decisive moment in the history of 
select committees, and, for some commentators, of twentieth century relations 
between Parliament and government. The thesis challenges this proposition, drawing 
attention to the impact of earlier developments in the political landscape and in 
parliamentary procedure and practice. 
A review of the literature on Parliament, the Executive and select committees 
Parliamentary select committees have a long history at Westminster, but in recent 
times it was the series of mid-1960s reforms associated with the name of the Labour 
politician Richard Crossman, and then the creation of the system of House of 
Commons ‘departmentally-related’ select committees in 1979, that brought them to 
greatest public prominence. This section reviews the literature on the history of 
constitutional relationships between Parliament and the Executive, and asks what that 
might tell us about the role of parliamentary select committees.  
 
Prompted largely by the radical constitutional reforms introduced by Tony Blair’s 
Labour Government from 1997, the public and academic debate on the nature of 
constitutional change expanded considerably in the early years of the twenty-first 
century. But this interest was not new. Generations of constitutional theorists have 
seen Parliament as playing a central, though never independent, role in the workings 
of the constitution. Reviewing the work of commentators from the 1850s to the 1950s, 
Vernon Bogdanor concludes that the British Constitution could be described at that 
time as ‘What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law’. He continues ‘It was because 
the sovereignty of Parliament has been seen as the central principle of the British 
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Constitution that it appeared pointless to draw up a codified constitution.’2 Anthony 
King identifies six writers, from Walter Bagehot in the 1850s to Leo Amery in the 
mid-twentieth century, as key commentators on the British constitution.3 He calls them 
his ‘canonical sextet’, describing them as ‘classical writers’ who in his view came to 
‘define for the British, over a long period of years, what their uncodified constitution 
was and what it meant’.4 King describes their general view as being that the British 
constitutional system was characterised by ‘the existence within it of a single, solitary 
locus of power and authority’.5  
 
For Bagehot this single locus was the Cabinet, and for Dicey it was Parliament; Low 
situated it in the office of the Prime Minister and his inner Cabinet.6  Wherever it was 
to be found, this single locus of power used Parliament as its main public ‘arena’, but 
this was a Parliament whose chief function was to produce and support the government 
of the day. That government was composed of the Queen’s Ministers, armed as they 
were with prerogative powers whose exercise often needed little or no parliamentary 
sanction. David Judge described this arrangement as combining ‘legislative, judicial 
and executive functions in an exceptional constitutional mixture’.7 In none of the 
traditional nineteenth and early twentieth century accounts of how this ‘exceptional 
constitutional mixture’ worked does there appear any sense of a separation of powers 
between legislature and executive, let alone any true conflict or antagonism. This was 
not the autonomous Parliament that challenged Charles I. The ‘sovereignty’ of 
                                                          
2   Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford: Hart, 2009), p.13 
3    See especially Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, with an Introduction by R.H.S. 
Crossman (Glasgow: Fontana, 1963) (First published 1867), and Leo Amery, Thoughts on the 
Constitution (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1947) 
4    Anthony King, The British Constitution (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007), p.15 
5    Ibid., p. 30 
6    A.V.Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, 1885); Sidney Low, The Governance of England (London: T.Fisher Unwin, 1904) 
7    David Judge, The Parliamentary State (London: Sage, 1993), p. 6  
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Parliament did not give that body any separate power, and there is much evidence in 
this thesis of the close connections between the life of Parliament and the workings of 
government.  
 
This settlement, producing a Parliament whose procedures and actions were to a large 
extent dictated by the needs of government, was seen by many commentators in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries as something to be applauded. Bagehot described 
the ‘English’ constitution as ‘a great entity’8 while Amery called it ‘an inspiration to 
other nations’ - something emphasised by the widespread export of ‘Westminster’ 
constitutions to the countries of the Empire and then the Commonwealth, especially 
in the first 70 years of the twentieth century. Senior Labour party figures such as 
Clement Attlee and Professor Harold Laski saw the value of a conservative 
constitutional settlement that could, as in 1945, assure a decisive majority for a radical 
socialist government just as it had produced stable Conservative administrations.9 The 
idea of a Parliament that existed primarily to support a strong central government was 
widely accepted as a key constitutional principle. This thesis contains substantial 
evidence that, by the late 1950s, some of the other functions of Parliament, including 
holding Ministers to detailed account for their performance in office, had atrophied. 
 
1960s discontents and Parliament 
There is a substantial literature exploring the long-term decline of Britain as an 
imperial, military and economic power from about 1870, with the Suez debacle of 
1956 seen as a key post-war accelerant of the process. Many writers have attributed 
decreases in British economic and geopolitical power to the country’s alleged 
                                                          
8   Bagehot, The English Constitution, p.59 
9   King, The British Constitution, pp. 32, 70   
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underlying failings, rather than to the inevitable tides of history. Jim Tomlinson has 
described the pervasive nature of British ‘declinism’ from the late nineteenth century 
onwards, suggesting that narratives of decline started in the political sphere and were 
taken up by historians. Tomlinson argued that this had distorted our view of Britain’s 
performance, and that ‘more productive narratives’ could be used to describe 
twentieth-century British history.10  But in the early 1960s the perception of decline 
was at least as important as the reality. Parliament was not exempt from this self-
lacerating narrative; in his 1962 book Anatomy of Britain, for instance, Anthony 
Sampson lamented what he saw as the weakening of Parliament’s capacity for 
controlling or even effectively scrutinising ministerial actions. In a similar way, 
Bernard Crick’s The Reform of Parliament, the first edition of which appeared in 1964, 
complained that ‘Britain so lacks effective scrutiny of the workings of the Executive 
that  ... popular esteem for Parliament and Government declines and its own 
effectiveness crumbles’.11 Crick concluded that there were ‘great gaps in the critical 
and informative function of Parliament’.12 To help remedy this, Crick recommended 
the establishment of a series of ‘”Standing” Committees of Advice, Scrutiny and 
Investigation’ covering the whole work of government.  These should be ‘set up for 
the whole life of a Parliament to give its members time to specialize and see things 
through’.13 This last point proved important in the later development of select 
committees. 
 
                                                          
10   Jim Tomlinson, ‘Thrice Denied: “Declinism” as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the 
Long Twentieth century’, Twentieth Century British History, 20/2 (2009), pp. 227-251 
11   Bernard Crick,  The Reform of Parliament (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964),  p. 2   
12   Ibid., p. 172 
13   Ibid., p. 199. For the introduction of such ‘whole-life-of-a Parliament’ select committees in 
1974, see below, p. 170 
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This was in one sense a demand for MPs to be more professional. Michael Rush 
explores this in his 2001 study of The Role of the Member of Parliament since 1868: 
From Gentlemen to Players.14 Rush examines figures for parliamentary activity over 
the whole period to the end of the twentieth century and identifies what he sees as a 
gradual professionalisation of the MP’s role, with part-time ‘gentlemen’ being 
replaced by full-time ‘players’. Select committees are one way in which such 
professionalism is exercised.   
 
This concept of investigatory committees had been advocated before in the twentieth 
century, as Chapter One makes clear: the report of Lord Haldane’s Machinery of 
Government Committee had called for what would effectively be departmentally-
related parliamentary committees in 1918, and others, including a number of 
academics, had taken up the cry several times in the intervening years.15 But the 1960s 
did see a number of specialist studies which both assessed the performance of current 
committees and advocated reforms.16 In 1966, for instance, Gordon Reid examined 
the effectiveness of Parliament’s mechanisms of financial scrutiny. He concluded that 
the Commons Chamber had over many years largely failed to exercise control of 
spending through its supply procedures.17 This left much of the initiative on scrutiny 
of expenditure to the Treasury itself. However, in contrast to the failure of the House’s 
                                                          
14   Michael Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament since 1868: From Gentlemen to Players 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). See also Donald D. Searing, Westminster’s World: 
Understanding Political Roles (London: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 32 
 
15    Ministry of Reconstruction, Report of the Machinery of Government Committee, 1918, Cmd 
9230. Hansard Society, Parliamentary Reform 1933-60: A Survey of Suggested Reforms (London: 
Cassell, 1961). Harold Laski, Reflections on the Constitution (Manchester: Manchester University  
Press, 1951), p. 91 
16    Hansard Society, Parliamentary Reform: A Survey of Recent Proposals for the Commons 
(London: Cassell, 1967) 
17    Gordon Reid, The Politics of Financial Control: The Role of the House of Commons ( London: 
Hutchinson, 1966),  p. 83 
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formal prior approval procedures, the three ‘financial committees’ - those concerned 
with Public Accounts, Estimates and Nationalised Industries - performed a valuable 
retrospective role, applying ‘political sanctions’ to government and stimulating public 
debate.18 A more sceptical writer was Nevil Johnson, who in 1966 published a study 
of the post-1945 work of the Select Committee on Estimates.19 Johnson concluded that 
the role of select committees was essentially modest. He saw the rationale of the 
Estimates Committee, one of the main existing scrutiny bodies, as ‘the pursuit of an 
explanatory dialogue. It is essentially one of the means by which a small number of 
Members of the House can satisfy themselves that they have a tolerable understanding 
of what is being done in particular sectors of government.’ Johnson calls this ‘a modest 
role which can rarely be judged in terms of concrete achievements’.20 
 
The parliamentary reforms of the mid-1960s, associated with the name of Richard 
Crossman, Leader of the House at the time, saw the creation of a number of specialist 
committees,21 and won praise from some contemporary commentators. In 1967, the 
Hansard Society updated Parliamentary Reform: A Survey of Recent Proposals for the 
Commons, originally published in 1961. The Chairman of the Hansard Society in 1967 
was Sir Edward Fellowes, formerly Clerk of the House. The Society may have called 
its book a ‘survey’, but it left the reader in little doubt that the Crossman reforms could 
be a force for good, concluding that ‘the experimental introduction of specialist 
Committees and other procedural changes made or proposed in 1966 are likely to add 
                                                          
18    Ibid., p. 152 
19   Nevil Johnson, Parliament and Administration: The Estimates Committee 1945-1965 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1966) 
20   Ibid., p.168 
21   See Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister: Volume Two: Lord President of the 
Council and Leader of the House of Commons, 1966-68 (London: Book Club Associates, 1977), 
especially pp. 346-47 and 391-92  
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considerably to the vitality of the House’.22 But reformers and others were often 
disappointed by the results of the ‘Crossman’ committees. There was a strong sense 
among academics and other writers between 1960 and 1979 that select committees 
were failing to do the job.  
 
This judgement has generally persisted. For instance in 2014 the Speaker of the House 
of Commons, John Bercow, said that in the early decades of the twentieth century 
select committees had been ‘corroded by fierce partisanship and as a consequence 
came to be eclipsed or marginalised’, and he suggested that later reforms had been 
ineffective.23 There has in particular been much criticism of the effectiveness of the 
1960s reforms to committees, with S.A. Walkland saying that they did ‘Little work of 
lasting value’ and were ‘powerless’ in the face of government obstruction.24 Paul 
Seaward and Paul Silk say that in action the ‘Crossman’ committees ‘disappointed 
many reformers’.25 According to Alexandra Kelso the 1960s committees were 
‘emasculated’ because they were not able to consider policy matters.26 Others have 
been less critical; in the early 1980s, for instance, Bruce George MP and Barbra Evans 
noted enhancements in practical arrangements for select committee operation in the 
20 years from 1960.27 Peter G. Richards, writing in 1972, delivered a mixed verdict 
on the new committees, on the one hand noting that many members were enthusiastic 
                                                          
22   See  Dermot Englefield, The Study of Parliament Group: The First Twenty-one Years, 1964-85 
(London: Study of Parliament Group, 1985) 
23    Rt Hon John Bercow MP, Michael Ryle Memorial Lecture, 30 June 2014 
24    S. A. Walkland, ‘Parliamentary Reform, Party Realignment and Electoral Reform’ in David 
Judge (ed.), The Politics of Parliamentary Reform (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 44 
25    Paul Seaward and Paul Silk, ‘The House of Commons’  in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), The British 
Constitution in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),  p.169 
26    Alexandra Kelso, Parliamentary Reform at Westminster  (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2009),  p. 94 
27    Bruce George and Barbra Evans in The Politics of Parliamentary Reform, p. 78 
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about the ‘Crossman’ committees, but on the other hand that they appeared to have 
had little influence on government policy.28  
 
The select committees of the 1970s, and especially the Expenditure Committee which 
began its work in 1971, have also had a very mixed press. S. A. Walkland was able to 
congratulate the Expenditure Committee on helping to improve the system of public 
expenditure control.29 Michael Rush observed in 1990 that ‘The establishment of the 
Expenditure Committee was a major step towards the creation of a comprehensive 
select committee system covering all major government departments.’30  
 
But in general the 1970s committees have been assessed as having failed. This 
criticism has ranged from accusations that coverage of government activity was 
‘piecemeal’ and ‘patchy’ - the assessment of the Commons Procedure Committee of 
197831 - to disappointment that there were very few debates on select committee 
reports on the floor of the House - the opinion of the Department of the Clerk of the 
House in written evidence to the same Committee.32 Among academics, Ann 
Robinson complained at the time that the Expenditure Committee had not ‘revived 
Parliament’s traditional power of the purse’ as intended. It had enjoyed only modest 
influence on government.33 In 1981 David Judge lamented the failure of 1970s select 
committees to develop the ‘division of labour’ required to hold governments 
systematically and rigorously to account and thereby to challenge ‘executive 
                                                          
28    Peter G. Richards, The Backbenchers (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), pp.126-37 
29    S. A. Walkland, ‘Parliamentary Reform, Party Realignment and Electoral Reform’, p. 44 
30    Michael Rush, ‘Select Committees’ in Michael Rush, (ed.), Parliament and Pressure Politics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press,1990), p. 138  
31   First Report of the Select Committee on Procedure, Session 1977-78 (588) [hereafter Procedure 
Committee 1978], Vol I, p.1i 
32   Ibid.,Vol. II, p. 114 
33   Ann Robinson, Parliament and Public Spending (London, Heinemann 1978), p. 154 
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dominance’.34 In later years Seaward and Silk also criticised the Expenditure 
Committee as being ‘unsystematic and uneven’.35 These criticisms vary depending on 
the interests of the critics: for Robinson the failure to exert the power of the purse is 
the key shortcoming, while for clerks the main problem was the ragged and inchoate 
arrangement of the 1970s committees, the lack of a rational order. As this thesis makes 
clear, it was a great deal easier for the House to remedy the problem of lack of 
coherence by restructuring the committees than it was to turn MPs into effective 
controllers of spending.   
 
By contrast, the literature on the departmental committees first established in 1979 is 
sometimes, though not always, glowing in its praise. Examples of academic 
assessments of the new system of 1979 include Peter Hennessy’s judgment that it was 
‘not just the most significant parliamentary development of the post-war period, but 
the single most important clawback in terms of the relative influence of the legislature 
and the executive since the Balfour reforms of 1902’.36 Philip Norton regarded the 
new pattern of committees as having ‘a qualitatively as well as quantitatively different 
nature to previous such structures’.37 Derek Hawes was just as positive about select 
committees’ role in 1993, identifying a series of possible functions. According to 
Hawes, committees could not only ‘Expose loopholes in existing legislation’ and 
‘Bring new concerns to the House’s attention’ but also ‘Help to establish new alliances 
between key actors both within and outside Parliament’ and ‘Mediate between 
                                                          
34   David Judge, Backbench Specialisation in the House of Commons (London: Heinemann, 1981), 
pp. 184-85 
35   Seaward and Silk in The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century,  p. 170  
36  Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring: Unearthing the British Constitution (London: Indigo,1996), 
p.153 
37  Philip Norton, ‘Behavioural Changes: Backbench Independence in the 1980s’ in Philip Norton 
(ed.), Parliament in the 1980s (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p.43 
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interests’.38 Though slightly more sceptical, Philip Giddings came to similarly positive 
conclusions in 1994.39 In 2004, Seaward and Silk called the departmental system ‘a 
significant enhancement of the capacity for scrutiny of government activity by the 
House of Commons’, although they also identified a number of weaknesses, including 
a lack of effective powers to insist on the provision of written and oral evidence, and 
a failure to arrange for select committee reports to be debated by the House as a 
whole.40    
 
The most detailed and thorough survey of the 1980s committees remains that edited 
during the decade by Gavin Drewry for the Study of Parliament Group.41 There were 
chapters on the overall philosophy of the new system as well as studies of each of the 
new committees, using a mixture of statistical and descriptive methods. The aim was 
to describe and evaluate the departmentally-related committees, and a variety of 
techniques was used, from narrative description of each committee to statistical 
analysis covering for example composition of the committees, turnover of 
membership, numbers of evidence sessions, attendance and numbers of reports. 
Although Drewry dismissed some of the more enthusiastic judgements about the 
significance of the new committees, claiming the ‘impossibility of effecting 
constitutional revolution by procedural reform’, his verdict was cautiously favourable: 
‘the new committees ... are an important evolutionary step in the modernization of a 
House of Commons that has been slow to adapt to the realities of a complex and highly 
                                                          
38  Derek Hawes, Power on the Backbenches? The Growth of Select Committee Influence (Bristol: 
School of Advanced Urban Studies, 1993), pp. 199-202 
39  Philip Giddings, ‘Select Committees and Parliamentary Scrutiny: Plus Ça Change’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 47/4 (1994), pp. 669-86 
40   Seaward and Silk in The British Constitution in the Twentieth Century,  p. 170  
41   Gavin Drewry (ed.), The New Select Committees: A study of the 1979 reforms, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 
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diversified polity’.42 But Drewry had cast some doubt on the constitutional impact of 
the new committees in a 1984 article which suggested that they might be considered  
a ‘constitutional non-event’.43 Tony Wright (later to play a major role in the 
development of select committees himself as Chair of a reforming twenty-first century 
committee) was cautious in the mid-1990s in assessing the effectiveness of the 
departmental committee system44 and the backbench MP John Garrett attacked the 
House’s select committees in 1992 because they ‘do not have the means to carry out 
serious policy evaluation, nor the assessment of public needs, and they have never 
shown much interest in examining the quality of management of government 
departments’.45  
 
There have been a number of attempts to measure the achievements of select 
committees. In recent years there has been a particular focus on whether or not they 
have been able to influence policy. For example in 2009 Hindmoor, Kennon and 
Larkin, in a study of the post-1997 work of the House of Commons Education 
Committee during the Labour Government of Tony Blair, found  ‘little evidence ... of 
the Education Committee exercising a consistent influence over government. The 
government rarely rejected committee recommendations out of hand. But neither did 
it welcome many of them with open arms’.46 However, the authors did not dismiss the 
possibility of such influence, especially in the complex field of policy development, 
                                                          
42   Ibid., p. 391  
43   Gavin Drewry, ‘The New Select Committees: A Constitutional Non-Event?’ in Dilys M. Hill 
(ed.), Parliamentary Select Committees in Action: A symposium (Glasgow: Strathclyde Papers on 
Government and Politics, 1984), p.30 
44   Tony Wright, Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on British Politics (London: Routledge, 1994), 
p.47 
45   Ibid., p. 18  
46   Andrew Hindmoor, Andrew Kennon and Phil Larkin, ‘Assessing the Influence of Select 
Committees in the UK: The Education and Skills Committee, 1997-2005’, Journal of Legislative 
Studies, 15/1 (2009), p.76 
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with its think tanks, pressure groups and party political considerations. While they did 
not find, and did not expect to be able to identify, a ‘clear causal policy chain’ between 
the Committee’s reports and policy change,47 they were struck by the number of times 
Ministers, including senior Ministers, were able to identify ‘policy issues on which the 
Education Committee had, in their view, exercised significant influence over New 
Labour's education policy’. This might happen when a Minister used a select 
committee to give ‘greater leverage in their negotiations with the Treasury’ or because 
it helped in winning an internal party battle.  
 
Similar questions were raised in the most substantial recent study of this issue, 
published in 2011 by Meg Russell and Meghan Benton. The authors were assisted by 
House of Commons committee staff in an analysis of the influence of the work of 
some of the key select committees in the years after 1997.48 Using both qualitative and 
extensive quantitative analysis, Russell and Benton traced the extent to which 
committee recommendations had been successful in influencing government policy 
and practice. As part of a wider study of the policy influence of Parliament, Russell 
and Benton considered a number of ways in which the mere fact of a committee 
inquiry with oral evidence can change a Department’s approach to an issue.49 It is 
notable that this phenomenon of ‘anticipated reactions’ - governments seeking to 
avoid trouble with backbenchers by modifying their policy proposals - was identified 
by Martin Redmayne, a long-serving government Chief Whip in the Tory 
                                                          
47   Ibid., p. 78 
48   Meg Russell and Meghan Benton, Selective Influence: the Policy Impact of House of Commons 
Select Committees (London: The Constitution Unit UCL, 2011). See also D. Monk, In the Eye of the 
Beholder? A Framework for Testing the Effectiveness of Parliamentary Committees, (Canberra: 
Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, 2009) 
49   Meg Russell and Meghan Benton, Assessing the Policy Impact of Parliament: Methodological 
Challenges and Possible Future Approaches, Paper for PSA Legislative Studies Specialist Group 
Conference, 2009   
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administrations of the 1950s and 1960s.50 However, recognising a distinctive and 
decisive select committee contribution to a particular policy change can be very hard, 
as Russell and Benton acknowledge when they talk about ‘the “attribution problem”, 
whereby the committee may be only one amongst many voices calling for a change’.51  
 
Research questions 
This thesis addresses a number of research issues, especially in relation to the years 
1960-1990. It considers, for instance, the effectiveness of select committees, and in 
particular whether the roles played by committees changed over time and whether the 
advantages of such committees outweighed the disadvantages. The underlying 
question is whether committees helped to strengthen Parliament in its role of holding 
Ministers to account. The thesis also looks at the way reform was promoted during the 
1960s and 1970s. The main research questions there concern the significance of the 
committee reforms of the 1960s and the 1970s for Parliament and the public and the 
influence on reform of Ministers, backbench MPs and even the permanent officials of 
the House. The heart of the matter is the question whether the changes to select 
committees which took place in the 1960s and 1970s were transitory or permanent. 
 
Finally, the thesis looks at the evidence for select committee activity and impact in the 
1980s. It sets this evidence in the context of Margaret Thatcher’s time as Prime 
Minister, and asks whether the new departmental committees established in 1979 
                                                          
50   Noted by Dick Leonard MP and Valentine Herman, in The Backbencher and Parliament: A 
Reader (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. xvii 
51   Russell and Benton, Selective Influence, p. 90 
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represented a new departure or were simply a matter of continuing down the path set 
in the previous 20 years.      
 A note on sources and methodology 
The thesis uses a range of primary sources, including Prime Ministers’ papers, Cabinet 
papers and other government material from the National Archives, internal working 
papers of select committees available in the Parliamentary Archives, Hansard, the 
reports and formal minutes of select committees and a number of interviews with 
former MPs, civil servants and clerks of the House of Commons. In addition there is 
also an assessment of media reporting of select committee activity. The diaries of 
Richard Crossman, Leader of the House of Commons when a number of new select 
committees were appointed in the mid-1960s, are also used.  
The approach taken in this thesis is to assess how committees worked and developed 
as institutions, both in Parliament and outside. This is partly based on an analysis of 
the relevant statistics which attempts to evaluate how much time and effort were spent 
by MPs on various activities, and the priority they appeared to give to them. This is 
closely related to the question ‘What defines success for a select committee?’ Equally, 
it might be asked, ‘Is success to be measured by the number of reports issued, 
recommendations accepted/implemented and policies influenced or even initiated?’  
In analysing the role of committees, the thesis makes substantial use of statistics, 
especially the number of times the words ‘select committee’ were used in 
parliamentary debates and elsewhere.52 This is admittedly a crude metric, but it is a 
useful indicator of the extent of the interest taken by MPs, Cabinet Ministers in others 
                                                          
52
 These figures were arrived at by using the search engine of the Hansard 1803-2005 series of 
digitalised records of  parliamentary debates 
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in the work of committees. This was especially the case when, as in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century, references to select committees rose very rapidly, after many 
years when such references were relatively rare.  
Many authors have, as noted above, measured the work of committees by reference to 
their impact, or lack of impact, on policy. Policy change is clearly an important 
benchmark of committee success, and it makes a profound constitutional point - that, 
whatever the limitations of its legislative scope, Parliament has a place in determining 
the direction taken by the country. But this is only one measure of a committee. For 
Members, indeed, it may not even be the most significant measure. Rush’s research 
from the 1990s (after many years of select committee development) suggested that 
influencing and changing policy was far from the most important part of the job for 
many MPs at the time, with constituency work usually seen as the top priority.53 The 
thesis therefore assesses not only the intended influence of a select committee on 
policy via accepted and implemented recommendations - but  also the political impact 
of committees, which also includes unintended or unplanned effects, as well as 
encompassing the role of committees in the life of Parliament. 
This thesis also recognises an important conceptual distinction between different types 
of reform. Several recent writers have discerned a difference between reforms that aim 
to speed the progress of legislation and so help governments deliver on their 
programmes, sometimes called ‘efficiency’ reform, and changes that help strengthen 
the capacity of Parliament to hold Ministers and their civil servants to account, 
sometimes categorised as ‘effectiveness’ reform.54 These two types of internal or 
                                                          
53   Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868, p. 217. A similar point is made in 
Russell and Benton, Selective Influence, p. 8 
54   See for example Matthew Flinders, ‘Analysing Reform: The House of Commons, 2001–5’, 
Political Studies, 55/1 (2007), pp. 174–200; and Meg Russell, ‘Never Allow a Crisis To Go To 
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institutional reform play very different constitutional roles. But David Judge goes 
further, holding that internal parliamentary reform and changes of attitude are 
essentially ‘flawed’ because they fail to challenge the constitutional status quo. Such 
reforms, presumably including those of 1979, are in his view ‘at best timorous’, failing 
to stimulate greater independence or to make more than a limited impact.55 Judge 
suggests, in particular, that such reforms do nothing to address ‘the “executive 
mentality” - the defensive, secretive and closed normative values within Whitehall’. 
Finally it is worth noting that this thesis demonstrates, much more strongly than 
previous studies, the importance of the permanent staff of the House of Commons to 
the success of parliamentary reform. Most if not all of these were clerks, who were the 
main providers of procedural advice to Members and others and also a key resource 
for all select committees, managing inquiries, producing briefs and drafting committee 
reports. A surprising number of these House servants (who are quite separate from the 
wider Civil Service which supports Ministers) emerge from this thesis as reformers 
who were (and sometimes still are) prepared to make public their ideas for change. 
This sets them apart from the vast majority of Whitehall civil servants, who keep a 
low profile in deference to their political ‘masters’.    
Thesis structure  
The thesis begins with a chapter which summarises the role and function of 
committees, especially select committees, in the life of Parliament from the earliest 
                                                          
Waste’: The Wright Committee Reforms to Strengthen the House of Commons’,  Parliamentary 
Affairs, 64/4 (2011), p. 613 
55   David Judge, The Parliamentary State, p. 215 
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days up to about 1960.  The rest of the thesis concentrates on the period between 1960 
and 1990, a time of much change for select committees. 
Chapter Two describes the gradual growth of political and academic interest in select 
committees after 1960.  Chapter Three traces the development of the Expenditure 
Committee during its brief lifetime of nine years, and notes the growth in activity of 
other committees of the 1970s, including a number appointed to examine specific 
policy issues. The Chapter puts select committee development into the context of a 
turbulent political period. Chapter Four describes the process by which the new system 
of departmentally-related select committees was proposed and introduced in 1979.  
 
Chapter Five examines the statistical evidence on the activity and impact of the new 
departmental select committees in their first decade from 1979. Chapter Six contains 
case studies which illustrate the work of departmental select committees during the 
1980s. It assesses how effective the departmental committees were in responding to 
some major issues of the day.  
 
The argument of this thesis 
This thesis argues that the importance of the introduction of departmentally-related 
select committees in 1979 has been exaggerated in the academic literature and in other 
accounts. On the other hand not enough attention has been paid to the steady progress 
made by select committees before 1979 and especially to the number of modest but 
significant reforms that strengthened the capacity of Parliament to hold government to 
account during the 1960s and 1970s. The committee reform of the late twentieth 
century did not depend on a single change such as the enshrining in 1979 of the 
principle of departmental committees; rather it was a continuous process over a 
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quarter-century, of modest improvements in terms of committee powers, activity and 
resources. The fact that the post-1979 committees were and continue to be related to 
individual departments has helped to give the system some rationality and long-term 
stability, but it was only one factor in their growth, and probably not the most 
important one. More broadly, the thesis contends that the post-1960 strengthening of 
select committees was a return to a long-term, indeed centuries-old, parliamentary 
norm. The importance of small reforms in the process of strengthening committees is 
emphasised; because such reform was modest, it was not seen as destabilising or a 
threat to the prerogatives of government. Thus committee progress continued between 
1960 and 1990 at times both of strong or fairly strong government - for example under 
Labour in the late 1960s or the Conservatives in the 1980s - and of weak government, 
as with Labour in the late 1970s. 
 
Finally the thesis calls for some proportion in assessing the longer-term constitutional 
impact of select committees. They have in some ways flourished since the 1960s, but 
they have been acceptable both to backbenchers and to Ministers because they have 
not intervened regularly or with much impact in the process of legislation. This has 
made them in some ways more attractive to backbenchers because committees have 
been free to set their own agendas and have not been burdened with detailed 
consideration of Bills. Ministers have largely been able to achieve their legislative 
aims unhampered by committees, unless they failed to manage affairs on the floor of 
the House. But these restraints have prevented such committees from exercising direct 
influence on the most important determinant of the direction of policy - legislation. 
The constitutional role of select committees, though stronger than it was in 1960, is 
therefore still limited. 
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          Chapter One: House of Commons Select Committees before 1960  
 
This Chapter analyses some key themes in the history of House of Commons select 
committees up to 1960.  It distinguishes several different types of select committee, 
and recalls that they were a pervasive feature of Parliament’s work from the Middle 
Ages onwards. This Chapter asks, in relation to the period before 1960, what sort of 
issues were addressed by select committees, whether the roles played changed over 
time and what were seen as the advantages and  disadvantages of select committees as 
parliamentary bodies. It also poses a more fundamental question which will be 
important throughout this thesis - whether select committees played any part in setting 
and adjusting the balance of power and influence between Parliament and Ministers.   
 
Select Committees: Three Categories   
It is important, before considering the early history of select committees, to distinguish 
the three broad categories of select committee inquiry which will be described in this 
thesis. Investigatory select committees throughout parliamentary history have 
performed a wide variety of constitutional and political functions, though in the vast 
majority of cases they have shared one key characteristic - they were largely or wholly 
composed of backbench Members.  
 
One category of investigatory select committee might be called the ‘scandal or failure’ 
committee, an ad hoc body established, often urgently, to consider cases of 
government maladministration or corruption. These would almost always be matters 
of political controversy and they would often be the subject of dispute between 
Ministers and other Members.  
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The second type of committee inquiry was concerned with the financial propriety and 
efficacy of expenditure by Ministers and their departments; such inquiries were seen 
as part of the fundamental function of Parliament in exercising the ‘power of the purse’ 
by granting or withholding supply to Ministers of the Crown, or of examining the 
Estimates brought forward.   
 
The third might be called the ‘policy and administration’ inquiry, examining, either ad 
hoc or on a continuing basis, policy proposals or policy implementation, or monitoring 
the routine general administration of a department.   
 
There was generally an acceptance that ‘power of the purse’ committees were 
constitutionally appropriate House of Commons bodies and could normally be allowed 
to exercise their functions with a degree of determination and persistence. On the other 
hand, ‘failure and scandal’ committees and ‘policy and administration’ committees 
were often seen as intruding improperly into the sphere of government. 
 
Important from early days: select committees in the Middle Ages and later 
From an early date committees were a central feature of parliamentary life, the topics 
they considered being important and sometimes urgent. For example in October 1382 
two new military projects engaged the attention of Richard II’s Parliament. One was 
a proposal for the Duke of Lancaster to lead an army to enforce his claim for the throne 
of Castile, the other a plan for an expedition by the Bishop of Norwich to the county 
of Flanders.56 The Commons and Lords disagreed as to which campaign to advise 
                                                          
56   J. S. Roskell, Linda Clark and Carol Rawcliffe (eds), The House of Commons 1386-1421 
(Stroud: History of Parliament Trust, 1992), Vol. I,  p.106 
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Richard to pursue; the Commons requested that a committee of ten peers should be 
convened to consult and help Parliament to decide the issue.57 
 
During the sixteenth century, committees became increasingly used to revise Bills as 
well as to undertake a range of other tasks.58 Jennifer Loach observes that ‘Committees 
were one of the answers to the problem of ever-expanding business, and the use of 
committees became much more frequent in both Houses in the course of Elizabeth’s 
reign’.59 Among policy issues considered in committee in the Tudor and Stuart period 
for example were leading constitutional and religious questions of the day.60 But 
committees were not just used for occasional set pieces. Hasler demonstrates the extent 
to which committees were a regular and routine part of the work of the Elizabethan 
House of Commons, calculating for example that 50 percent of the membership of the 
House in the Parliament that first met in 1572 were members of committees, including 
committees on what Hasler describes as ‘social/economic’ and ‘legal’ matters.61 This 
could however also generate its own problems, as Loach notes; these included a 
tendency to create very large committees which could become unwieldy.62 Ronald 
Butt observes that during the reign of Elizabeth I the House had an experience of 
                                                          
57   Ibid. 
58   Jennifer Loach, Parliament under the Tudors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 48, 140-145 
59   Ibid. p.140 
60   For example, in its report Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive (First 
Report of Session 1999-2000 (300)), p.xxvi, the Liaison Committee noted that: ‘A random 
selection from some four centuries ago includes the Committee for Uniformity of Religion (1571), 
the Committee for the Examination of Fees or Rewards taken for Voices in this House (1571), the 
Committee on the Queen of Scotts [sic] (1572), the Committee on the Confirmation of the Book of 
Common Prayer (1604), and the Committee on Union with Scotland (1604), as well as regular 
Committees on the Subsidy (the grant of money to the Crown), on Grievances, and on Privileges, 
and occasional Grand Committees which apparently operated rather like Select Committees (such 
as the Grand Committee for Evils) (1623)’.    
61   P.W. Hasler (ed.), The House of Commons 1558-1603 (London: History of Parliament 
Trust,1981), p.78 
62   Loach, Parliament under the Tudors, p. 141 
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‘using committees widely and giving them greater scope in policy matters than 
parliamentary committees have normally enjoyed in Britain’.63  
 
Various studies suggest that the tradition of asking select committees to address 
intractable problems remained vigorous through the seventeenth century. There were 
‘inquiries into government failures, often related to possible impeachments, for 
example those on the mismanagement of the Second Dutch War in 1667-8, and of the 
war in Ireland in 1689’.64 Also in the seventeenth century, ‘several standing 
committees were appointed to review matters relating to general areas such as 
privileges or petitions’.65 Nevertheless, sixteenth and seventeenth century committees, 
as small closed bodies working away from the open forum of the floor of the House, 
were sometimes criticised as being too open to manipulation from outside, and 
particularly from Ministers seeking to get their way by exerting pressure or promising 
favours. Campion suggests that the system of select committees which had developed 
by this time was seen as dominated by Privy Councillors and other Members 
representing the interests of the Crown, and was therefore, to use Campion’s word, 
‘suspect’.66  
 
The select committees of the House of Commons in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries were often composed at least partly of Members with a special 
interest; there were for example at different times group nominations of ‘all the 
                                                          
63   Ronald Butt, The Power of Parliament London: Constable, 1967), p. 353 
64   First Report from the Public Administration Select Committee, Session 2004-5, Government by 
Inquiry (51), p.10 
65   David L. Smith, The Stuart Parliaments, 1603-1689 (London: Arnold, 1999), p.71 
66   See for example Lord Campion, An Introduction to the Procedure of the House of Commons 
(London: Macmillan, 1958),  p. 43 
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Members of the long robe’ (lawyers) or Members from Norfolk and Suffolk.67 By the 
eighteenth century, if not before, some select committees also contained the potential 
for Members of Parliament to demonstrate independence and act against the interests 
and wishes of Ministers of the Crown. Sedgwick identifies ‘a special type of select 
committee’ which was set up to examine matters of great importance, with members 
chosen by (secret) ballot among all MPs.68 One such select committee of the 1730s 
examined the highly contentious subject of the frauds in the customs by which the 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Walpole had justified his Excise Bill. A proposed list of 
committee members was prepared by Mr Pulteney and Sir William Wyndham, 
containing, according to one contemporary account, ‘not one friend of the 
Administration’.69 The Administration, it was said, ‘took an alarm’ at this 
development and ‘a meeting of the Government’s friends’ was called to draw up an 
alternative list which was more amenable to Walpole - which won the day in the ballot, 
although the disappointed opposition side had ‘imagined numbers would have sided 
with them since they could do it without discovering themselves’. The episode does 
show that in considering select committees the eighteenth century House of Commons 
could put Ministers on their mettle; committees provided opportunities for dissent to 
be registered.70  
 
Cross-party committee activity was a very important part of the work of the House in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Peter Jupp noted an increasing 
number of what he calls ‘public interest’ select committees which examined prominent 
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issues of public policy, ranging from food shortages to policing. He concluded that 
‘Partisan committees certainly existed but they were the exception rather than the 
rule’71  
 
 
The nineteenth century: building a Parliament for committees 
The nineteenth century saw important developments in the House’s approach to all 
three types of committee inquiry. There were many select committees on policy and 
administration matters in the newly-reformed House of the 1830s and 1840s.72 
Calculations made as part of the research for this thesis show that there were on 
average 10 select committee reports per session in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, and that the figure doubled to about 18 in the 1820s. But the figure rose again 
at the beginning of the 1830s; from the first reformed Parliament of 1833 onwards the 
number of select committee reports seldom fell below 30. In the 1830s as a whole the 
average of reports per session was 33, and in the 1840s it was 35. The 1847-48 Report 
from the Select Committee on Public Business noted that there were no fewer than 44 
select committees on such business in the 1847-48 Session, with an average of 15 
members to each committee; they covered subjects ranging from Commercial Distress 
to Divorce Bills and Highways to Navy, Army and Ordnance Expenditure.73 Some sat 
for over 35 days in the Session. Along with this went 28 election committees (to decide 
on disputed elections), and over 140 groups and committees on private and railway 
                                                          
71   Peter Jupp, The Governing of Britain 1688-1848 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 218-219. See 
also S. E. Finer, ‘The transmission of Benthamite ideas 1820-50’ in G. Sutherland (ed.), Studies in 
the Growth of Nineteenth-Century Government (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), pp.11-
32 
72   The Representation of the People Act 1832 (2 & 3 Will. IV c. 45) reformed electoral 
arrangements, granting House of Commons seats to large industrial cities, previously 
unrepresented in that House, and taking seats away from the so-called ‘Rotten Boroughs’ with 
small electorates and, in many cases, wealthy patrons  
73   Report from the Select Committee on Public Business, Session 1847-48 (644), Appendix 
32 
 
Bills. The report indeed expresses concern about ‘This great amount of Committee 
business, and the heavy demand it makes on the time of Members ... [which] must be 
borne in mind in considering the course of Public Business in The House itself’.74 
 
The building in which Parliament met had also changed around the time of the reform 
of the franchise. In 1834 a disastrous fire had destroyed much of the medieval Palace 
of Westminster. The design and layout of the building that replaced it over the next 
few decades demonstrated that this was a Parliament which needed to accommodate 
many committees; the new Parliament’s mid-Victorian Committee Corridor with its 
many wood-pannelled rooms was both an architectural and a constitutional statement.  
 
Select committees and other parliamentarians in the nineteenth century 
The wider political world of the nineteenth century appeared to be taking more notice 
of select committees as the century wore on. Whereas the figures for the ‘supply side’ 
of select committees - their output of reports - went up markedly, the trajectory of the 
political ‘demand side’ - the extent to which politicians as a whole responded to that 
output - was spectacular.  The numbers of references to the phrase ‘select committee’ 
in the Chambers of both Houses gives some indication of this. Between 1803 and 
1809, there were only 174 such references, while between 1810 and 1819 there were 
224. The 1820s saw a rise to 352 references, but it was after 1830 that the phrase 
became much more frequent – the numbers of Chamber references to the words ‘select 
committee’ rose by over 400 percent, to 1583 in the 1830s, and the increase continued, 
with 1772 references in the 1840s, 3,493 in the 1850s and 5,554 in the 1860s. A good 
proportion of these mentions inevitably involved private Bill select committees, 
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reflecting the growth of the railway network and other infrastructure developments, 
but not all of the steep rise can be attributed to that source.  
 
Nineteenth-century select committees could have a major political impact; indeed the  
establishment of a select committee to examine scandal led to the fall of a government 
during the Crimean War. When in 1855 the Commons voted to appoint a committee 
to ‘inquire into the condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the conduct of 
those departments of Government whose duty it has been to administer to the wants 
of the army’ the government of Lord Aberdeen resigned.75 Lord Palmerston became 
Prime Minister as a result, and he acquiesced in the appointment of the committee; 
three leading members of the new government, Sir James Graham, the Hon. Sidney 
Herbert and William Gladstone, tendered their resignations immediately. Gladstone 
complained to the House on the day of his resignation that the select committee inquiry 
was ‘incompatible with real confidence on the part of Parliament in those who hold 
executive office’.76 In particular, Gladstone believed that the establishment of the 
committee was inappropriate at a time when the war was continuing. Gladstone 
attacked the notion that ‘the powers of the Crown’ could be delegated ‘to a small 
Committee upstairs’.77 Despite Gladstone’s patronising remarks, the ‘small 
Committee upstairs’ did its job, and published its report.78  
 
But there was a more significant select committee development in this period: the 
establishment in 1861 of the Committee of Public Accounts (usually abbreviated to 
                                                          
75   Quoted in William Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, Fifth Edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1922), Vol. I, p.399  
76   Hansard, House of Commons Debates [afterwards HCD], col. 1838, 23 February 1855  
77   Ibid. 
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‘PAC’).79 The importance of the PAC lies in the fact that it epitomised from the 
beginning what Gordon Reid has described as ‘the House’s financial function’, namely 
‘to check, to verify, or to safeguard the finances of the State’.80  This particular 
assertion of the power of the purse took the form, not of occasional interventions like 
the select committees of long tradition, but of a body that was a parliamentary fixture 
rather than a passing phenomenon. The foundation of the PAC was thus a very 
important step towards the institutionally permanent ‘policy and administration’ 
investigatory committees that developed in the twentieth century. 
 
These events of the 1850s and 1860s also demonstrated the important political and 
constitutional distinction between ‘scandal and failure’ committees and those that 
exercised the power of the purse. Whereas the House’s right to scrutinise policy has 
often been contested, examining the finances as part of the process of supply and audit 
has always been seen as legitimate. Indeed it was Gladstone himself, as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, who successfully moved for the appointment of the PAC. That was, he 
said, ‘obviously the true completion of the duty of [the Commons] with regard to the 
public money’.81 Gladstone did, however, acknowledge that pressing for economy in 
the spending of public money might not suit all, or even a majority of,  Members.  In 
a phrase that contains an important and lasting truth about what most MPs prefer, 
Gladstone accepted that the duties of members of the new PAC would be ‘of a dry and 
repulsive kind’.82 
                                                          
79    The history of the Public Accounts Committee has been the subject of several studies, and it 
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Ad hoc investigatory committees of the House of Commons, charged with considering 
specific and substantial questions of policy and administration, continued to be 
common in the second half of the nineteenth century. Highly significant issues were 
the subject of select committee inquiries in the 1860s, 1870s and 1880s, ranging from 
sewage disposal in towns to the Mutiny Act and from grants to members of the Royal 
Family to the compulsory registration of midwives.83  
All three types of backbench investigatory committee were thus active during the 
second half of the nineteenth century. And there was a noticeable effect on the working 
lives of Members. For example, as many as 270 MPs served on select committees of 
all kinds (including those that dealt with private business such as railway construction, 
as well as public business) in the Session of 1856,84 with 298 Members on select 
committees in 1867,85 and 299 in the 1878 Session.86 It was in the 1880s that numbers 
of Members serving on select committees probably reached a peak; in 1882 there were 
441 select committee members, in 1883 the number dipped slightly to 411, but in 1884 
the number hit a probable all-time high of 541- nearly 83 percent of the House’s total 
membership of 652.87 These figures, for both investigatory and non-investigatory 
committees, represented substantial proportions of the House - always in excess of 40 
percent of Members and often a much higher proportion.  
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The early twentieth century: key developments in committees 
Up to this point this Chapter has described a House of Commons that, over many 
centuries, had nurtured a strong tradition of committee work. From almost the very 
beginning Members were prepared, or sometimes forced, to go into committee. In the 
early- and mid-twentieth century, however, there seems to have been a serious 
slackening in the volume and significance of committee work, with investigatory 
select committees especially affected. It came to be accepted in some circles that 
committees were simply not appropriate for many types of significant discussion, and 
that the Chamber of the House was the only proper place for parliamentary debate. 
Although it is impossible within the scope of this thesis to prove it, is possible that the 
period between 1920 and 1960 was among the most barren in terms of committee 
activity in the whole history of the House.  
 
The first three decades of the twentieth century, however, also saw several key 
developments in the history of select committees. Between 1900 and 1914, select 
committee activity continued on nineteenth century lines, with subjects covered 
including workmen’s trains, the Post Office’s approach to telephone services and the 
rise in motor traffic.88 Numbers of Members on select committees continued to be 
substantial for most of the period to 1914, although there was a noticeable fall in the 
number of select committee members, from 412 in the Election year of 1906 to 199 in 
the 1913 Session and 196 in 1912-13.89 Then, around the time of the First World War, 
there was a break with tradition on select committees; the long-established notion that 
major scandals and cases of maladministration could be sent to a committee of the 
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House for examination appears to have lost favour. A select committee became no 
longer the last refuge in a scandal. 
 
The reasons for this change in perceptions of ‘failure and scandal’ committees are not 
easy to identify, but it may have had something to do with the committee which in 
1913 investigated the Marconi affair, which involved allegations of corrupt share 
dealing by senior Liberal politicians, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
David Lloyd George, in relation to contracts for imperial telegraph stations. The affair 
has been described by Roy Hattersley, a recent biographer of Lloyd George, as 
bringing ‘the risk of destruction’ on the head of the Chancellor.90 Its suggestions of 
what would today be called ‘insider dealing’ were the more serious as they involved 
not only Lloyd George, who had already acquired something of a reputation for sailing 
close to the wind on some financial dealings, but also other senior members of the 
government. Nevertheless, the final report on the matter from a Liberal-dominated 
committee exonerated the Liberal leadership in ringing terms: ‘It has been proved to 
the Committee that there is no foundation for any of the charges made against these 
ministers’.91 But the Opposition were not convinced, and voiced suspicions about the 
motives of Committee members. The Unionist Member Oliver Locker-Lampson, 
speaking just after the report’s publication, said that work was needed ‘to restore 
public confidence in the credentials of the Committee as a whole’.92   
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The turbulence surrounding the Marconi Committee may also have been a by-product 
of the stresses which affected economic, social and political life in Edwardian and 
‘Georgian’ Britain, from controversies over the legal status of trade unions to disputes 
over the idea of votes for women and a profound constitutional collision between a 
Liberal Government bent on paying new social benefits and a recalcitrant, Tory-
dominated House of Lords.93 In the first decade or so of the twentieth century, the 
prominence of such divisive issues must have contributed to the decline of the select 
committee.  
 
The new scepticism about the wisdom of asking MPs to undertake such high-profile 
and contentious inquiries at a time of what Ronald Butt calls ‘the increased rigidity of 
party allegiances’94 was reinforced a few years later by a key policy development - the 
passage of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921.95 This provided for High 
Court-style evidential powers to be given to an ‘inquiry into a definite matter […]of 
urgent public importance’  following a resolution of both Houses. The effect of the 
legislation was to offer an alternative to parliamentary investigation, and to give 
external inquiries a more elaborate armoury than the one possessed by select 
committees. The Act created new machinery that could be operated by government in 
a way that might be politically more manageable for ministers than the vagaries of 
select committee inquiry. The change came about almost by accident, in response to 
the loss of important papers during the winding-up of the wartime Ministry of 
Munitions.96 But the passage of the Act did reveal a change in attitude to select 
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committees. To suggestions that a substantial number of MPs should be included in 
an inquiry to examine the allegations of official impropriety, Andrew Bonar Law, Lord 
Privy Seal and Leader of the House, who was to become Prime Minister in 1922 ,  
replied that there needed to be an inquiry ‘that will command confidence in all 
quarters’. His proposal was for an investigation that involved not one Member of the 
House of Commons. He suggested ‘a Committee consisting of a judge, if we can get 
one, and I have one in my mind, whom I shall try to get, who is well known to 
Members of this House. There ought also to be a well-known business man, who is 
above suspicion in cases of this kind, and the third member ... should be a good public 
accountant’.97 Although this was, like the Marconi affair, exactly the sort of matter 
that would in the past have been considered right for select committee investigation, 
the idea was not mentioned. Instead, a suggestion was made by another Member that 
a statute should be enacted to facilitate the operation of external inquiries, in particular 
to enable them to take evidence on oath,98 and the government agreed and acted with 
almost breakneck speed. After a very brief parliamentary passage, the Tribunals of 
Inquiry (Evidence) Act became law late in March 1921.  
 
The Act did not, however, immediately transform the investigatory landscape; it was 
little used in the 1920s. And the threat of a select committee could still prove 
politically potent, a point dramatically demonstrated in October 1924, when the 
resignation of Ramsay MacDonald’s first Labour government was prompted partly by 
the proposed establishment of a select committee which was moved by the Liberals 
and supported by the main opposition party, the Conservatives. The committee would 
have investigated the circumstances leading up to the withdrawal of proceedings, 
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recently instituted by the Director of Public Prosecutions, against  J. R. Campbell of 
the Workers’ Weekly (organ of the Communist Party of Great Britain), on charges of 
sedition. The controversy partly concerned Opposition suspicions that Labour 
Ministers tacitly supported remarks that were seen as an incitement to military mutiny. 
But more damaging was MacDonald’s handling of the matter; he appears for instance 
to have misled the House about his dealings with the Attorney General and the 
Director of Public Prosecutions.99 MacDonald, significantly, felt that the proposal for 
a select committee was unfair because his party would be in a minority. In the 
Commons confidence debate of 8 October 1924 which brought his Government down, 
MacDonald noted acidly ‘the Committee which they were setting up was a Committee 
of seven against us and three for us’. The Marconi affair was clearly still fresh in his 
memory. MacDonald told the House that ‘When the conduct of a Member of the 
Government is called in question, and the Government propose an inquiry, as has been 
done, good and well. But even then I think that a Select Committee is not the right 
court to send it to’. MacDonald made it clear that it was the House’s experience of the 
Marconi Committee that had led him to that conclusion.100 
 
 Despite a hasty Cabinet meeting to decide tactics, the House agreed to an opposition 
motion to appoint a select committee.101 The government had lost on an issue of 
confidence. At another Meeting at 11.30 that night the Prime Minister told the Cabinet 
that he would be seeking a dissolution of Parliament. The general election on 29 
October saw the end of this first Labour Government. The idea of a select committee 
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had been the occasion (rather than the cause) of the government’s defeat. MacDonald’s 
remark, like Bonar Law’s on the Ministry of Munitions issue, showed the depth of the 
resistance to select committees among senior politicians. The impact of the Marconi 
affair on the reputation of the House for effective scrutiny (and perhaps its self-
confidence in attempting that scrutiny) was long-lasting; arguably it had still not 
recovered by the early years of the twenty-first century. For example, when in 2005 
the Public Administration Committee drew up a list of the twentieth century’s major 
public inquiries, it could find only three inquiries into government action which had 
been undertaken by a select committee after the passage of the 1921 Act, and none 
since 1948.102  
 
‘Continuous and well-informed interest’: the first moves towards committee 
specialisation 
While the reputation of ‘scandal and failure’ select committees continued to suffer in 
the first third of the twentieth century, thinking about the other two types of backbench 
investigatory body - on administration and finance - developed in a more positive way 
during, and to an extent after, the First World War, although practical progress was 
elusive.  
 
One powerful argument for Parliament to take a more active role in monitoring public 
expenditure was the widely-noted growth of the state. Civil service numbers rose from 
under 17,000 in 1841 to over 116,000 in 1901.103 But Parliament’s procedures for 
monitoring the associated expenditure did not match that growth. Granting supply had 
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always been recognised as a key constitutional task for the whole House, but during 
the nineteenth century ‘Committee of Supply’ debates on the floor of the House, 
involving any Member who wished to attend, had become increasingly general and 
the focus on finance had been lost. Some Members also argued that, as public 
expenditure increased, the Public Accounts Committee’s post-hoc scrutiny of 
spending should be supplemented by a closer look at earlier stages in the departmental 
spending process.104   
 
The history of Parliament in the very early years of the twentieth century often focuses 
on the extensive procedural changes aimed at enabling legislation to have a more 
orderly and predictable passage through both Houses. This ‘parliamentary railway 
timetable’ is closely associated with A. J. Balfour, Leader of the House of Commons 
from 1895 to July 1902, and then Prime Minister. In February 1902105 Balfour 
proposed a series of new procedural rules which have been seen, correctly, as 
favouring the Executive and particularly helping to ease the passage of government 
Bills.106 However, at the same time, some Members were giving thought to ways of 
improving detailed financial scrutiny of the Executive. In May 1902, Winston 
Churchill urged Balfour, considering ‘the growth of public burdens’ to move for the 
appointment of ‘a Select Committee ... to consider and report whether National 
Expenditure cannot be diminished without injury to the public service, and whether 
the moneys voted cannot be apportioned to better advantage than at present’.107 
Balfour was non-committal but not dismissive about Churchill’s proposal, and in May 
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1902 the House resolved to appoint a select committee to ‘inquire whether any plan 
can be advantageously adopted for enabling the House, by Select Committee or 
otherwise, more effectively to make an examination, not involving criticisms of 
policy, into the details of national expenditure’.108 The Committee met and reported 
serious shortcomings in the consideration of the Estimates by the House.109 In 
comments that go to the heart of the House’s long standing preferences, and recall 
Gladstone’s recognition of the ‘repulsive’ character of financial scrutiny, the report 
complained that ‘the examination of Estimates by the House of Commons leaves much 
to be desired from the point of view of financial scrutiny ... the Estimates are used in 
practice ... mainly to provide a series of convenient and useful opportunities for the 
debating of Policy and Administration’.110 
 
To correct the apparent weakness of financial scrutiny, the 1903 Committee on 
National Expenditure recommended the appointment of a new committee to examine 
estimates, designed to provide a proper focus for examination of expenditure rather 
than political point- scoring, with the intention of making it, like other select 
committees, ‘usually devoid of party feeling’.111 The recommendation, however, came 
to nothing and no committee was established. 
  
However, the pressure for better parliamentary control over expenditure continued. In 
the 1911-12 Session backbenchers of all parties circulated a memorandum which 
claimed that the House no longer had the control over expenditure that ‘it was wont to 
have’ and pressing for action. The memorandum attracted the names of 244 Members 
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of all parties and was sent to the Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Lloyd George, acknowledged that it was ‘one of the most influentially 
signed memorials ever presented to a head of government’ and the result was the 
setting-up on April 12 1912 of a Committee on the Estimates.112 This body of 15 
backbench Members was given a broad order of reference which required it to examine 
and report on such Estimates as it saw fit.113  It was however, excluded from 
‘consideration of questions of policy’ - a key provision that was to preserve for many 
years the existing boundaries between the spheres of parliamentary committees and 
Ministers. The Estimates Committee had a difficult start, existing for just three 
sessions until in 1914 it was suspended and replaced by a National Expenditure 
Committee, more suited to the control of wartime spending, much of which was not 
presented in the form of Estimates.114 The Estimates Committee was then revived in 
1921, when the National Expenditure Committee was not reappointed.  
 
But revival did not bring renewal. Nevil Johnson, in his 1966 study of the Estimates 
Committee, observes that little changed between 1921 and 1960 in the Committee’s 
methods of working. He says that while ‘it was still thought’ that the Committee 
should ‘concentrate on the financial details of the estimates, and if possible make 
reports which might be relevant to the discussion of particular estimates in the 
Committee of Supply’, this never happened. Johnson concludes that ‘financial scrutiny 
in the narrow sense was of little interest to the House’. Another of the weaknesses of 
the Estimates Committee in the interwar years in particular was that it worked entirely 
as a full committee of 28 members. According to Johnson, ‘this made it an unwieldy 
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body, ill-suited to detailed and intensive questioning, and liable to suffer from poor 
attendance’.115  
 
But the early twentieth century also saw the first suggestions by politicians that the 
House should consider a more concerted and systematic foray beyond estimates and 
into the highly contested ground of policy and administration. Proposals were put 
forward for the development of a system of committees which would subject the 
overall policy and administration of government departments to continuous and 
systematic scrutiny - something very different from the work of the ad hoc committees 
that in the late nineteenth century examined specific individual matters of policy. In 
1914 for instance the Independent Labour Party Conference adopted a plan by F. W. 
Jowett (Member for Bradford) which argued for government departments to be partly 
run by all-party committees of MPs.116 The idealists of the 1914 I.L.P. Conference 
were over-ambitious and nothing came of the Jowett plan, but they were not alone in 
seeing the potential of select committees, properly organised, for improving the 
performance of Parliament. 
 
Select Committees and Cabinet during the First World War 
The deterrent effect of the Marconi debacle on parliamentary inquiry into scandal and 
failure was clear and long-lasting. But the situation with policy and administration was 
slightly different. The start of the First World War in 1914 might have been expected 
to dampen enthusiasm for policy and administration select committees, as risking 
delay in decision-making and hampering the implementation of executive action. 
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There has been little academic interest in the activities of select committees during the 
War. Yet in fact select committees of both Houses were established to address a 
number of highly significant issues during the conflict. Moreover, Cabinet papers 
examined for this thesis reveal that, from 1917 onwards, Ministers were very sensitive 
to the need to respond carefully to recommendations by select committees, especially 
the Select Committee on National Expenditure. The strength of this interest at high 
political level is suggested by tallying the number of references to the words ‘select 
committee’ in the Cabinet papers of the wartime and immediate post-war period. 
Whereas there were no references to those words in 1915 (when The National 
Archives series of Cabinet Papers starts) and 1916, there were 63 between 1917 and 
1919. It is true that a good number of the references were to committees of Empire 
legislatures mentioned in briefing papers, but there were also many references to 
committees at Westminster.  
 
The role of the Select Committee on National Expenditure was also prominent in 
sounding the alarm over the proliferation of what Peter Hennessy refers to as 
‘mushroom ministries’ - established during the War and given control over their own 
spending and staffing in a way which threatened to undermine both Treasury and 
parliamentary control.117 In a way that perhaps seems surprising given the pressures 
of time, Parliament’s machinery for controlling expenditure and administration was 
both vigorous and well-respected at high political levels during the War.   
 
The Cabinet furthermore sometimes saw select committees as a potentially useful way 
of clarifying and suggesting solutions to matters that would arise on the home front 
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after the War, especially the problems of reconstruction. Many of the references to 
committees in Cabinet in 1917, 1918 and 1919 concerned the details of transition from 
war to peace. For example a Commons select committee had sought to clarify the 
definition of ‘the end of the war’ so that the scope and application of wartime 
emergency legislation could be determined.118 In August 1918 the Committee 
recommended that a Bill should be drawn up to set out the principles, and Christopher 
Addison, the Minister for Reconstruction, recommended acceptance of that to Cabinet 
on 23 October 1918.119  
 
In the immediate post-war period Cabinet interest in select committees was 
maintained. Profiteering at a time of shortage was an important issue, in which there 
was strong and lively public interest. On 14 July 1919 the War Cabinet, which was 
still meeting eight months after the Armistice, discussed at length a Memorandum 
from Sir A. C. Geddes, President of the Board of Trade, on ‘The Prevention of 
Profiteering’.120 Among other things, this Memorandum proposed that ‘small tribunals 
should be set up in all urban and rural districts to receive complaints about excessive 
charges made by retailers’.121 During the discussion, Lord Curzon, Lord President of 
the Council, suggested that the proposals should be ‘referred to a Select Committee of 
the House of Commons’. The Minutes record that Curzon continued ‘Everyone felt 
that something should be done, but the Government ought to have the support of public 
opinion for their proposals before taking action. He thought that such a Committee 
should report in ten days or a fortnight’.122 Hardly surprisingly, A. C. Geddes 
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expressed his doubts as to whether a Committee could report in so short a time, but 
others at the meeting concurred with Curzon, and the Minutes report that the War 
Cabinet agreed that a select committee should be established ‘to investigate whether 
excessive profits were being made out of dealings in staple articles, and to make 
recommendations’.123 The Select Committee on High Prices and Profits was appointed 
within nine days, met on 30 July and (in the spirit of Curzon’s advocacy of openness) 
decided that all its sittings should be held in public, and that all witnesses should give 
evidence on oath (the last a highly unusual stipulation, and a sign of the acute public 
interest in the issue of profiteering).124 The Committee took evidence at six sittings, 
but shortly after the inquiry started the Profiteering Act was passed and a (non-
parliamentary) committee was established to investigate high prices and profits.125 The 
Select Committee’s report noted the passing of the Act and in slightly exasperated 
tones suggested that therefore ‘they could serve no useful purpose by proceeding with 
detailed investigations’. Nevertheless, the report indicated that the Committee would 
be kept in being to ‘watch the working of the Act’.126  
 
This episode demonstrates the opportunities for select committees to contribute to 
policy formulation, but also their limitations in influencing fast-moving policy 
developments. Parliamentary processes took time and a Prime Minister, especially a 
decisive one like Lloyd George, could move much faster. Nevertheless there was 
confidence among some senior Ministers in the select committee process, both in 
terms of the sheer capacity of committees of the House to produce reports and of its 
ability to act as a focus of public opinion on policy matters. Parliament is seen here to 
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be capable, through its select committee procedure, of playing some part in the process 
of policy development. 
 
The role of Parliament was rather more prominent in another issue which came before 
Cabinet in 1919 - the question of reforms to the governance of India. In February 1919 
the War Cabinet discussed a draft Bill to amend the Government of India Act to 
implement the constitutional reform proposals contained in the Montagu-Chelmsford 
report. An appendix noted that the government were pledged to refer the Bill after 
Second Reading to a Select Committee of both Houses.127 We shall see that this was 
an early example of the use of select committees, and especially of joint select 
committees of Lords and Commons, to consider questions concerning the Empire.  
 
However, when wartime conditions disappeared, so, it appears, did much of the 
enthusiasm for select committee scrutiny. This was despite heavyweight support for 
the notion from the Committee chaired by Lord Haldane, the former Lord Chancellor, 
and containing an array of the great and good, ranging from the leading Labour thinker 
Beatrice Webb to the distinguished civil servant Sir Robert Morant. The Haldane 
Report of 1918 on Machinery of Government helped to shape the debate about the 
future Whitehall landscape and, to a lesser extent, the relations between government 
and Parliament. The report called on government to define ‘the field of activity in the 
case of each Department according to the particular service which it renders to the 
community as a whole’.128  Haldane also made a case for a matching system of 
parliamentary scrutiny to ensure that the work of these Departments was properly 
reviewed. Haldane was clear what should happen: ‘It would, we think, be generally 
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felt that any improvement in the organisation of the Departments of State that was so 
marked as substantially to increase their efficiency should have as its correlative an 
increase in the power of the Legislature as the check upon the acts and proposals of 
the Executive.’ The report was sympathetic to the idea that the efficiency of the public 
service could be improved if ‘steps were taken to secure the continuous and well-
informed interest of a Parliamentary body in the execution by each department of the 
policy which Parliament has laid down’.129 Then the Report goes on to support ‘the 
appointment of a series of Standing Committees, each charged with the consideration 
of the activities of the Departments which cover the main divisions of the business of 
Government’. Haldane’s proposals for committees were not implemented, but as we 
shall see, they caught the imagination of reformers over the next few decades. 
Departmentally-related select committees became a sort of Holy Grail, one key aim of 
those who sought to improve the accountability of government to the governed.   
 
Within a few years, the debate about policy and administration scrutiny by committee 
had moved on. In 1925, Harold Laski, one of the most prominent Labour-supporting 
intellectuals, published A Grammar of Politics. Laski took Haldane’s sketch of the 
idea of departmental committees and filled in some of the detail, in a description of 
the relationship between the executive and committees of Parliament that contained 
many of the elements that were to appear in the departmental committees of later 
years:  
 
There might be set up a series of committees, each of which would deal with 
a single department ... They would work not as the makers of policy, which 
is primarily ... a ministerial function, but in part as a consultative organ and 
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in part as a means of bringing to the legislature a definitely competent opinion 
upon the working of the administrative process.130 
 
Laski’s words reflected a current debate within the 1920s Labour Party, a debate which 
also foreshadowed later arguments. The ‘proposal to use specialized parliamentary 
Committees ... was much in the air in the 1920s and 1930s’ according to one survey, 
with ‘considerable argument, especially within the Labour Party’.131 A. H. Hanson has 
described how Laski and his Labour colleague F. W. Jowett disagreed during the 
1920s about the form a select committee system might take, with Jowett advocating 
his old scheme involving direct parliamentary involvement in the running of 
government departments but Laski opposing it.132 Laski argued that establishing cross-
party committees with executive powers (rather than with a limited consultative role 
as he envisaged) would, in current conditions of capitalist domination, stymie a Labour 
government’s progress towards socialism through its legislative programme. The 
arguments divided Labour members and undermined the Party’s interest in reform. In 
later years committees’ ‘dangerous tendency to compromise’133 came to be seen as by 
some leading Labour figures - including Herbert Morrison and later Michael Foot - as 
a telling argument against select committee scrutiny.  
 
The quiet committee rooms of the 1920s and 1930s 
Parliamentary practice generally failed to match Haldane’s vision in the years after the 
First World War. The well-equipped Victorian committee rooms were indeed often 
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silent during the 1920s and 1930s. Numbers involved with select committees, though 
not negligible, were consistently modest between the wars: for example, 174 Members 
sat on select committees in the 1924-25 session,134 142 Members in 1927,135 171 in 
1929-30136, and 174 in 1930-31, with further falls to 136 in 1933-34 and 117 in 1934-
35.137 Thus fewer than 30 percent of Members in the House were involved with select 
committees for large parts of the 1920s and 1930s.138 This indicates a significant 
decrease in MPs’ interest, or at least involvement, in select committees compared with 
50 years before. Many of the Commons select committees of the 1920s and 1930s 
were indeed on private Bills for municipal and other infrastructure projects. 
Committees on public business, apart from the Estimates Committee, were rare. 
Bizarrely, one exception was a select committee on sky-writing which attracted no 
fewer than 25 mentions in the Chambers of Parliament in 1932 and 1933.139 Much 
more serious was a Select Committee on Capital Punishment, which recommended 
abolition for a trial period of five years. The political controversy caused by this 
recommendation, in which Conservative Committee members opposed the 
Chairman’s advocacy of abolition, may have contributed to the general distrust of the 
select committee process. The unsympathetic Labour Government denied calls for a 
Chamber debate on the Committee’s report.140 
 
The 1919 committee on India set a precedent for later developments in the use of select 
committees on imperial matters during the 1920s and 1930s, with several of the more 
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prominent committees considering colonial and Indian issues jointly with the Lords. 
These included a Standing Joint Committee on Indian Affairs, which lasted from 1921 
to 1929, and later ad hoc joint select committees on Indian constitutional reform,141 
and on East Africa, in the early 1930s.142 In the case of the latter joint committee, there 
were a number of complicating factors, among them the existence of strong and 
vociferous communities of European settlers in East Africa, the need for the 
government in London to exercise ‘trusteeship’ in relation to the peoples of the British 
territories in the region, and even the concerns of the government of India over the 
treatment of Indians who lived there. A historian of the end of Empire has described 
the Joint Select Committee’s report as playing a part, along with several commissions 
and government policy statements, in a ‘tussle for control’ between these conflicting 
interests.143 The proceedings of these committees attracted substantial attention in the 
chambers of both Houses. It seemed that the government and the House of Commons 
were prepared to try the ‘policy’ select committee, or to accept government prompting 
to establish such a committee, but often only when the issue concerned the distant 
problems of Empire, and preferably in conjunction with the Lords.  
 
There was little sign in the 1920s that MPs were confident in challenging government 
by means of committee scrutiny on their own account. The argument for a structured 
and comprehensive system of departmental committees did not quite disappear, 
however. One vigorous advocate of such an approach was David Lloyd George, now 
Father of the House, who in giving evidence to the Procedure Committee in 1931 
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criticised the poor attendance of Members at debates on the floor of the House on the 
key issue of the day -the economy.144 He said that Members failed to turn out for 
Chamber debates, ‘because they felt that these discussions would lead nowhere. You 
could not carry things any further by these mere broad discussions. The House of 
Commons has no machinery ... for pursuing the subject in the practical details and for 
investigating these questions closely’. Lloyd George, ironically perhaps in the light of 
the damage done to the reputation of investigatory select committees by the Marconi 
affair, in which he played the leading role, argued for a comprehensive system of 
committees to help  give the House ‘effective control over the Executive’.145  
 
But the Procedure Committee report of November 1932 disappointed some of the 
hopes of the reformers,146 giving the idea of a system of departmental committees very 
short shrift. This view was taken partly because the Committee was unconvinced that 
the committees would be ‘sufficiently representative of the House as a whole’ or ‘be 
a sufficient check upon Ministers and Departments to counter-balance the grave 
disadvantage which would, in their judgment, arise from the delays inherent in the 
system’.147 On the other hand, the Procedure Committee was much more sympathetic 
to the Estimates Committee, calling for it to be given the power to take into 
consideration matters of policy and to have assistance from ‘adequate technical 
advisers’, either drawn from the staff of  the Comptroller and Auditor General or 
appointed as an ‘independent technical staff’ specifically for the Committee.148 In the 
event the government rejected the Procedure Committee’s main proposals. Neville 
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Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave the brief and largely negative 
response during oral questions on 2 May 1933.149 Chamberlain rejected the Procedure 
Committee’s idea of assistance for the Committee from the Department of the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General or from a ‘newly formed body of technical officers’. 
He continued: ‘the better way would be to develop the existing arrangements by 
placing at the disposal of the Chairman several additional officers of the Treasury who 
will be selected to act as assistants to the Treasury official already attached to the 
Committee’.150 This mention of a Treasury official already in post, with the possibility 
of more to come, suggests that the Treasury were quite comfortable with the Estimates 
Committee and keen to see it work effectively. It is also an example of the connections 
that existed between the staff cadres of Whitehall and Westminster.  
 
One other factor in the lack of interest in select committees may have been that there 
were other ways for backbenchers to make known their feelings on policy issues. Party 
subject committees, concerned with issues as varied as foreign affairs and agriculture, 
were significant in policy discussion in the period after the First World War and 
continued to be so after the Second World War. Norton describes the growth of many 
such committees in the 1920s and 1930s, especially in the Conservative Party, 
suggesting that their establishment was prompted at least partly by failures of 
communication between the Tory leadership and the backbenches.151 
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Select Committees during and after the Second World War 
The Second World War gave new impetus to scrutiny of spending, with the 
replacement once again, as in 1914-18, of the Estimates Committee by a National 
Expenditure Committee. Despite the constraints of wartime, the National Expenditure 
Committee did acquire something of a reputation for effectiveness, and even the War 
Cabinet accepted its value. In 1941 for instance Winston Churchill, as Prime Minister, 
paid tribute to the Committee during a dispute with the government over an inquiry 
into aircraft production.  He told the House on 16 October that year that ‘both the late 
and the present Ministers of Aircraft Production would be willing to attend a meeting 
of the Select Committee and explain the position fully to them’.152  
 
Whitehall also took the wartime National Expenditure Committee seriously, 
appointing for the first time a significant number of departmental liaison officers ‘to 
facilitate committee investigations’. In 1949 there were still as many as 36 committee 
liaison officers in government departments, ‘ranging from a Third Secretary to the 
Treasury to Assistant Principals’.153 Ten especially sensitive reports of the National 
Expenditure Committee were not published, but rather sent to the Prime Minister for 
consideration by the War Cabinet.154 After the war the National Expenditure 
Committee was not reappointed, and the election in 1945 of a Labour government with 
a radical manifesto and a large majority appears to have suppressed interest in select 
committees. 
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During a wide-ranging inquiry in 1945 and 1946, the Procedure Committee assessed 
the effectiveness of the House’s scrutiny of spending.155 The history of the Third 
Report of that Committee of 1945-6 shows clearly the divide in the immediate post-
war years between those who saw Parliament as primarily an instrument of political, 
social and economic change, and those who placed greater emphasis on Parliament’s 
role as a place of deliberation and scrutiny. The days when Jowett could make some 
headway in the Labour Party with proposals for a committee-based Parliament were 
long gone. The main protagonist on what might be called the ‘executive action’ side 
of this debate was Herbert Morrison, an advocate of the form of public ownership 
which became associated with his name and which was a key element in Labour’s 
planned legislative programme. On the other side was Sir Gilbert Campion, Clerk of 
the House of Commons from 1937 to 1948, who made the case for closer scrutiny of 
both spending and policy, and for Parliament as a deliberative institution. Campion’s 
thinking in the second half of 1945 was contained in an informal paper he sent 
confidentially to the Lord President as he (Campion) prepared to give evidence to the 
Procedure Committee.156 Campion’s paper called for ‘a preliminary decision as to the 
objective to be aimed at in such a reform[of procedure]’ and ‘a realistic inquiry into 
the functions of the House and the adequacy of the machinery and procedure devised 
for carrying out each function’. Campion was concerned that ‘Unless this preliminary 
work is done, there is a risk of over-concentration on a single function of the House 
(with inadequate provision for other functions)’. Campion left the reader in little doubt 
that the ‘single function’ he meant was legislation, and he expressed fear that ‘the 
hurried production of a short-range scheme for the period of reconstruction’ might 
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‘positively obstruct a general overhaul of procedure for normal times, which is long 
overdue’.   
 
Campion assessed the effectiveness of the current methods of parliamentary control 
and scrutiny of finance and administration, concluding that the ‘principal machinery 
for the control of expenditure - that which occupies  the time  of the House itself, the 
Committee of Supply and the Money Committees of the whole House - has almost 
ceased to function’. The Estimates Committee, according to Campion, ‘has been more 
or less ineffective’.157 The Committee of Supply (involving the whole House) ‘has 
long been regarded as an unsuitable piece of machinery’.158 The consideration of the 
Estimates came too late to make a difference to the outcome and supply had become 
a ‘good opportunity for criticizing administrative action’ rather than controlling 
expenditure.   
 
Within two months, Campion had produced a Memorandum for the Procedure 
Committee.159 Sent to the Committee on 9 January 1946, it made clear that Campion 
saw one of the main functions of Parliament as ‘the formulation and control of policy’. 
This was strong stuff from a Clerk. On the key question of control of expenditure, 
Campion opposed the Committee of Supply procedure. Campion said that ‘nobody 
seriously holds that the function of financial examination can be effectively discharged 
by a so large and indeterminate a body as that composed of the Members who happen 
to be present in the Chamber on a particular occasion’.160  Campion then argued for 
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financial control to be ‘delegated to a relatively small and permanent body - a select 
committee’. But he criticised the present financial committees, saying that the work 
of the Public Accounts Committee and that of the Estimates Committee was not co-
ordinated. He also expressed concern at a ‘lack of specialisation’ especially with the 
Estimates Committee, which was ‘Faced with a vast collection of intricate and detailed 
figures ... without any systematic sub-division of the field’. He continued, ‘in default 
of boundless leisure and knowledge its members are frequently at a loss for useful 
lines of inquiry’.161   
 
But there was one committee that Campion saw as a model of its kind - the former 
National Expenditure Committee. ‘The means by which the National Expenditure  
Committee during the last war sought  to cover the widest possible extent of the field 
were by selecting broad lines of inquiry, using administrative efficiency as the test of 
economic expenditure, and dividing the field between a number of specialising sub-
committees’.162 Campion’s suggested solution to the shortcomings of financial 
scrutiny was ‘the Public Expenditure Committee,’ which would combine the functions 
of the PAC and Estimates and would be similar in form to the lamented National 
Expenditure Committee. The plan was built on specialisation, with a framework of 
perhaps six investigating sub-committees and one co-ordinating committee.163  
 
These arguments for specialisation and small committees in expenditure control 
chimed with the views of those who, since Jowett and Haldane, had argued for greater 
use of committees to scrutinise policy and administration.  But the Clerk’s bold 
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proposals fell on deaf ears. Cabinet discussed in March 1946 a Memorandum from the 
Lord President, in which Morrison argued for rejection of all Campion’s 
recommendations except one, on supply procedure, ‘which is accepted with important 
modifications’.164 On the question of a Public Expenditure Committee, Morrison 
observed that Campion’s intention was the reconstitution of the wartime National 
Expenditure Committee. Morrison complained that that Committee had ‘constantly 
strayed outside its proper scope and frequently caused embarrassment to Ministers by 
ranging over wide questions of policy which should properly be dealt with on the floor 
of the House, where the responsible Minister can reply’. Morrison darkly added that 
‘Some Ministers thought at the time that an improper degree of power was in practice 
acquired by the clerks of the Committee and its sub-committees.’ After a brief and 
apparently unanimous discussion, Cabinet agreed with Morrison’s Memorandum and 
rejected Campion’s approach.165 When he gave evidence to the Procedure Committee, 
Morrison dismissed any suggestion of departmentally-related committees: ‘if 
Parliament is going to set up another duplicating set of administrative experts to take 
an interest in current administration, there is going to be a clash between Parliament 
and Government, which I think would be bad’.166 
  
The verdict of the Procedure Committee on the whole system of financial control was 
as scathing as Campion’s. The Committee said in its Report that the procedure of 
passing estimates in the Committee of Supply ‘has almost ceased to serve the purpose 
of financial scrutiny’.167 The Procedure Committee agreed with Campion’s 
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conclusions on the PAC and Estimates Committee and recommended the appointment 
of a Public Expenditure Committee which would combine the functions of the two 
committees.168  
  
The Procedure Committee included some Labour members who were to become 
distinguished in later political life, including Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the Party in 
the 1950s and 1960s, Sydney Silverman, who piloted through the House the 1965 Bill 
which saw the abolition of the death penalty, and Richard Crossman, who as Leader 
of the Commons was to be closely associated with the select committee reforms of the 
1960s. Yet none of them were very active when it came to the drafting of the 1946 
Procedure Committee Report. The record of the deliberation and voting on a few 
proposed amendments took up only three pages of the Minutes of Proceedings, 
indicating that there had not been much dissent, and select committees did not feature. 
The government wasted little time in rejecting even the limited reform of financial 
scrutiny suggested by Campion and the Procedure Committee. The House paid little 
attention to the Report when it was published, with only fleeting mentions in the 
Chamber, and press reporting was routine.169  
 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from the events of the late 1940s is that the 
initiative resided as firmly as ever with Ministers, and that parliamentarians had little 
scope for independent scrutiny via committees. Faced with an active and executive-
minded government and a heavy legislative burden, Members of the House showed 
relatively little interest in committee work in the late 1940s. According to Rush’s 
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figures, investigatory committee activity in the House of Commons fell to a new low 
in 1947-48, with only 7.1 percent of government backbenchers and 6.5 percent of 
opposition backbenchers taking part.170 These figures (taken together with such facts 
as the virtual absence of private members’ Bills) illustrate clearly the executive 
dominance of the Attlee years and the effect on the opportunities for select 
committees. The atmosphere of the time was summed up by an MP, Christopher 
Hollis, who in 1949 described the modern Member as the ‘obedient servant of the 
Party machine’.171 
  
But the Labour Government of 1945 was not completely monolithic in its attitudes to 
Parliament. When it suited them, Ministers could become defenders of the House’s 
role in scrutiny. Just as Morrison and his colleagues were giving short shrift to 
Campion’s scrutiny ideas during the early months of 1946, there was fierce debate in 
the Cabinet over whether or not to publish a highly critical and secret National 
Expenditure Committee Report on tank production from 1944, one of those that had 
originally been sent exclusively to the Prime Minister.172 After wartime’s relative 
truce, party political considerations were now to the fore. The tank report was seen as 
an opportunity to score party points over Winston Churchill, Prime Minister in 1944 
and still in 1946 Leader of the Conservative Party. The almost shorthand manuscript 
Notebook of the Cabinet Secretary Sir Edward Bridges, recording verbatim the 
Cabinet meeting of 14 February 1946, reveals that Herbert Morrison, softening for the 
moment his normally robust views on the limitations of Parliament’s scrutiny role, 
was on this occasion eloquent in defence of Parliament’s ‘right’ to information, 
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commenting that ‘Ministers or offls. shdn’t be permanently protected fr. discs of their 
mistakes’.173 But the Prime Minister stated his firm and highly conservative opposition 
to publication, as Bridges noted in his note of Attlee’s typically brisk remarks: ‘Diff. 
view. This was put up as secret & replies so given ... Publn of these poor rpts wd. 
cause scandal: then you’d have to have enquiry. These p.mortems do little good’.174 
In the end Morrison persisted with his new-found enthusiasm for transparency; in May 
1946 Cabinet agreed to the publication of the National Expenditure Committee’s 
Report on tanks, subject to consultation with the Minister of Supply, John Wilmot.175  
 
The Estimates Committee and the PAC continued to function during the late 1940s, 
with the Estimates Committee managing to tackle some tricky issues, despite the 
government’s wariness. Subjects tended to be important but routine, such as the Use 
of Motor Fuel by Government Departments, but the 1940s Estimates Committee also 
looked at the cost of Displaced Persons (refugees) in Germany, a huge political issue 
at the time.176 Visits were arranged for sub-committees to Germany, Austria and West 
Africa - an early example of ambitious committee travel. 
 
Select committees also occasionally challenged Ministers directly. One Estimates sub-
committee chairman, Labour’s Fred Willey, tells in his splendidly-entitled book The 
Honourable Member of his experience of Morrisonian disapproval when the sub-
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committee decided to include the three nationalised Airways Corporations within the 
scope of an inquiry:  ‘I was subject to the full “Morrison” treatment and the Clerk of 
the House [intriguingly, it was of course  Campion himself] was called in. We were 
satisfied, however, that we had correctly interpreted our jurisdiction and, in the course 
of our proceedings, summoned the Chairmen of the three Airways Corporations to 
give evidence before us’.177  The three chairmen duly turned up and gave evidence, 
making it clear, according to Willey, ‘that they were most anxious to do so’. The 
incident, in which a Labour-led sub-committee successfully defied Morrison, in many 
ways the godfather of post-war nationalisation and a towering figure in his party, 
certainly proved that backbench committees could be a force, even in these dog days 
for committee scrutiny.178   
 
As a footnote, it is worth recalling that standing committees to examine legislation 
were used much more after the Second World War than they had been before it.179 
This was a significant change, in that members began, during much of the 
consideration of legislation, to be drawn away from the Chamber, and towards the 
committee rooms above. This did not mean any increase in consensus or cross-party 
voting; indeed standing committees were and continue to be arenas of party 
contention, closely supervised by the whips. However, members were getting used to 
working in the different, and rather more intimate, atmosphere of a committee room.  
The move to more active standing committees represented a slight change in culture, 
not yet encouraging greater interest in select committees, but nevertheless 
accustoming more Members to working in committees.  
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‘Selecting a firm and sensible Chairman’: Government and committees in the 
1950s  
 The 1950s saw little innovation in committee scrutiny of departmental policy and 
administration. Ministers continued to be largely free of detailed parliamentary 
accountability via select committees, and government attitudes to committee inquiry 
were often dismissive. In 1954, for instance, Cabinet deplored the suggestion by a sub-
committee of the Estimates Committee that it should visit British embassies abroad to 
see how money was being spent,  citing that this would ‘imply that the House of 
Commons was seeking to exercise a jurisdiction in a foreign country’.180 Three years 
previously Sir Frederic Metcalfe, Clerk of the House, had cautioned an Estimates 
Committee Sub-Committee against travelling abroad as part of a similar inquiry, 
although the Foreign Office had already made arrangements for the visit. In the spring 
of 1954 Metcalfe was also opposed to the notion that a committee or sub-committee 
could sit as such abroad - even in a British embassy or consulate.181 With clerkly 
subtlety Metcalfe told the Sub-Committee in evidence that if the ‘whole lot’ of the 
Estimates Committee ventured abroad to collect information, that would be 
acceptable; what was unacceptable was for a committee or sub-committee to claim to 
act as a parliamentary body outside the UK.182 The Sub-Committee decided against 
going abroad in these circumstances and the Estimates Committee report indicated 
clear frustration that it had encountered such ‘considerable difficulties’.183 What is 
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surprising is the role of the House’s own most senior permanent official in creating 
those difficulties. 
 
The figures for participation in select committees during the 1950s were modest. For 
example in 1956-57, a fairly typical year, 114 Members took part in a select 
committee, including the 13 who were on the Kitchen Committee. Those 114 MPs 
represented just 18.1 percent of the total of 630 Members. The Estimates Committee 
was the largest committee, and perhaps too big, with 38 members. The subjects chosen 
by the Estimates Committee in the 1950s were often intrinsically interesting, including 
The Supply of Military Aircraft, the Running Costs of Hospitals and War Histories. 
But the treatment by the Estimates Committee veered towards the ‘dry’ if not 
necessarily the ‘repulsive’. Even on War Histories, only a small number of memoranda 
were received and the inquiry concentrated on strictly financial issues such as printing 
costs and office accommodation.184  
 
There was however one development on the select committee front during the 1950s 
which was important for the future - the establishment in 1956 of the Select Committee 
on Nationalised Industries. The industries nationalised by Labour after the War - 
including railways, the coal industry and iron and steel - were at the very heart of 
debate between the parties, and on the surface did not seem good territory for the 
consensus-seeking work of select committees. But when the Conservative MP Hugh 
Molson wrote an article for The Times in 1949 calling for a committee to allow 
Parliament to ‘control the strategy of nationalised industries and apply a periodical 
efficiency check’ it struck a chord with many on Molson’s own benches, concerned to 
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ensure that the new socialised businesses were properly monitored.  There appears 
also to have been support on the left for committee accountability of nationalised 
industries. Professor Harold Laski made the case in the early 1950s for a series of 
standing committees, one for each of the industries concerned.185 Yet progress towards 
the establishment of the committee was very slow. Several times in the early 1950s 
the House considered how it could monitor the activities of the recently nationalised 
industries without hampering their management and reducing efficiency, but without 
succeeding in establishing a committee.186  
 
The Nationalised Industries Committee was finally set up in November 1956, ‘to 
examine the Reports and Accounts of the Nationalised Industries’.187 This 
straightforward remit belied government soul-searching over whether such a 
committee should ever be allowed to see the light of day. A Cabinet Memorandum of 
May 1956 by the Lord Privy Seal, R. A. Butler, encapsulated the government’s attitude 
to committee scrutiny.188 Butler accepted that a select committee was probably the 
best way forward, but he recommended minimising the ‘dangers inherent’ in that by 
‘Selecting a firm and sensible Chairman, who can be relied upon to keep the 
Committee under control’ and  
Providing the Committee with suitable assistance and guidance, preferably in 
the form of an official (additional to the ordinary Clerk of the House as 
Secretary) whose functions would be to act as the link between the 
Committee and the Departments concerned, to brief the Chairman and 
members of the Committee and generally to ‘steer’ the Committee’s 
proceedings ... I hope that it may be possible for the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to make a Treasury officer available for this purpose. 
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Even when the objects of scrutiny were the creation of the opposing party, as in this 
case of the nationalised industries, Ministers felt moved to minimise the scope for 
Parliament to question and probe, and to arrange for committees to be ‘steered’ by 
civil servants. Like Herbert Morrison, Butler saw Parliament’s committees as in some 
ways a support for the Executive. Nevertheless, the Nationalised Industries 
Committee, despite its controversial and constricted birth, was indeed approved by 
Cabinet and set up, coming to be regarded by many in later years as something of a 
success.189 
 
The prevailing very conservative attitude to select committee scrutiny was, however, 
once again demonstrated clearly in the report of the Procedure Committee of 1958-59, 
which was chaired by James Stuart, the Conservative Member for Moray and Nairn 
(who had first been elected in 1923). Others on the Committee were less long in the 
parliamentary tooth, with most coming from the post-1945 intakes. However the 
Committee contained few members who had made or would make a significant mark 
on the House as prominent Ministers or backbenchers, with the exceptions of the 
former Liberal Party leader Clement Davies and the future Cabinet Minister Anthony 
Wedgwood Benn. The bulk of the members were solid constituency MPs. Peter 
Hennessy has described the Committee as ‘an inside job from start to finish’, the work 
mostly done by a group of civil servants commissioned by the Cabinet’s Home Affairs 
Committee.190 The Committee’s proceedings certainly tend to support that view. This 
is shown vividly by the fate of the proposal for a ‘specialist’ colonial committee, to 
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examine issues arising from the still-large but rapidly-disappearing former Empire 
territories, which was put forward by Sir Edward Fellowes, Clerk of the House.191  
 
The Procedure Committee considered the idea, but decided that a colonial committee 
was not needed. During their consideration of the draft Report, the Committee 
discussed a proposed section which would have called for the establishment of a 
‘Colonial Standing Committee’ which would sit in public and would, according to the 
proponents, ‘provide an effective means of calling attention to the necessity for the 
redress of grievances in the colonies’. The Committee divided on this proposed 
amendment and the amendment was lost by eight votes to six, with Labour voting in 
favour and the Conservatives voting against.192 This was a narrow defeat, but it was 
clear enough, and always likely given that there was a Conservative majority over all 
other parties of three - ten against seven. The Committee’s report said that such a 
‘radical constitutional innovation’ was not required. In a muddled but hard-line 
statement of the mid-twentieth century boundary between the executive and 
Parliament, the Procedure Committee continued:  
the activities of such a committee would ultimately be aimed at controlling 
rather than criticising the policy and actions of the department concerned. In 
so doing, it would be usurping a function which the House itself has never 
attempted to exercise ... The establishment of a colonial committee would not 
only invade this principle, but would also lead to the establishment of other 
similar committees.193  
 
When the Procedure Committee report was debated on 13 July 1959, some Members 
revealed a profound procedural and constitutional conservatism. R. A. Butler, still 
Leader of the House, was indeed so implacably opposed to the idea of a colonial affairs 
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Committee that he forgot that the Procedure Committee had rejected it and entered on 
a fierce dismissal of the idea. Butler said that a colonial select committee would risk 
‘usurping the functions, not only of colonial Governments themselves, who are 
enjoying a steadily increasing approach to the idea of self-government, but also of 
United Kingdom Ministers, who have a responsibility both to and in Parliament 
itself’.194  
 
Butler’s dismissal of the idea was perhaps not surprising in view of the widespread 
controversy over colonial affairs both inside the Conservative Party and outside it. 
This was especially sharp in 1959; the deaths of eleven MauMau nationalist fighters 
at the Hola detention camp in Kenya on 3 March caused widespread outrage and 
considerable criticism in Parliament.195 Enoch Powell, who called Hola ‘a great 
administrative disaster’196, was among several Conservatives who joined Labour 
Members in criticising in the House the way the Camp had been run. This would 
appear to have been an excellent opportunity for select committee inquiry, whether ad 
hoc or as the first business of a colonies committee, but the possibility of such an 
inquiry was never raised in the Chamber.  
 
There was no evidence of a widespread demand for a colonies committee, or other 
committees, even from Opposition backbenchers, some of whom who might have 
been expected to show an interest. Some Labour Members opposed the whole idea of 
select committee expansion, including Morgan Philips Price, who, (no doubt 
unconsciously) echoing Gladstone’s 1855 remarks, said ‘I am against specialist 
                                                          
194  Hansard, HCD, col. 42, 13 July 1959 
195  Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997 (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 2007)  has a full account of the Hola incident and its aftermath 
196  Hansard, HCD, col. 232, 27 July 1959  
71 
 
committees ... as it would tend to undermine the authority of the Executive, and control 
of the Executive is better exercised by this House than by a Standing Committee’. 
There were certainly others in the House who favoured specialist committees in 
general, including Labour’s Sidney Silverman and Ellis Smith. Other Labour 
Members were in favour of specialised  committees but felt colonial matters were too 
important to be left to bodies who sat ‘upstairs’ on the Committee Corridor. Among 
them was George Darling who said a colonies committee ‘is probably the last 
Committee that should be set up. Colonial affairs are so important at present that they 
ought to remain on the Floor of the House if possible’.197  
 
Even at the lowest point of recorded select committee activity, however, between 
about 1945 and the early 1960s, there appears to have been a clear sense among both 
frontbench and backbench Members that select committees, once appointed, had the 
right to decide how to interpret their own remits - or ‘orders of reference’ to use the 
correct parliamentary term.  This applied even during the late 1940s when Labour’s 
legislative programme dominated the life of Parliament and seemed to push 
accountability well down the list of priorities. The Conservative Chairman of the 
Public Accounts Committee, Osbert Peake, told the Procedure Committee in 1946 that 
‘no power on earth can stop a Select Committee of the House of Commons from going 
beyond its terms of reference’.198 These were not just the assertions of leading 
committee men; in 1955 the Attorney-General, Sir Reginald Manningham-Buller, told 
the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries that ‘it is for the Committee to 
determine what is the proper construction to be placed on its own terms of 
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reference’.199 It appears therefore to have been widely understood that select 
committees were not entirely biddable and that the House and the government could 
not fundamentally restrict their activities, once started. This may help to explain why 
immediate post-war governments were so keen to prevent individual committees from 
being set up in the first place.  
 
The other factor which should be noted is that by the end of the 1950s the idea of 
departmental committees had been discussed in political circles for many years; 
Haldane’s had not been the only voice in their favour. In a book published by the 
Hansard Society in 1961, a middle-ranking clerk, David Pring, and the House of 
Commons Deputy Librarian, Dr David Menhennet, considered the main schemes of 
parliamentary reforms which had been set out since 1933.200 In a long and detailed 
discussion of ‘the system of committees’ Pring and Menhennet recorded the support 
given to the idea of departmental committees over thirty years by politicians such as 
the senior Conservative L. S. Amery, the leading Labour figure Sir Stafford Cripps, 
and the Liberal Jo Grimond as well as academics such as the historian G. M. Young 
and the constitutional lawyer Sir Ivor Jennings, and of course clerks such as 
Campion.201 Pring and Menhennet looked in some depth at some important practical 
issues around the possible establishment of departmental select committees, including 
what functions they should have - should they look at expenditure and legislation as 
well as administration? - and their size, powers and composition. This was a step 
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forward for the idea of committees, as it filled out the broad outlines sketched by 
Haldane and Lloyd George. But little of this interest percolated into the Commons 
Chamber. 
 
On the other hand, party committees continued to be important, especially for 
Conservatives. Lynskey concludes that ‘The usefulness of the functional [subject] 
committees to Conservative malcontents can hardly be overstated’ and calculates that 
they were ‘important’ in at least 21 of the 27 disputes between Tory frontbenchers and 
backbenchers between 1945 and 1957. ‘Frequently the committees proved to be the 
central arena [Lynskey’s emphasis] for the conflicts between the dissidents and the 
government’, with over 100 Members sometimes attending to hear a Minister defend 
an unpopular policy.202 Although Labour committees were less important, it is clear 
that in the 1950s as in the 1930s, some of these active party bodies undoubtedly helped 
to satisfy backbench needs for challenge to, and scrutiny of, Ministers.  That may go 
some way to explaining the mid-century malaise suffered by cross-party select 
committees.   
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has made it clear that select committees were a pervasive feature of 
parliamentary life from the beginning. Well before the Victorian era, active 
committees had become almost the norm. However, committees were a complicated 
phenomenon. Firstly, the various categories of committee had different political 
weights and implications, and history treated them differently. Whereas ‘power of the 
purse’ committees were often accepted as an intrinsic part of Parliament’s machinery, 
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and there was certainly room for committee investigations of government 
incompetence, those dealing with policy had a harder time. Secondly, select 
committees were not always regarded as instruments of accountability which could 
change the terms of engagement in favour of Parliament and against Ministers; 
sometimes they were seen as closed forums in which the influence of the Executive 
could be exercised away from the potentially scrutinising gaze of most MPs. This was 
the case over many years; the suspicions aroused in the minds of MPs by the activities 
of some committees packed with Crown-supporting Privy Counsellors in the sixteenth 
century bore a close resemblance to the concerns of those who were to oppose the 
expansion of the select committee system in the twentieth century.  
   
The fact that from the early twentieth century the main Commons investigatory 
committee (apart from the Public Accounts Committee) was the Estimates Committee 
must also have dampened enthusiasm for challenge on policy and administration. The 
narrow remit of Estimates was sometimes ignored as Members got to grips with policy 
issues, but that remit must have acted as a deterrent to wider investigation, and the 
presence of Treasury officials as committee advisers cannot have encouraged 
activism. The experience of the active National Expenditure Committee in two Wars 
was an interesting exception to this picture, (perhaps encouraged by the cross-party 
environment provided by coalition government), but in both the 1920s and the later 
1940s the House failed to see that Committee as a template for the future.      
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The early twentieth century did see the first calls for a rational, comprehensive system 
of policy and administration scrutiny committees, in the proposals of the 1918 Haldane 
Committee. The intellectual environment perhaps began slowly to favour committee 
scrutiny, with academic support growing. But the political climate was harsh. The 
twentieth century decrease in select committee activity can certainly be attributed in 
part to a response to the botched inquiry into the Marconi affair, but there were other 
reasons why all three types of committee retreated or lost credibility during most of 
the period 1920-1960. One reason may have been the growth of party committees. The 
Commons committee rooms were often busy in the 1920s and 1930s, not with select 
committees but with Conservative (and sometimes Labour) MPs pressing Ministers 
for policy answers in party subject committees.  The impact of these party bodies on 
the perceived need for more active select committees may have been significant. There 
may also have been a more fundamental political problem. The Labour Party debated 
the issue of select committee expansion in the 1920s and 1930s and some Labour 
intellectuals, notably Laski, showed continuing interest in committee reform. 
However, as senior figures in the party grew used to the frustrations of governing in 
various difficult contexts in the 1920s and 1930s, with short-lived administrations and 
the National Government of the early 1930s, the attractions of parliamentary 
accountability faded. To use the wounding words of a later politician in a different 
context, they appeared too often to be ‘in office but not in power’.203 From 1945, 
therefore, the Labour Party’s priority was unequivocally the exercise of power, aimed 
at achieving social and economic change through legislation largely untrammelled by 
parliamentary challenge. The dismissive attitudes of 1940s Labour leaders to select 
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committees and other parliamentary processes may thus have been a product of the 
desire to put behind them the impotence of the inter-war years and seize the 
opportunities for change presented by the landslide victory of 1945. Later chapters 
describe the long-term effects of such attitudes on the development of select 
committees. 
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Chapter Two: Select Committees 1960-1970 - Measurable Progress 
 
The long-prevailing view of the work of select committees in the early and mid 
twentieth century was summed up in June 2014 by the Speaker of the House of 
Commons, John Bercow, who said, in a lecture organised by the Study of Parliament 
Group, that in the early decades of the twentieth century, select committees ‘were 
corroded by fierce partisanship and as a consequence came to be eclipsed or 
marginalised. Moreover, various later well-intended reforms around the concept of 
Subject Committees either as institutions in their own right or as sub-committees of 
an Estimates Committee never really caught fire’. 204  
 
This view has merit in relation to much of the period between 1920 and 1960, as noted 
in the previous Chapter. But, this Chapter asks, is it fair to be equally negative about 
the select committees of the 1960s? Certainly the majority of academic and other 
commentators who have written on the select committees of that decade have been 
critical of the reforms associated with the name of Richard Crossman, who was Leader 
of the House of Commons from 1966 to 1968. In the early 1980s for instance S. A. 
Walkland was scathing about the scale of the 1960s committees, which he said, had 
done ‘Little work of lasting value’ and which were ‘powerless’ in the face of 
government obstruction.205 More recently, in a comprehensive review of the British 
Constitution, edited by Vernon Bogdanor and published in 2004, Paul Seaward and 
Paul Silk assessed the gestation of the committee system from the beginning of the 
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twentieth century.206 They saw the committees established in the 1960s as having 
‘disappointed many reformers’207 and as a ‘half-way house’ which was ‘commonly 
felt to be unsatisfactory’.208 Alexandra Kelso has suggested that a ‘significant problem 
faced by the [1960s] committees was that the proposals which led to their creation 
prevented them from considering policy matters, which arguably did much to 
emasculate them’.209  
 
Only a few authors have detected any real rise in committee activity or influence in 
the 1960s. For example, Bruce George, MP for Walsall South, and Barbra Evans, 
noted that since 1960 committee travel and the employment of advisers had become 
easier and evidence-taking in public had become more frequent.210 The thesis also 
takes account of the work of writers such as Peter G. Richards, who gave a rounded 
assessment of the new 1960s committees in 1972.211 He saw them as a significant 
development, describing them as ‘the most important parliamentary innovation of 
recent years’.212 With about sixteen members, he thought they were perhaps too large. 
However Richards noted that the size did permit the formation of sub-committees 
which could work simultaneously (and might be able to specialise). Attendance at the 
meetings of the specialist committees was reasonable, averaging around 66 percent of 
those appointed to the committees between 1966 and 1970. The opportunity was now 
there for committees to take evidence in public, though Richards observes that ‘the 
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press have shown little interest in the proceedings even when Ministers have appeared 
to give evidence’.213 More generally, Richards identified ‘little influence on 
government departments’ from committee reports and observed that only a minority 
of reports had been debated in the Chamber of the House.214 It was this lack of apparent 
influence that, by the early 1970s had, according to Richards, ‘helped to revive 
criticism of the whole concept’ of specialised committees. He saw their inquiries as 
tending to be ‘a little academic’.215 Richards recognised that most Members who have 
served on them ‘seem enthusiastic’; they were not, however, ‘a typical cross-section 
of the House because they tend to be “full-time” Members who devote almost all their 
energy to parliamentary affairs’.216 
 
A more recent survey of the parliamentary reforms of the 1960s, by Donald Shell, also 
gives a balanced assessment of the select committee changes, observing that although 
there were disappointments during the decade, the new committees provided a 
‘precursor’ to the 1979 system.217 Shell makes use of National Archives material to 
trace some of the political and especially ministerial discussions which resulted in the 
‘Crossman’ reforms. He notes also that Richard Crossman had very little interest in 
parliamentary reform before he became Leader of the House in August 1966.218 This 
lends weight to one of the contentions of this Chapter - that the role in select committee 
reform of Harold Wilson, Prime Minister from October 1964 to June 1970, has been 
understated by many writers, while the part played by Crossman has been overplayed. 
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The next two chapters suggest that the evidence to support this somewhat more 
positive view of committee developments between 1960 and 1979 has not been fully 
explored, and that the literature on select committees has become somewhat 
unbalanced as a result.  
 
This Chapter and the next, covering respectively the 1960s and 1970s, will assemble 
and interpret evidence which suggests that the House of Commons committee reforms 
of 1979 were not in themselves epoch-making, but rather one important stage in a 
more gradual but relentless mid-twentieth-century trend towards more effective 
scrutiny and a greater involvement of Members in the work of investigatory 
committees. This Chapter considers in particular developments in the mid-1960s, the 
period of the ‘experiment’ in select committee expansion associated with the name of 
Richard Crossman, Leader of the House at the time. The main research questions asked 
in this Chapter concern the significance of the committee reforms of the 1960s for 
Parliament and the wider public, including the media, and the influence of Ministers 
on those reforms. The core question is whether the 1960s reforms brought permanent 
improvement in the effectiveness and impact of select committees or whether they had 
little lasting impact.    
 
The very beginning of the 1960s saw hints of a change in the fortunes of select 
committees after their 15 post-war years of relative obscurity. On 16  March 1960, R. 
A. Butler, still Leader of the House, gave the same sort of fair wind to enhanced 
financial scrutiny that Gladstone had bestowed a hundred years before, acknowledging 
that ‘we have to apply ourselves to the question of how a more detailed consideration 
of the Estimates can be made by this House  ...  I would ...  examine the possibility of 
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either some enlargement of the Committee on Estimates or of some variants under 
which the Committee on Estimates or ... a Committee on Expenditure, should have an 
opportunity of considering administrative policy earlier in the year’.219 This was clear 
encouragement to the idea of a stronger Estimates Committee, but it is worth noting 
Butler’s suggestion that it should look at something he describes, without really 
defining it, as ‘administrative policy’. This may have been a small positive straw in 
the wind, contrasting with Butler’s dismissal of a committee on the colonies the 
previous year; it is difficult to judge from the exchanges in the House. Neither is there 
any guidance to be gained from the Cabinet papers of the time; the subject of select 
committees does not appear to have come up at any Cabinet meeting in 1960, despite 
its obvious potential importance to Butler’s senior colleagues. But Butler’s remark 
might be seen as a suggestion that party managers would not oppose some form of 
regular scrutiny of the links between policy and administration. However, it would be 
wrong to read too much into this; Butler’s words were very similar to the dismissive 
statement of Neville Chamberlain in 1933. 
 
There were nevertheless some other positive signs. Minor improvements to the 
arrangements for committees were taking place in the early 1960s. In 1960 the 
Estimates Committee was enlarged, provided with a slightly wider remit through a 
new Order of Reference and promised more time for debates of its reports in the 
Chamber.  In 1961, another of the many Commons clerks who haunt these pages, the 
middle-ranking Robert Rhodes James (later to become a Conservative MP) 
commented positively on the performance of two select committees in his popular 
guide to the House of Commons. He described the Estimates Committee as doing 
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‘excellent work’ and having ‘great importance, if only as “nuisance value,” to keep 
officials on their toes. Of the Nationalised Industries Committee, he said it had ‘risen 
very quickly in importance in the past five years’.220 
 
But these were not indications of a real revival of interest in committees. There was 
little pressure from MPs in the 16 March 1960 debate to extend the policy scrutiny 
work of select committees; for most Members who spoke, the focus of the discussion 
was firmly on financial control and the Estimates. Only Jo Grimond, the Leader of the 
Liberal Party, made much of the case for specialist policy and administration 
committees, using the occasion to advocate an ‘experiment’ with a Standing 
Committee on the colonies, presumably along the lines of the proposal rejected by the 
Procedure Committee in 1959.221 The idea that the House could conduct an 
‘experiment’ in subject committee scrutiny was to recur regularly during the 1960s, in 
part a sign that many reform proposals were tentative at best. The total number of  
Members involved on select committees was modest at the beginning of the 1960s - 
180 in Session 1960-61, including those on bodies such as the Standing Orders 
Committee and committees on hybrid Bills, with 206 in Session 1961-62. The number 
of meetings of select committees was not negligible - 294 in 1960-61 and 272 in 1961-
62 - but neither was it impressive.222 Select committee work was still very much a 
minority activity. To judge by the figures, little had changed in terms of MPs’ 
involvement in select committees since the 1920s and 1930s; the total of 180 in 1960-
61 (just over 28 percent of the total membership of the House at the time) is very 
similar to the 174 Members who sat on select committees in, for instance, the (slightly 
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smaller) House in 1924-25 and 1930-31. Interest among Members of both Houses who 
were not themselves involved in committee work remained limited, with the number 
of Chamber references to the words ‘select committee’ for the year 1960 just 522 - 
similar to the figures for the lean years of the 1950s.  
 
The 1960s – discontent with Parliament as an institution 
But the wider landscape was changing. Discontent with the performance and status of 
the country became a prominent feature of public comment in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. Kenneth Morgan observes that in the early 1960s ‘Britain embarked on a 
traumatic process of self-examination, self-doubt and declining morale’.223 Anthony 
Sampson diagnosed many of the country’s ills in 1962 as the UK struggled to find a 
role in a changing post-war and post-colonial world. In his highly popular book 
Anatomy of Britain Sampson examined the UK’s institutions - the monarchy, 
government, the universities - identifying ‘A loss of dynamic and purpose, and a 
general bewilderment ... felt by many people both at the top and the bottom in Britain 
today’.224  
 
The Palace of Westminster was not exempt from criticism. Sampson said that ‘the 
realisation of the decline of parliamentary power has been particularly painful and 
disturbing’.225 Backbenchers certainly seemed to Sampson to be especially feeble and 
unwilling to challenge the government - he was told by one former Conservative whip 
that they were ‘much less independent than they were before the war ... Perhaps they 
were emotionally drained after Suez’. The Suez crisis of 1956, when the USA had 
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failed to support Britain and France in a military adventure in Egypt, had shown the 
limitations of British power, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s the former Empire 
began to break up in a rapid succession of independence ceremonies in Africa and 
Asia. The House’s unwillingness to address the questions raised by colonial matters 
with a select committee in 1959 is a particularly poignant example of a Parliament 
failing to come to terms with a changing world.    
 
Sampson was dismissive of the existing committees of the House. He said that 
backbenchers of both parties were particularly ‘defeated’ by the sheer size and 
complexity of government affairs:  
Like indignant shareholders, MPs have tried to supervise the ministries and 
industries which, in theory, they own. They set up committees to cross-
examine civil servants and managers, and they ask fierce questions about late 
trains and bad coal. Sometimes their interventions have been successful: but 
the intricacy of administration has usually defeated them.226  
 
This may not have been entirely fair; there was for instance no sense of the Estimates 
Committee being ‘defeated’ in 1962 when it received over 100 pages of written 
evidence from various Departments on Classified Roads, produced 13 specific 
recommendations on fundamental changes to the system of road planning and had 
several of them accepted.227  But committees were certainly not high on the political 
agenda at the very beginning of the 1960s. 
 
However, the ‘broadsheet’ newspapers, usually regarded as more serious and 
analytical than the ‘tabloid’ or popular press, were gradually beginning to take up the 
theme of reform, with the idea of specialist committees mentioned more and more in 
the public prints. In the spring of 1963 The Observer ran a series of articles on the 
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need for parliamentary change entitled ‘Parliament and People’. In March 1963 Mark 
Bonham Carter, former MP and leading Liberal, made the case in The Guardian for 
‘specialised committees’, arguing that ‘without such committees the private member 
is at the mercy of the information which Ministers or the Civil Service care to disclose 
or the press is able to discover’.228 The issue of specialised committees was not just of 
interest to left-leaning papers. Within weeks, a middle-ranking House of Commons 
Clerk, Michael Ryle, was given considerable space in The Times to set out in some 
detail his proposal for specialised committees, which would ensure better information 
for MPs, would be empowered to call for evidence and witnesses, but would be purely 
advisory - very much the model followed by the reforms of the next two decades.229 
The fact that this junior, non-partisan House official was allowed by his superiors to 
urge committee reform in the public prints suggests that the case for change was 
becoming accepted more widely. However, while the press were beginning to consider 
specialised committees, MPs were for the moment much less interested. 
 
This had been made very clear the previous month, on 15 March 1963, when the 
Chamber saw a debate about parliamentary reform, which included the suggestions 
for specialist committees and select committees generally. Only two MPs - the 
Conservative Airey Neave and, again, Jo Grimond - spoke at any length in support of 
the idea of more select committees to examine policy and administration, and an 
amendment containing the clause ‘the use of Select Committees in examining the 
administration of policies approved by Parliament’ was not itself selected by the 
Speaker for debate - a sign perhaps that there was little pressure to take that particular 
                                                          
228   The Guardian, ‘Facts, Pay and Freedom for MPs’, 8 March 1963 
229   The Times, April 17 1963, ‘Greater Committee Scope for MPs’ 
86 
 
route to reform.230 The Labour MP Charles Pannell was not challenged when he 
condemned the external calls for parliamentary committee reform saying that ‘A great 
cry goes up for more Committees. But we already have a proliferation of Committees. 
I find that those people who write in the newspapers about them and who call for new 
ones to be set up are not notorious for serving on the existing ones. Ask any of the 
whips about that’. Herbert Bowden MP (Labour) acknowledged that ‘We already have 
important Select Committees which do things for us’. However he was not thinking 
of committees scrutinising government policy and administration; the first example he 
gave was the House’s own domestic Kitchen Committee, and he also had kind words 
for the equally homely Select Committee on Publications and Debates Reports. 
Bowden’s main reform suggestion was for the establishment of a select committee on 
accommodation - an important issue for MPs but not in itself of great constitutional 
significance.231 As we shall see, Bowden was to become Leader of the House on the 
return of a Labour government in 1964, and by then he was able to see a slightly bigger 
picture.  
 
Among those who expressed scepticism on 15 March 1963 about the media 
enthusiasm for specialised committees were the senior Labour figure Barbara Castle, 
who feared that such committees would ‘empty the House’232, and Iain McLeod, 
Leader of the House, who pointed to the number of occasions on which Ministers 
already faced questions and debates in the Chamber; analogies with Congress, where 
committees were one of the few opportunities for members of the executive to be 
questioned, were, he believed, false.233 A gap had thus opened up between the steady 
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flow of external (and in the case of the clerk Michael Ryle, internal) comment in 
favour of specialised committees and the continuing apparent lack of interest from 
MPs. However, Parliament’s leading figures may have been rather more sceptical 
about committees than the rank and file. Among the broad mass of MPs, there seems 
to have been modest though not overwhelming support for greater use of committees; 
when The Observer surveyed MPs as part of a series highlighting Parliament’s 
problems just over half of respondents - 54 percent - favoured keeping broad principles 
of policy in the Chamber while delegating some of the House’s work to specialised 
committees. This was not any sort of scientific sample - although a respectable total 
of 162 MPs responded - but Grimond and Neave may not have been as isolated in the 
House as a whole as they appeared in the debate, where senior figures predominated. 
The Observer noted that ‘Most members of the Government thought it tactful to 
abstain [from completing the survey questionnaire]. So did most Labour 
frontbenchers’.234  
 
Progress on select committees continued to be hard to detect in 1963. The Profumo 
affair of that year demonstrated that things were no easier for the idea of select 
committee investigation into failure and scandal in government than they had been in 
the 1920s. The furore surrounding the relationship between John Profumo, the 
Secretary of State for War in Harold Macmillan’s Conservative Government, and the 
19-year-old Christine Keeler, involved accusations of possible security breaches 
because of Keeler’s alleged contacts with the Soviet naval attaché in London. One 
serious feature of the case was that Profumo was caught lying to Parliament about the 
affair. David Marquand observes that the Profumo affair ‘might have been designed 
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to prove that the charges brought against the traditional elite were well founded’.235 
Yet despite the obvious assault on the privileges of the House, the Labour Opposition 
decided against tabling a motion calling for a select committee to investigate the 
matter. Ronald Butt summarises the reasoning behind Labour’s decision:  
such a move would be a tactical mistake [which] would convey to the public 
the impression that the Opposition was conducting a vendetta against the 
Government over the Profumo affair, besides having the effect of closing the 
Conservative ranks around Macmillan, whose leadership was being generally 
questioned in his own party.236 
 
Butt then generalises the argument, noting that demands for select committees of 
investigation usually occur ‘when there are political implications – in other words, 
precisely when no Government is prepared to give hostages to its opponents’.237 Thus 
the considerations which affected Gladstone in the 1850s, Lloyd George in 1913 and 
Ramsay MacDonald in 1924 again influenced events in the Profumo affair of 1963. 
Establishing select committees to investigate scandal usually posed insuperable 
political problems - on all sides.  
 
1964 :  moves towards reform 
The establishment in 1964 of the Study of Parliament Group (SPG), which brought 
together clerks and academics to engage in ‘serious study of the working of 
Parliament’ was an important sign that demand for committee change was growing. 
On 24 September that year a memorandum calling a meeting was drawn up by Sir 
Edward Fellowes, the recently retired Clerk of the House of Commons, the serving 
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and more junior clerk Michael Ryle, and Dr Bernard Crick of the London School of 
Economics. The memorandum noted that  
Both the Conservative and Labour Parties have pledged themselves to create 
a Select Committee on Procedure early in the life of the new Parliament ... 
There would seem to be a unique opportunity to persuade such committees 
of the House to look at the problem of the effectiveness of Parliament as a 
whole (even perhaps to include the relationship of work done by the Lords to 
that of the Commons). Certainly as regards procedure in the Commons, there 
seems a real chance, whichever Party is in power, of changes going 
considerably beyond those proposed in 1959.238  
 
In his seminal work of 1964, The Reform of Parliament, Crick had set out some of the 
major reasons why he believed specialised committees should be an important part of 
those changes.  In particular, Crick suggested that Parliament had nothing to match the 
National Economic Development Council (NEDC), set up a couple of years before to 
bring to the UK the French idea of economic planification. The remit of this influential 
advisory body, made up of trade unionists, industrialists and economists along with 
government Ministers, extended to all sectors of the economy. NEDC could call on a 
range of expertise, much wider than that available to Parliament. Crick indeed said 
that the NEDC was ‘in one sense, a symptom of the decline of Parliament. For when 
the Government does go outside Whitehall for advice, it takes care to by-pass 
Westminster.’239 Crick and his SPG colleagues would see committees as one way of 
redressing the balance in favour of Parliament.  
 
In terms of the political calendar, the birth of the SPG was also well timed. Harold 
Wilson, who was to become Prime Minister in October 1964, made practical politics 
out of committee reform, and his contribution to the development of the system has 
been underestimated.  He started with the advantage of experience in the field.  From 
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1959 to 1962, Wilson was a very active and forensic Chairman of the Public Accounts 
Committee, describing its work in 1961: ‘Perhaps it is not going too far to say that the 
Public Accounts Committee is the only blood sport which is sanctioned by Parliament 
and which is enjoined upon a select number of its hon. Members as a parliamentary 
duty’.240 So it was with no false modesty that Wilson devoted part of a speech at 
Stowmarket in Suffolk in July 1964, just before that year’s general election campaign 
started, to describing the work of select committees:  
In the past year or two, we have seen how effective certain Select Committees 
– Estimates, Public Accounts, Nationalised Industries - have been at getting 
to the heart of some national problem by summoning witnesses, taking 
evidence and reaching agreed conclusions, cutting right across Party 
controversies. I believe this could be taken further.241   
 
Having identified a sense of growing select committee effectiveness, Wilson then 
moved down what turned out to be, for him, a blind alley when he noted that in the 
nineteenth century a select committee on railways had produced a report with a draft 
Bill annexed. He said that ‘this technique could be used more and more for non-
controversial measures, particularly those within the field of the Home Office’. Wilson 
saw these committees as being ‘parliamentary committees, under ministerial 
chairmanship,’ with power to take evidence from experts and outside bodies’. 
Wilson’s ‘Stowmarket’ notion of committee work differed in two key ways from the 
ideas of many of those who were pressing for committees to lead reform of the House. 
First, he saw committees as carrying out the time-consuming work of legislation rather 
than concentrating on the examination of policy and administration. Second, he 
envisaged that Ministers would chair committees, in a way which would make the 
committees at least partly instruments of the executive rather than parliamentary 
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bodies. In terms of the distinct categories of reform discussed above, Wilson was 
trying to mix ‘effectiveness’ reform with ‘efficiency’ reform.242 
 
Legislation was again at the forefront of Wilson’s mind when he took up the 
committee issue afresh very soon after his narrow election victory (with a majority of 
just four) on 15 October 1964. On 21 November 1964 Wilson wrote a Personal Minute 
to Herbert Bowden, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of 
Commons, putting on paper his ideas for ‘bringing MPs and the House of Commons 
more fully into the pre-legislation work’.243 Wilson thought that there was ‘a wide 
range of possible legislation where there are no clear white lines and where it is 
important to tap not only the judgment and expertise of MPs but also - before the 
details of legislation are decided on - the knowledge and professional experience of 
members of the public’. Wilson proposed ‘one or more Select Committees to which a 
particular subject could be allocated. Their terms of reference would be to inquire first 
whether legislation was needed. Secondly, if it were needed, the lines on which it 
should proceed, the lines on which it should proceed, and thirdly, if thought fit, to 
prepare the draft of a Bill’. He said that ‘a Minister, usually a Minister of State or a 
Parliamentary Secretary - might well be chairman of this Committee ... The Minister 
would then have the advantage in piloting the Bill through the House that he had 
secured a fair measure of expert and of Party agreement on his proposals which should 
save legislative time’. 
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Bowden responded on 3 December.244 He was unhappy with Wilson’s proposals for 
legislative committees, complaining ‘this will not save Parliamentary time. In terms 
of the general process of legislation it will add a stage, perhaps a fairly lengthy one, 
with considerable demands on the time of Ministers and backbenchers alike.’  Bowden 
identified ‘Another difficulty, especially with our present majority,’ which was that 
‘this method could have the effect of losing Government control. Select Committees 
are notoriously more difficult to control than business on the floor of the House’. But 
then Bowden volunteered: ‘A modification of the idea which might be easier to work, 
would be to confine the scope of the Committee to making enquiries and issuing 
reports on the given subject: they would call for papers, interview Ministers, officials 
and other Members but would not be expected to come up with legislation.’  Wilson’s 
comment, tidily written in what looks like red biro on the face of Bowden’s minute, 
was: ‘In the circs. of this present Parlt. I agree with the “modification”’.   
 
This rise in the political salience of committees was matched in the mid-1960s by 
something that was also important - an increase in the use of specialist advisers from 
outside the House. Peter Laugharne identifies 1964 as the beginning of ‘the epoch of 
expansion and consolidation’ for specialist advice.245 He gives a range of examples of 
1960s committees getting and using the power to make specialist adviser 
appointments, from the Estimates Committee in 1966 to the Nationalised Industries 
Committee and Science and Technology Committee in 1967.246 Other examples 
included the ill-fated Agriculture Committee, which managed to appoint four outside 
advisers before its abolition in 1969.247   
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The reformers of the 1960s were generally united about the need for change, if not 
always about the form it should take. But on the issue of specialist advice from outside 
there were differences between the reformers. Hill and Whichelow were the 
pseudonyms of two reform-minded clerks who wrote What’s Wrong with Parliament 
in 1964.They said that committees’ comments ‘should be the comments of politicians, 
not of a range of resident experts on the pattern of Congressional Committees, which 
are entrusted constitutionally with a governing function of far wider scope’.248 Hill 
and Whichelow suggested that experts should be called as witnesses, not brought in 
as advisers. It is hard to avoid the feeling that these views were prompted by 
defensiveness on the part of clerks who felt their role as committees’ policy advisers 
to be under potential threat. They may also indicate that clerkly resistance was one of 
the reasons why committees were so slow to take on specialist help from outside. 
 
But clerks nevertheless continued to push for reform. In 1965 Michael Ryle, by then 
Clerk of the Nationalised Industries Committee, proposed in Political Quarterly that 
a new Select Committee on Expenditure should be set up to examine White Papers on 
the government’s investment and spending plans for the next five years.249 Such 
intellectual self-confidence in advocating radical change was unusual even for clerks 
of the day; Ryle was a fairly junior official in his thirties. Ryle’s suggestion then 
formed a central part of the evidence provided by the Study of Parliament Group to 
the Procedure Committee of 1964-65. This Committee came to very different 
conclusions from its predecessor of 1958-59. Its make-up was also very different, with 
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a number of members who had already made a mark or who would do so in time. 
There was a senior Labour figure in Michael Foot, a frequent writer on political history 
and the constitution, along with the Committee Chairman, Donald Chapman, who had 
been General Secretary of the Labour-supporting Fabian Society, one of the earliest 
‘think tanks’ and a leading intellectual force on the left. Labour’s Michael English, 
who later played a major part in pressing for reform as Chairman of the General Sub-
Committee of the Expenditure Committee, was also a member of the 1964-65 
Procedure Committee. Another significant contemporary figure was the Conservative 
Sir Martin Redmayne, until October 1964 the government Chief Whip. This Procedure 
Committee could therefore boast a lot more intellectual and perhaps political weight 
than many of its twentieth-century predecessors. The whips, who had by far the biggest 
say in the composition of any select committee at this time, may have thought 
Redmayne would act as an effective brake on reform.  
 
The strains occasioned by reform were certainly showing in the House, or at least in 
the Labour Party. June 1965 saw a press report in the left-leaning Guardian of 
disagreements between Labour ‘modernisers’ who were keen on reforms, such as were 
being contemplated by the Procedure Committee, and more traditional Members who 
took the Morrisonian view on procedural change.250 The Labour Party Chairman, 
Emmanuel Shinwell, was said to be ‘hostile to the tactics of the reformers, if not to 
their proposals’. A resolution was reached on the matter, but the incident did show that 
procedure was rising up the political agenda.251  
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The Procedure Committee, in its Fourth Report in the summer of 1965, recognised the 
need for the reports of the Estimates Committee to be given ‘greater depth’ by ‘more 
specialised consideration of particular topics’.252 The Procedure Committee’s most 
significant recommendation showed the influence of the thinking that lay behind 
Ryle’s article, suggesting:    
that a new Select Committee be set up, as a development of the present 
Estimates Committee, ‘to examine how the departments of state carry out 
their responsibilities and to consider their Estimates of Expenditure and 
Reports’ ... the new Committee should function through Sub-Committees 
specialising in the various spheres of governmental activity.253 
This was at least a half-way house to the system envisaged by Haldane, although this 
report did not recommend that the new committee should examine policy.254  
The Committee had divided on the recommendation for the new committee during the 
drafting process, with Michael Foot proposing an amendment that described the 
‘proliferation of parliamentary committees’ as ‘not a cure but part of the disease’. 
Foot’s proposed amendment was opposed to the proposed new committee, on the 
grounds that the main purpose of parliamentary reform should be ‘to restore the 
authority of the House of Commons chamber itself’, and more committees could only 
reduce Chamber attendance and ‘nurture the miserable deception that more and more 
issues can profitably be “taken out of politics”’.255 Foot was defeated when he sought 
to press his amendment, with nine Committee colleagues (including a number of 
Labour members) opposing him in the voting, and only Redmayne - a political 
opponent but a procedural ally - in support. The Procedure Committee also indicated 
that the new Committee should have ample staff and technical assistance, and that it 
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should be empowered to travel abroad ‘with the leave of the House, when 
investigations require it’. Thus the Procedure Committee of the mid-1960s had 
delivered something fairly close to the Haldane scheme, with the added element of 
allowing travel. The vote that went against Foot and his Tory ally was significant in 
that it helped to keep up the mid-1960s momentum towards more scrutiny by 
committees. The outside pressures on Parliament to reform were underlined when the 
Committee’s report paid tribute to the evidence of three academic members of the 
Study of Parliament Group, Professors Bromhead, Hanson and Wiseman, which was 
‘to the effect that the machinery of Parliament has failed to keep pace with the increase 
in the scope of governmental activity’.256 But the Committee also welcomed the 
contribution of David Lidderdale, the Clerk Assistant, who came up with the suggested 
words describing the remit of the proposed new committee.257 Thus the combination 
of greater political weight, concerted academic argument and the drafting skills of 
reform-minded clerks had given the House an opportunity to move towards something 
approaching Haldane. The Observer was among those who welcomed the idea of a 
new committee around the time of the report’s publication.258  
But Herbert Bowden was not inclined even to take up Procedure’s fairly modest 
proposal for a new committee. Responding in a debate on 27 October 1965, the Leader 
of the House was lukewarm about the recommendation: ‘I have said that the 
Government are prepared to consider this and look at it, but they are very anxious that 
the development of the Estimates Committee should not get into the position where 
discussion of financial control and keen scrutiny of the expenditure of Departments is 
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lost and replaced by policy discussions’.259 It was six decades since the report of the 
Committee on National Expenditure, and over a century since Gladstone’s candid 
words about the ‘dry and repulsive’ work of financial scrutiny, but the same point was 
being made - MPs preferred the excitement of policy analysis to the hard slog of 
financial scrutiny, and that made Ministers wary. The next day The Guardian 
supported the Procedure Committee’s proposals for a new select committee and 
criticised Ministers such as Bowden ‘whose chief concern is a quiet life’.260 
Despite Bowden’s very cautious response, practice moved on somewhat, although 
nothing became of the full Procedure Committee recommendation for a new 
committee.  In March of 1966 the Estimates Committee reorganised itself into six sub-
committees, each one specialising in broad areas of government work, including 
Economic Affairs and Defence and Overseas Affairs.261 Nevil Johnson, who produced 
a book-length study of the Committee in 1966, judged that while in 1939 the Estimates 
Committee had been ‘little regarded by officials’, by 1966 the Committee had 
‘emerged from this state of neglect’. It had ‘secured the attention of most departments 
and is treated with a reasonable amount of respect by their Ministers and officials’.262 
This was useful enough. But the Estimates Committee also had some influence on 
policy in the mid-1960s. Its report on Recruitment to the Civil Service 263 
recommended the establishment of a wide-ranging inquiry into the Service along the 
lines of the Plowden inquiry into education.264 The government accepted the 
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recommendation and the Fulton inquiry duly began its work in 1966, publishing in 
1968 a major report which resulted in a number of reforms, aimed at introducing 
greater professionalism into the Civil Service.265 
The Nationalised Industries Committee continued its work in the 1960s, holding 
inquiries into individual industries, but also ranging wider, addressing matters of great 
political sensitivity, such as ministerial control of these industries.266  In his 1966 study 
of the Committee David Coombes marshalled some interesting evidence of the 
effectiveness of the committee, concluding that it had been ‘successful’ in an area 
where political views were often polarised. In particular, ‘The Committee showed 
respect for the statutory independence and the commercial nature of the boards [of 
nationalised industries] in the timing and range of its inquiries’. The Committee was 
seen as having sensibly drawn a ‘functional distinction between what would be 
intolerable for the boards and what would be acceptable to them’. Indeed, Coombes 
says, ‘As a Select Committee of Parliament, [the Committee] was particularly well 
placed for investigating the relationship between Ministers and boards.’267 This was 
because, while Ministers were clearly accountable to Parliament through traditional 
methods, especially questioning in the Chamber, nationalised industries enjoyed a 
measure of autonomy from Ministers which arguably created an accountability gap. 
Contrary to the perhaps unfair criticism of Sampson about inquiries concerning ‘late 
trains and bad coal’, backbench MPs on the Committee seem to have showed that they 
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had the capacity to play a measured role in parliamentary scrutiny of a difficult and 
contested set of issues.  
Ian Mikardo, a prominent Labour figure, who chaired the Nationalised Industries 
Committee during the late 1960s, claimed in his memoirs that he had ‘helped the 
Committee to improve its performance in both quantity and quality’.268 He had, for 
example, arranged for Committee sittings outside Westminster, encouraged public 
evidence sessions and recruited specialist advisers. Mikardo also noted some other 
inquiries that gave him ‘particular satisfaction’. Among them was an inquiry into the 
Bank of England, which had been nationalised in the 1940s. The Committee inquiry 
was said to have rendered the Chancellor, Jim Callaghan ‘speechless with horror’ at 
the idea of ‘a group of questioning MPs crossing the sacred portals of the Bank’.269 
But the Committee persisted despite opposition from Callaghan, his successor Roy 
Jenkins and the Bank Governor, and Mikardo observed that the report showed that, 
while Bank nationalisation had been intended to help the Treasury ‘control the City’, 
in fact ‘the Bank was acting as the mouthpiece of the City influencing the Treasury’.270  
There is also a rare opportunity to see the work of this Committee from two sides; 
Michael Ryle, Clerk of the Committee in the late 1960s, gave his thoughts on working 
with Mikardo in an interview in 2003. Ryle was warm in his praise for Mikardo, 
describing him as a ‘brilliant’ Chairman, with the ability to conduct examinations of 
witnesses ‘like a top QC in a court’.271 Ryle recalled that one witness was Sir Ronald 
Edwards, Chairman of the Electricity Council, who, he said, had been subject to a 
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‘brilliant piece of examination’ by Mikardo which had exposed clearly that Ministers 
had a major effect on prices, despite Sir Ronald’s protestations to the contrary.272   
 
But nationalised industries were still seen as very different from government 
departments, and the case for specialised committees to scrutinise Ministers and their 
policies had still not been conclusively made. On April 6 1966, just a week after the 
general election that had given him a comfortable majority of 97, Wilson returned to 
the question of select committees. In a Minute to Bowden about ‘the problem of 
keeping our enlarged Parliamentary Labour Party active, busy and happy’273 Wilson 
again mentioned the possibility of select committees, perhaps covering Home Affairs 
and Education, as ‘experiments’. But this time, Wilson’s concept had changed; there 
was much less emphasis on legislative work. Wilson did not rule out the production 
of draft Bills by a committee, ‘as an annex to their report’ but ‘we could of course give 
no commitment that Parliamentary time could be found for such a Bill in any given 
session’. Instead there was now much more about ‘reporting on administration’ - the 
central aim of the Haldane proposal. 
 
In the Debate on the Address on 21 April 1966, Wilson was able to tell the House that 
the ‘modernisation process’ in which his government was engaged ‘cannot exclude 
Parliament’.274 He acknowledged the work of the Public Accounts Committee, and the 
‘most valuable reports’ of the Estimates Committee along with the ‘constructive’ 
reports of the Nationalised Industries Committee.  He believed that 
the time has now come when we might consider an experiment to extend this 
system over a wider field of public administration. Accordingly, the 
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Government will enter into discussions through the usual channels with the 
two Opposition parties on the suggestion of establishing one or two new 
Parliamentary Committees to concern themselves with administration in the 
sphere of certain Departments whose usual operations are not only of national 
concern but in many cases are of intensely human concern. 
 
Wilson specifically mentioned the Home Office as a department which could be 
among the first to be scrutinised in this way.275  
 
On 14 June 1966, Wilson, Bowden and the government Chief Whip Edward Short met 
the Leader of the Opposition, Edward Heath, and William Whitelaw, the Opposition 
Chief Whip. A Note for the Record documents this meeting.276 This says that Wilson’s 
‘preliminary view’ was that he did not want committees ‘on the congressional pattern. 
The most appropriate way ahead would probably be by experimenting to see which 
particular type of Committee produced the most effective results within the framework 
of United Kingdom constitutional practice and procedure.’ Wilson suggested a 
number of approaches for the new system, including committees covering departments 
and committees that covered specific topics, many of them subjects that crossed 
departmental boundaries. In stark contrast to the Stowmarket speech, however, the 
Note made no reference at all to committees dealing with legislation. Bowden told the 
meeting that he was ‘virtually committed’ to setting up a new committee dealing with 
Science and Technology and ‘perhaps one other dealing with the affairs of a particular 
Department’. Wilson said that the committees should ‘deal with policies and not just 
financial questions and it would therefore be necessary for Ministers, probably junior 
Ministers to guide the committees’ activities but not to veto them’. He suggested also 
that the Terms of Reference might be that the Committees should consider subjects 
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referred to them by Ministers, but, in an important intervention, ‘Mr Heath doubted 
whether this would be acceptable to Members’.  
 
There was only one major point of disagreement: Whitelaw said that ‘there would 
certainly be pressure for committees to be appointed to deal with defence and foreign 
affairs’ but Wilson was clear: ‘committees dealing with these matters could be ruled 
[presumably ‘ruled out’] because they could not function without access to classified 
information’. Nevertheless, the meeting ended on a constructive note, with agreement 
that Short and Whitelaw would discuss the matters further and that Short would 
‘produce a Paper on the basis of the discussions’. Interestingly, a left-wing Labour 
backbencher, John Mendelson, opposed the establishment of a defence committee in 
the House in October 1966, on the grounds that such a committee would discriminate 
between two types of Member. While ‘ordinary Members might be taken to [defence] 
establishments and talked to by the Admiral, the members of the defence committee 
would be shown far more and would usually be there on condition of secrecy’. In 
Mendelson’s view, this would in fact ‘make the position of the Executive much more 
powerful than it has ever been’.277 In the event, there was no defence committee in the 
1960s. The home affairs committee, covering some of the most delicate of domestic 
policy areas, also failed to materialise, despite Wilson’s explicit reference to the idea 
in the House.     
 
Heath responded to the government’s paper on 8 August, agreeing to the establishment 
of the Science and Technology Select Committee.278 Another committee, he said, 
                                                          
277   Hansard, HCD, col. 245, 27 October 1965 
278   TNA, PREM 13/1053 ‘Letter from Mr Heath’, 8 August 1966 
  
103 
 
could be set up, but ‘We think that this Committee should be appointed by the House 
and should report to it, and that the Minister should not be an ex-officio Member.’ 
Heath’s reservations about ministerial committee membership carried the day, and this 
takes its place among the small decisions of the 1960s and 1970s which ensured that 
select committees would become instruments of Parliament rather than tools of the 
Executive. Heath continued the cautious and ‘experimental’ theme by saying that ‘the 
number of Committees involved in the experiment should be restricted to these two 
because already the main existing Committees are very poorly attended’. 
 
These exchanges show that the main elements of the select committee policy which is 
closely associated with Crossman’s name were in place before Crossman took over as 
Lord President and Leader of the House from Herbert Bowden in August 1966. 
Heath’s interventions were highly significant, forcing Wilson to change his ideas on 
ministerial membership of committees and to allow committees to develop their own 
programmes. Without these pragmatic amendments the committees may well have lost 
their way.  
 
Richard Crossman took over from Bowden as Lord President and Leader of the House 
on 11 August 1966.  His contribution to the further development of the policy was to 
promote the concept and give an invaluable political lead; he made committees a high 
priority and as a constitutional thinker he particularly relished the opportunity to lead 
the ‘experiment’. Crossman was keen to go beyond the very limited numbers of 
committees agreed by Wilson and Heath, but Heath made it clear to him that he 
‘wasn’t going to allow me to appoint a committee on agriculture unless it was 
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expressly stated that it would be for only one experimental year’.279 But if Crossman 
was still disappointed when, on 14 December 1966, he rose to urge the House to set 
up the two new committees - one on a subject, science and technology, one on a 
Department - Agriculture, he did not show it. He placed the new committees firmly in 
a wider constitutional context, seeing them as allowing the House to address ‘the 
growing power of the State ... At present, huge tracts of this public sector are virtually 
screened from accountability to the House of Commons’.280 
 
Crossman also welcomed the fact that new rules widened the opportunity for 
committees to take evidence in public, especially from Ministers. But disillusion set 
in early, despite Crossman’s enthusiasm.  At a meeting with Labour backbench 
reformers in February 1967, Crossman was told of the extent of the influence of the 
Chief Whip, John Silkin, on the selection and work of the Agriculture Committee. 
Crossman quotes one of the reformers, Dr David Kerr, as saying that the select 
committees ‘are packed by the whips and have no genuine independence’.281 
Crossman mused that ‘the assumption which he and each Minister has that  they will 
in future be able to control the business and forbid the Committee to do anything of 
which they disapprove is really unconstitutional’.282 A few months later, the House 
debated a motion on procedure, and Crossman had to explain another one of the 
teething troubles of the new select committees - staffing. To man the new committees, 
the House had been ‘forced to cut back the manpower that we had allocated to the 
Estimates Sub-Committee, with consequent detriment to its work’. The shortages 
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‘cannot be plugged by bringing in civil servants from Whitehall’. Recruitment of new 
senior clerks was needed.283 
 
Despite their difficulties, the Crossman committees had an immediate and, as it turned 
out, lasting, effect on the work of the House. In the context of the often barren years 
following the Marconi committee debacle of 1913, the growth in committee activity 
of all kinds, legislative and investigatory, from the mid-1960s, was dramatic. One area 
of expansion was in the volume of committee work associated with the consideration 
of legislation, both primary and secondary. In the 1947-48 Session there had been 140 
legislative committee meetings and there were 216 such meetings in 1961-62. But 
from the mid-1960s the growth of legislative (standing) committees accelerated 
somewhat. In the calendar year 1965 there were 234 sittings of such legislative 
committees in the House of Commons, in 1966 the number was 252 and in 1968 there 
were 330 sittings.284  
 
The rise in select committee activity was larger and more sustained. From the middle 
of the 1960s, the numbers of Members involved in select committees rose by between 
25 percent and 30 percent, to a level they maintained well into the era of the post-1979 
departmental select committees. Whereas in the early 1960s there were about 200 MPs 
on select committees and similar bodies, by 1967-68 the number was over 250 - around 
40 percent of the whole House.285 This was not mere tokenism; the committees also 
began to work harder. The numbers of meetings increased substantially; whereas there 
were 272 in Session 1961-62, there were 483 in 1967-68 and as many as 585 in 1968-
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69. Even in the truncated General Election Session of 1969-70 there were 513 select 
committee meetings, not far off double the numbers in the non-Election Session of 
1961-62. This trend is confirmed by Rush’s figures for the average number of 
committee meetings per sitting day. He calculates that the number of investigatory 
committee meetings rose from 0.8 per sitting day in 1956-57 to 2.2 per sitting day in 
1968-69.286 The 1960s step change has not been properly recognised by most writers, 
who have focussed on the controversial and unstable pattern of Crossman era 
committees but have failed to notice that the increase in activity instituted a permanent 
trend.  
 
Cabinet and select committees in the ‘Crossman’ era 
Select committees also began to engage the attention of senior Ministers more and 
more seriously from the mid-1960s. In previous decades, Cabinets had regularly 
received Memoranda which mentioned possible or actual select committees, but in 
many cases references were only in passing and the papers did not invite discussion 
of the part played by committees. From the beginning of Harold Wilson’s second term 
in 1966, by contrast, the Labour Cabinet considered the pros and cons of select 
committees on a number of occasions, debating issues such as the rights of committees 
to seek information and to travel, and the best way for Ministers to approach the giving 
of oral evidence to committees.   
 
Three weeks after the 1966 General Election the new Cabinet indeed discussed select 
committees. The presence of a separate ‘select committee’ item on the agenda and the 
unusually generous three pages of the Cabinet Conclusions given up to the topic 
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demonstrate the significance of the subject.287 Herbert Bowden, the Leader of the 
House, gave a balanced assessment of the arguments for a wider use of committees, 
seeing the benefits of ‘providing interesting work for back-bench Members and of 
implementing proposals which the Labour Party had put forward when in Opposition 
for enabling Parliament more effectively to scrutinise the work of Departments’. There 
would be questions to address, including the possibility of changes in the relationship 
of Ministers to Parliament, increased burdens on Ministers and ‘the possibility that 
Committees would develop into pressure groups for increased expenditure by 
particular Departments’. At a time of constant economic crisis, the last point could 
have been a telling one.  
 
But the idea of more committees was given general support, with several Ministers, 
including the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins and the Education and Science Secretary 
Anthony Crosland, speaking in their favour. Jenkins and Crosland argued that a select 
committee ‘could provide a useful forum for the explanation of a Minister’s policy 
and help to create informed opinion’. There was a recognition in Cabinet that 
‘backbench Members were unlikely to be content to consider topics which were 
neither controversial nor central to the problems of government; the new Committees 
would certainly be concerned with policy and it was not clear how in the long run they 
could be excluded from the consideration of foreign affairs and defence’. Wilson urged 
action in terms that pre-figured the language of Tony Blair when he came to power 30 
years later, saying that ‘it was essential that in the new Parliament the Government 
should take the initiative in promoting the modernisation of both procedure and 
machinery’. Cabinet agreed to Bowden’s proposals and the process of establishing the 
                                                          
287   TNA, CAB 128/41/19, ‘Conclusions of  a Meeting of the Cabinet’ 20 April 1966, pp. 6-9 
108 
 
first of the new select committees began. Thus from the start of  1966, and well before 
Richard Crossman became Leader of the House, the government had developed broad 
plans for select committees that recognised that they would tackle policy matters and 
that they would not take kindly to interference. However, as the committees started 
work in 1966 and 1967, the reality turned out to be more modest and more tentative, 
but also more controversial, than the vision. 
 
At the Cabinet meeting of 11 April 1967, leading figures expressed scepticism, or 
worse, about the new committees. According to Crossman, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer James Callaghan suggested that the idea of Ministers appearing before 
committees to deal with policy issues was ‘an outrage’, while Michael Stewart, First 
Secretary of State, echoed Morrison in saying that ‘he couldn’t understand how any 
socialist could propose to limit the powers of the Government by creating Specialist 
Committees to poach on their preserves’. Crossman got his way and the principle of 
ministerial appearances in front of Committees was approved, with caveats for 
sensitive matters. By May 1967, Crossman was noting that, after a year of the 
‘experiment’, the importance of committees was ‘growing’.288 The trouble this was 
causing among Ministers and officials was, however, demonstrated when the Minister 
of Technology, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, was ‘rebuked’ for absenting himself from 
Cabinet to become the first Minister to appear in public before such a Committee.289 
Wilson’s support for the committee experiment also seemed to be wavering. Crossman 
commented at the time: ‘It’s obvious that Whitehall is putting great pressure on Harold 
[over the select committees] and that he’s now in two minds. When he’s alone with 
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me he’s always in favour of Specialist Committees but in Cabinet he’s always 
accepting Ministerial objections’.290 
 
But committees were not always seen as a problem by Cabinet. At other meetings 
during the late 1960s, Ministers discussed the potential usefulness of select 
committees in airing major issues, including how to prevent a recurrence of the 
pollution disaster caused by the wreck of the ship Torrey Canyon in 1967.291 But this 
openness to parliamentary scrutiny in the field of failure and scandal had its limits. 
Where ministerial wrongdoing or gross incompetence might be found, there was great 
reluctance to encourage Parliament to set up a select committee - even when political 
opponents were the intended subject of inquiry. In May 1967, Cabinet discussed the 
publication of a highly critical book on the handling by Anthony Eden’s Government 
of the 1956 Suez crisis, written by the former Conservative junior Minister, Anthony 
Nutting. One or more Ministers were recorded as saying in that meeting that ‘it would 
not necessarily be expedient to acquiesce in any proposal [that] a Select Committee, 
or other form of inquiry’ should be set up to investigate ‘the Suez episode’.292 At the 
Cabinet meeting of 6 February 1968 some further politically weighty aspects of the 
committee-Whitehall relationship were discussed in particular relation to the 
Agriculture Committee. These included the sensitivities involved in providing to 
committees forecasts of future economic trends and whether there should be a limit on 
the costs which could be incurred by Departments in providing information to the 
‘specialist’ committees.293 The political system was taking time to become 
accustomed to the new committees. 
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In these circumstances it was not surprising that the ‘Crossman’ committees 
experienced mixed fortunes, with Agriculture especially running into trouble. The 
particular dispute with that Committee concerned its wish to travel to Brussels to 
investigate the likely effects on UK agriculture of the possible accession of the country 
to the European Common Market. Donald Shell describes how the Committee ended 
up having ‘an angry stand-off with the Foreign Office, which clearly felt that meddling 
by inexperienced MPs in matters they did not really understand would only make life 
more difficult for the experienced diplomats who had ongoing responsibility in these 
delicate matters’.294  
 
It is one of the ironies of history that Fred Peart, the Minister of Agriculture during the 
Committee’s life, succeeded Crossman as Leader of the House in October 1968. 
Within a few months the Agriculture Committee had been abolished; that may not 
have been a coincidence. The Science and Technology Committee fared much better, 
being reappointed Session by Session until the dissolution of Parliament in May 1970. 
Science and Technology, like Nationalised Industries, was a specialist committee that 
showed confidence in its abilities. Labour’s Arthur Palmer, its Chairman for much of 
its life, was an eloquent advocate for the Committee right to the end of its life,295 and 
its reputation among the scientific community appears to have been high from the 
beginning. In 1968 for instance the respected journal Nature noted with admiration 
that the Committee had ‘fired several shots across the ambitious bows of the Natural 
Environment Research Council’.296 Another select committee was appointed in 1969 
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to consider the activities of the Department of Education and Science and the Scottish 
Education Department. In November 1968 an additional ‘subject’ Committee was set 
up to examine the operation of the Race Relations Act 1968 and the admission of 
immigrants to the United Kingdom, followed in February 1969 by a Committee to 
consider Scottish Affairs. Finally in April 1969 a Committee was appointed to 
consider the activities of the Ministry of Overseas Development. These last four 
Committees were all reappointed for the session 1969-70.  
 
Gripping the consciousness of Parliament: attitudes to select committees in the 
1960s 
The Crossman and post-Crossman committees of the 1960s were, as noted several 
times in this Chapter, regarded from the beginning as an experiment. Although it was 
accepted that they could tackle controversial subjects, the idea of permanent 
investigatory committees dedicated to regular scrutiny of departments was still hard 
to accept in government and outside; Richard Crossman himself told the House in 
November 1967 that the government’s ‘original intention [in setting up the Agriculture 
Committee] was that a Departmental Committee should spend one Session on each 
Department, and then move on’.297      
 
But in reality the practice of select committees was changing substantially, and 
attitudes were changing as well. The ‘Crossman’ specialist select committees were 
able to take evidence from Ministers and did so - unlike the Estimates Committee and 
the Public Accounts Committee. Public evidence-taking was indeed becoming 
commonplace; the very first words of the first report of the Science and Technology 
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Committee were ‘Your Committee have decided that, in general, they will take 
evidence in public session.’298 The new pattern of more active committees appears to 
have had a broader political impact, judging by their effect in, for instance, the 
Chambers of the Houses of Lords and Commons. The figures revealed by my analysis 
of parliamentary impact are interesting. Decade by decade during the twentieth 
century, the numbers rose and fell, so that in the 1900-1910 period there were over 
5300 mentions of the term ‘select committee’,  while in the 1920s there were only just 
over 3600 – probably an indication of the House’s post-Marconi withdrawal from 
select committee work. The 1950s saw just over 4900 but in the 1960s there were 
7400, a 50 percent rise. A look at the annual figures for Chamber references shows 
that there was a definite ‘Crossman’ effect towards the end of the decade. In the last 
three years of the 1960s, as the new committees began to operate, the number of 
Chamber references to ‘select committee’ rose strongly, with 948 in the calendar year 
1967, 1058 in 1968 and 1233 in 1969 - startling figures compared with the total of just 
522 Chamber references in 1960.  
 
The trajectory of references in the Chambers of the two Houses to the term ‘Estimates 
Committee’ followed a similar pattern. Whereas in the 1920s there were just 325 
mentions of the phrase, only 192 in the 1930s and 283 in the 1950s, during the 1960s 
the figure rose sharply, to 1594. This latter pattern suggests that the Estimates 
Committee changes of the 1960s, hardly noticed by most historians, made a significant 
difference to the political salience of the Committee. Whereas there was little wider 
political interest in the Estimates Committee for the first 50 years of its life, it appears 
that, from 1960 onwards, Estimates Committee began to make something of a political 
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impact. The figures indicate that the 1960s reform era was of fundamental importance 
in the development of committee work - it was so much more than a short lived 
‘experiment’.   
 
During the 1960s select committees were also achieving a higher profile at the most 
senior political level. In the nineteenth century several Prime Ministers made regular 
references to the term in the Chambers of both Houses; this can be seen by noting the 
identities of the most frequent users of the term. For example, in the 1850s the Prime 
Minister, Lord John Russell, was, according to analysis of Hansards, among the top 
five users of the phrase ‘select committee’ and in the 1900s no fewer than three Prime 
Ministers, Balfour, Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith, were among the top five of 
those referring to the term. But as the twentieth century wore on Prime Ministers used 
the phrase less and less frequently. Between 1910 and 1960 only one other Prime 
Minister appears to have been a frequent user of the term ‘select committee’ in the 
House, Neville Chamberlain, who mentioned the phrase 50 times during the 1930s. 
But in the 1960s one Prime Minister began to use the term with great regularity - 
Harold Wilson. Wilson made as many as 111 references to the term ‘select committee’ 
during the 1960s, the great majority of them after he became Prime Minister in 1964; 
Wilson also used the term much more than any single one of his Edwardian 
predecessors.299 Many of Wilson’s forerunners as Prime Minister probably used the 
procedural term ‘select committee’ in their capacity as (simultaneously) Leader of the 
House, the main manager of Commons business. The fact that Wilson used the term 
so frequently wearing his purely Prime Ministerial hat demonstrates the importance of 
his interest in committees in the 1960s.   
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The impact of select committees still generally tended to be shallow, however. There 
were, for instance, few debates on Estimates Committee reports at any time during its 
post-war life, including the 1960s. Philip Giddings notes that ‘Between 1945 and 1960 
Estimates Committee reports were formally considered on only seven occasions by 
the House. The position improved after 1960 but even those debates which did occur 
were modest parliamentary occasions. Attendances at such debates were small, and 
usually a high percentage of those taking part were members of the committee who 
had been concerned with the report in question’.300 Many of the debates on select 
committee reports in any era were adjournment debates, often at the end of the day. 
Writing in 1970, Nevil Johnson called the results of the select committee 
developments ‘disappointing’ because the committees’ impact would always be 
constrained by the inevitable opposition of party leaderships and the Executive to any 
‘diminution of [their] prerogatives’.301 In 1969 a new Procedure Committee concluded 
that ‘the existing system of select committees for scrutinising policy and its execution 
is at present inadequate ... The range and the  terms of reference of the Estimates 
Committee are not wide enough’.  A further difficulty had been ‘uncertainty as to the 
length of life of specialist select committees, which has restricted their 
effectiveness’.302  
 
However, the picture was not all gloom. MPs continued to be generally well-disposed 
to select committees in the mid-to-late 1960s. Barker and Rush asked MPs in 1967 
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whether select committees should be extended, and over 75 percent of those with less 
than 13 years in the House supported some extension.303 Outright opposition to the 
idea of select committees was tiny among newish MPs (4 percent) though much 
greater among old hands (23 percent). There were a number of possible reasons for 
the increase in committee activity, but one fundamentally important one may have 
been that Labour’s large number of backbench MPs were increasingly seen by party 
leaders as needing to be kept fully occupied.  
 
As noted above, Crossman, Wilson and others made little secret of their view that 
select committees could provide gainful employment for Members on the Labour 
benches, many of whom were new and highly-educated. Michael Rush has identified 
a ‘socio-economic convergence of the two major parties which has taken place since 
the rise of the Labour Party as a major electoral force’ around 1918.304 As part of this 
trend, the proportion of Labour MPs with backgrounds in manual occupations has 
been calculated as falling from two-thirds of the Party by 1945 to only one-third by 
1966.305 The educational background of Labour MPs changed, so that the proportion 
of graduates increased from 22.2 percent for the period between 1922 and 1935 to 50.3 
percent in the decades between 1945 and 1997.306 The change had started before, as 
the 1966 figure for disappearing manual workers on the Commons benches 
demonstrates, and it had occurred at all levels of the party; during Wilson’s 1960s 
premiership, the proportion of Cabinet Ministers with a ‘proletarian’ background, who 
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had left school at an early age and become manual workers, union organisers or low-
paid clerical workers fell from about half to less than a quarter - just three of Wilson’s 
1970 Cabinet had such a background. There may indeed have been a connection 
between the changing educational background of MPs and interest in select committee 
work; to take just one example, of 15 Labour MPs who served on the Agriculture 
Committee in 1968-69, no fewer than 11 were graduates - a far higher proportion than 
the average for the post-war period. In some ways this is perhaps the more surprising 
because involvement in agriculture does not in itself require graduate skills.  
 
Those who replaced working-class Labour MPs on the Commons benches in the 1960s 
were often lawyers but they were also from other professions where effective use of 
language was equally important. It was calculated at the time that at the General 
Election of 1966 51 lawyers were returned for Labour, along with 56 described as 
lecturers or teachers and 18 managers or economists. The ranks of Labour lawyers in 
1966 almost outnumbered those of Conservative lawyers, of whom there were 55 in 
1966.307 Many of these professionals would be well used to both oral and written 
communication - giving speeches and presentations and report-writing. This emphasis 
on language and particularly rhetorical skills would seem to make these ‘drafting’ 
professionals - making it more likely that the new breed of Labour MP would feel 
comfortable in a select committee. Something similar was apparently happening on 
the Conservative benches; the Tory MP Julian Critchley, who left the House in 1964 
and returned in 1970, said that there had been an ‘embourgeoisement’ of the party in 
his years away, with scions of aristocratic families much less in evidence. In the 
Conservative Party, ‘the politically active middle class who began by taking over the 
                                                          
307   Arthur Palmer MP, ‘The Select Committee on Science and Technology’ in Dick Leonard and 
Valentine Herman (eds), The Backbencher and Parliament, p. 161 
117 
 
constituency parties ... are now taking over Parliament itself’.308 There was a media 
perception that the intake of 1966 was highly interested in reform of Parliament. In 
June 1966, The Times observed that the 83 new MPs, many ‘bursting with intellect 
and energy’ often took ‘a dim view of the rusty machinery of Westminster’.  
Committees appeared to be popular with this cohort; the paper, reporting on a survey 
of the attitudes of the new Members, noted that eight of them mentioned ‘the 
fashionable idea of specialist backbench committees’ when asked what would make 
Parliament a better place.309  
 
Traditionalists saw things differently, while confirming the importance of the new 
social mix on the green benches. In 1967 the weighty Commons figure of the 
Conservative ex-Minister and constitutional thinker Enoch Powell attributed the 
current ‘modernizing’ reforms of the House dismissively to the ‘pullulation of 
departments of politics at the multiplying universities and the impatience of a large 
new intake of the managerial Labour Party in 1964-66’.310 Powell identified one of 
‘the favourite nostrums of the modernizer’ as the new select committees, which he 
described as ‘the congressional committee à l’Américaine’, and he suggested there 
would be ‘strict limits’ on the scope of select committees, because ‘it is on the floor 
of the Chamber that men and Ministers are made or broken - in debate and in the party 
struggle’.  
 
The new intakes were well represented on the select committees of the mid-1960s. To 
take just one Session, 1966-67, some of the main select committees had plenty of 
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members who had been elected in the 1960s. For example the Nationalised Industries 
Committee included, by the end of the Session, 10 MPs who had been elected since 
1960, out of a total of 18 Committee members. 21 members of the 1966-67 Estimates 
Committee, out of a total membership of 43, (and 16 out of 31 Labour members), had 
been elected since 1960. One of the new ‘Crossman’ committees, Science and 
Technology, included seven post-1960 MPs out of a total of 14. At least numerically, 
the impact of recently-elected members on the select committees was therefore 
powerful.  
 
The committees could also be robust in their dealings with government. Barker and 
Rush observed in a near-contemporary study that the Estimates Committee and the 
Nationalised Industries Committee regularly dealt with matters of policy, some of 
them highly contentious.311 The Guardian noted in November 1970 that, since the 
establishment of the Nationalised Industries Committee in the 1950s, select 
committees had begun to ‘venture farther’ beyond financial matters to ask questions 
about the efficiency of the administration, and that process had accelerated in the past 
four years.312 Ronald Butt, writing at about the same time, explained this phenomenon 
incisively in the context of the dual management of government activity by Ministers 
and civil servants.  He saw committee reformers as having ‘abandoned hope of 
effectively controlling the politicians direct [Butt’s emphasis](through the traditional 
processes of politics on the floor of the House)’ and therefore seeking ‘a new way in 
which the House of Commons might call the politicians to account through the 
administrators who are suspected of dealing in policy as well as administration’.313 
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This tendency to ignore procedural boundaries and to exercise political accountability 
through the back door - in some respects, to hold departments to account for their 
policies by questioning Ministers and, particularly, their permanent officials, about its 
implementation - would also characterise the work of the select committees of the 
1970s.  At a time when governments of both parties were (for most of the time) 
expanding the scope of their detailed intervention in the social and economic spheres, 
such a tactic had an obvious appeal. Select committees could also be seen by Ministers 
as useful in internal battles with officials. Butt wrote that he had personal experience 
of hearing ‘one senior Cabinet Minister in the post-1964 Labour administration 
privately admit that he would welcome such committees because they would give him 
an added buttress against his own departmental civil servants’[Butt’s emphasis].314  
 
There were other signs of change in attitudes to select committees among senior 
politicians. An experienced Labour Minister, the robust government Chief Whip John 
Silkin, previously seen as plotting to place government loyalists onto committees, 
illustrated this when in March 1969  he told the Commons that: ‘I hope that the House 
will never abandon Select Committees. Indeed, I doubt whether it ever could. This 
idea has gripped the consciousness and general fibre of Parliament today, and 
Parliament would be a very much poorer institution without Select Committees’.315 
For Silkin to talk in these terms in 1969 suggests that the idea of scrutiny select 
committees, if not yet the practice, had moved forward a long way in just ten years.  
 
It is also clear that select committees had become established on a new procedural 
footing by the end of the 1960s, with yet another clerk, Clifford Boulton, listing recent 
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advances in the journal Parliamentary Affairs in the autumn of 1969. Boulton 
mentioned: the ‘growing tendency for Select Committees to take some or all of their 
evidence in public’, the power that several committees now enjoyed to employ experts, 
the power to release copies of select committee reports to the press 48 hours in advance 
of publication (a great boon to journalists and therefore something that helped to 
increase media coverage), the removal of the ‘constitutional objection’ to foreign 
travel by committees, and the appointment of the first Clerk of Committees, a very 
senior official overseeing the Committee Office. These relatively small but practical 
forward steps, all taken during the 1960s, were important in installing, or re-installing, 
select committees as an accepted and effective part of the machinery of the House.316 
 
Conclusion 
The development of select committees in the 1960s has often been seen as the story of 
a flawed and largely unsuccessful experiment in giving the House a say in policy 
matters and the opportunity to hold Ministers to account. The anti-hero of this 
narrative is often Richard Crossman. Yet it is also possible to see these developments 
as something different - a piece of reasonably successful Labour party management, 
with Harold Wilson playing a substantial initiating role. From 1964 onwards, Wilson 
was well aware of the need to keep intelligent and energetic new Labour backbenchers 
engaged, and after the 1966 General Election, when his majority allowed it, he acted. 
At first he attempted to mix ‘effectiveness’ reform with ‘efficiency’ reform, and he 
struggled before successfully concentrating on the former and thus strengthening 
Parliament. The fact that Wilson, the dominant political figure of the 1960s, had been 
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a leading select committee chairman may also have had something to do with their 
progress during the decade.  
 
The creation of the new select committees in the second half of the 1960s thus had an 
impact at senior political level that has not been recognised by previous writers. 
Cabinets regularly paid close attention to select committees after 1966, and James 
Callaghan emerged as a true heir of Herbert Morrison in his ill-concealed irritation at 
the idea that committees should deign to question Ministers on policy. But Callaghan 
and other opponents did not prevail over Crossman, despite Wilson’s wavering. Select 
committees changed their shape towards the end of the decade and some, like 
Agriculture, suffered for their feistiness, but the statistics are impressive; for perhaps 
the first time since the early twentieth century the proportion of the House involved in 
select committees settled at around 40 percent. Ministers discussed select committees 
much more often in Cabinet and they mentioned them more frequently on the floor of 
the House than they had during the 1950s. Even the Estimates Committee was noticed 
in the Chamber a little more. 
 
Underneath the political radar, the mundane but important changes to arrangements 
for select committees seen during the decade marked a gradual and almost 
imperceptible but important strengthening of the system. Very little has been said in 
the literature about the part played by House of Commons clerks in the development 
of select committees, but this Chapter provides evidence that they supplied an 
important element of continuity; it was in the 1960s in fact that younger clerks such 
as Michael Ryle and David Pring began to work in their various ways for reform. The 
importance of this modest 1960s wave of reformist clerks is that, unlike Campion and 
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Fellowes, they were not at the point of retirement. The younger clerks who pressed for 
reform would have the chance to continue their work and, in the 1980s, to celebrate, 
as senior figures in the House service, the coming of the departmental committees they 
had been advocating for 20 years. Along the way, they, and those of their colleagues 
who were equally reform-minded, helped the House to make the small changes in 
procedure and practice that would entrench improvements to the functioning of 
committees. This work underpinned a subtle change in the culture of the House of 
Commons which made the 1960s, despite all its failures, a decade of positive reform. 
 
The select committee advances of the 1960s also touch on a larger issue - the wide-
ranging debate about the idea of ‘consensus’ in post-war Britain. It has been argued 
that socio-economic and political consensus, broadly social democratic in some ways, 
prevailed in Britain from 1945 until the 1970s.317 This has been seen as characterised 
by a general striving for political harmony - for example in the era of ‘Butskellism’ in 
1950s Britain, when the leaderships of both the major parties, Labour and 
Conservative, were said to have shared broad policy aims such as full employment, 
the provision of social benefits for the vulnerable and an adequate level of public 
spending. However, it is worth noting that the whole notion that consensus was 
overwhelmingly the dominant feature of British politics after 1945 has been 
disputed.318 In 1996 many contributors to a book edited by Kandiah and Jones argued 
that in this period there were clear dividing lines between distinctively ‘Conservative’ 
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and unmistakeably ‘Labour’ positions on both domestic and foreign policy. Andrew 
Gamble had suggested in 1974 that the Conservatives lost the first General Election 
of that year because they had ‘appealed to a national consensus which did not exist’.319 
Ben Pimlott reached similar conclusions.320  Richard Toye suggests that the idea of 
consensus was used to advance a variety of political agendas in the post-war period, 
but he also argues that this did not prove the actual existence of consensus.321  
 
It is important here to distinguish between the idea of a broad, longer-term, underlying 
policy or ideological consensus (agreement by Ministers, MPs, civil servants and 
commentators on key features of the direction of social and economic policy) and the 
short-term committee consensus needed to allow a select committee to function and, 
in particular, to produce an agreed report. The latter may be seen as a product of a 
mindset or habit rather than any sort of ideological position. Nevertheless the two 
concepts of consensus are closely related, and the failure of select committees (based 
as they inevitably are on something of a shared frame of reference, even though the 
sharing is perhaps temporary) to make much political impact for the first 15 years after 
the Second World War, does lend some support to those who have doubted the 
existence of political consensus in the immediate post-war years.322 On the other hand, 
the rapid growth of select committees after the mid-1960s suggests that, from then on, 
more and more MPs were finding it possible to reach consensus with those of a 
different political stripe. In this way, the rise or fall of interest in select committees 
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could be seen as one indicator of the state of the political environment in the House of 
Commons. 
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Chapter Three: Select Committees and Political Crisis in the 1970s 
 
The previous Chapter has described a decade of steady committee growth and 
development during the 1960s. Nevertheless, at the end of the decade there was still a 
sense that improvements were needed, especially in financial scrutiny. In this spirit, 
the Procedure Committee which reported in 1969 welcomed the government’s 
intention to produce each year a public expenditure White Paper looking five years 
ahead.323 Linked to this, and to improve Parliament’s scrutiny of spending, the 
Committee recommended that the Estimates Committee should become the Select 
Committee on Public Expenditure, with a wider Order of reference allowing it ‘To 
consider public expenditure, and to examine the form of the papers relating to public 
expenditure presented to this House’. There should be eight Sub-Committees, each 
considering spending on a ‘function’ such as Education, Science and the Arts rather 
than departmental spending, and there should also be a General Sub-Committee.324 
Each Sub-Committee would examine ‘the implications in terms of public expenditure 
of the policy objectives chosen by Ministers’.325  
 
Press comment on the Procedure Committee’s report, though modest in scale, was 
positive; The Times called the Committee’s idea for a full-dress debate on public 
spending each year ‘revolutionary’ and said that the proposed Expenditure Committee 
system ‘would be the first big shift of influence this century back towards Parliament 
and away from the increasing Budget-making power of the Government and 
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Whitehall’.326 The Guardian said that this was an ‘immensely important proposal 
which, if accepted, would restore to the House of Commons much of the power to 
control policy which it has lost’.327 The 1968-69 Procedure Committee was highly 
unusual in containing a leading political scientist of the day, John P. Mackintosh, 
author of authoritative and influential works on Cabinet and other parts of the polity. 
David Marquand, also a Labour MP, was another member of this Procedure 
Committee; like Mackintosh he would have a distinguished career in the field of 
political science, as well as working at senior level in the European Commission. Thus 
the backbench mood for reform prompted by the Crossman changes of the mid-1960s 
was far from extinguished by the end of the decade, and there were knowledgeable 
politicians who were keen to take it further.  
 
The Conservative Government of Edward Heath, elected in June 1970, agreed to the 
establishment of a Select Committee on Expenditure with a remit to examine the 
expenditure implications of policy; the aim, in line with the recommendations of the 
1968-69 Procedure Committee, was to give Parliament a role in the emerging system 
of public expenditure control. The Expenditure Committee began its work early in 
1971, with an order of reference (Standing Order 80) that stated that it should, in 
particular, ‘consider how, if at all, the policies implied in the figures of expenditure 
and in the estimates may be carried out more economically’. Nevertheless there were 
some constraints; as appointed the Expenditure Committee had fewer members (49) 
and fewer sub-committees (six) than had been recommended by the Procedure 
Committee.328 It would therefore find it hard to do justice to some subjects. 
                                                          
326  The Times, ‘MPs propose annual debate to vet public spending’, 20 September 1969 
327  The Guardian, ‘... and so should the Commons’, 20 September 1969  
328  For the background see Cmnd 4507, Session 1970-71, Select committees of the House of 
Commons 
127 
 
The backdrop to the work of the Expenditure Committee and other select committees 
for much of the 1970s was one of acute political and economic crisis, with 
governments of both main parties struggling at times to assert control over organised 
labour and to manage dissent within their own backbench ranks.329 The Heath 
Government fell in 1974 largely because of its failure to manage the challenge of a 
miners’ strike and the effects of a three-day week imposed on British industry. As the 
1970s wore on, the political weather grew yet stormier. The Labour government of 
Harold Wilson which came to power in 1974 faced even more severe internal and 
external dissent. The trade union movement, with which the Labour Party was closely 
associated, became intensely unpopular during the decade, its influence increasingly 
seen as excessive. A series of incomes policies failed to curb inflation.  
 
There were other apparent threats to the integrity and effectiveness of the state; the 
continuing security and political crisis in Northern Ireland took up many hours of 
ministerial time, suggesting that at least parts of the country were not governable, and 
Britain’s new status as a member of the European Economic Community was 
continuing to raise complex questions about sovereignty. The senior Conservative 
Douglas Hurd, who was to become successively Home Secretary and Foreign 
Secretary in Thatcher’s 1980s’ governments, described Parliament in the 1970s as 
‘both  violent and feeble’, with a system of partisanship which persistently discussed 
‘politics as if there were only two possible judgements, that of our own party being 
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wholly right, the other wholly wrong’. Hurd feared that ‘So long as Parliament behaves 
in this out-of-date way it will fail in its main task of controlling and influencing the 
executive’.330 In these circumstances, select committees, with their non-partisan 
approach to policy analysis and scrutiny, might appear to offer to many MPs a 
constructive corrective to the stresses of partisan contention.  
 
At the end of the decade the departmental select committee system, essentially the one 
that has lasted until the present day, was established. This Chapter assesses the 
performance of select committees during the 1970s,  asks how they were  affected by 
the turbulent politics of the time and explores the reasons why the 1979 reforms came 
about.  
 
The 1970s select committees: the shortcomings and the statistics 
Positive judgements on the select committees of the 1970s have been rare. S. A. 
Walkland did applaud the work of the Expenditure Committee, and especially its 
General Sub-Committee, which he saw as having - in ‘fruitful partnership’ with the 
Treasury - achieved an overhaul of the system of public expenditure control.331  
 
However there were flaws in the 1970s pattern of committees. The Procedure 
Committee of 1978 criticised the development of the system as ‘piecemeal’ and 
resulting in ‘decidedly patchy coverage of the activities of governmental departments 
and agencies’.332 The weakness of the 1970s system enfeebled Parliament at a time 
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when the constitution was said to be ‘weighted in favour of the Government to a degree 
which arouses widespread anxiety’.333  
 
The wider shortcomings of the committee structure of the mid 1970s were also noted 
by the clerks themselves. The Department of the Clerk of the House told the Procedure 
Committee in 1977 that, because the House specified the powers of each committee, 
it created ‘inconsistencies between committees’. There were very few debates on 
committee reports - especially disappointing for committees because ‘Nothing would 
strengthen a committee’s hand more than to have its conclusions endorsed by the 
House.’ Just as significantly, government responses to reports were often so tardy that 
public interest in the subject had simply ‘evaporated’ by the time they were 
published.334  
 
Contemporary academic comment was just as unenthusiastic; for example the 
Expenditure Committee was described by Ann Robinson, the author of a 
comprehensive 1978 study, as having failed to fulfil many of the expectations held out 
for it at the start of the decade. The balance of forces between the House and the 
government had remained the same, and the Committee had not ‘revived Parliament’s 
traditional power of the purse’. The Committee’s influence on the rest of Parliament, 
the policy process and the wider world had been ‘limited’.335 In 1981 Nevil Johnson 
expressed deep reservations about the potential effectiveness of select committees, 
given the persistence of ‘the adversary relationship between Government and 
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Opposition’.336 Later commentators have also been critical. The observation of 
Seaward and Silk on the Expenditure Committee is that its work was widely regarded 
as ‘unsystematic and uneven’.337  
 
Yet the statistics suggest that 1970s select committees were highly active, and that 
many MPs were interested in taking part in them. The much-criticised Expenditure 
Committee was only one part of the machinery of committee scrutiny available to the 
House in the 1970s. The increased post-Crossman proportion of Members involved in 
committee work was maintained during the early 1970s, with the new committees 
continuing to meet regularly, while the Nationalised Industries Committee continued 
to fulfil its diverse remit with reports on major issues such as airports and the British 
Steel Corporation.338 During the 1970-74 Parliament, there were ad hoc select 
committees on the Civil List, which provides for the payment of the Monarch’s 
expenses339, and on corporation tax340 as well as on tax credits.341 After Labour came 
to power in 1974 there were ad hoc committees on Cyprus (established just after the 
Turkish invasion of the island which had brought it firmly to international attention 
once more),342 violence in marriage343 and the notion of a wealth tax.344 So the 
machinery of the select committee began to be used more often for inquiries into 
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controversial issues. In some but not all cases, government encouraged the 
establishment of the select committee. This level of select committee activity on 
largely domestic issues was to some extent reminiscent of the mid and late Victorian 
heyday of such bodies, and completely out of line with the general experience of the 
early twentieth century.   
 
The proportion of Members involved in select committees continued to be substantial, 
with 251 MPs for instance serving in 1970-71 and 250 in 1971-72 - nearly 40 percent 
of the total.345 The middle years of the 1970s saw something of a peak, with 291 
Members serving on select committees in 1974-75 and 294 Members in 1975-76. This 
last figure represented 46 percent of the whole House. The figure went down slightly 
to 254 in 1976-77 but the level of activity remained high through the decade - 222 
Members served on select committees and similar Commons bodies even in the 
Election-truncated Session of 1978-79.346 Rush calculates that the number of 
investigatory meetings per sitting day rose from 2.2 in 1968-69 to 2.7 in 1977-78 - not 
a spectacular increase but well above the 0.8 per sitting day of 1956-57.347  
 
The volume of Commons committee work continued to be considerable as the decade 
wore on. By 1976-77, Rush calculates, the figure for legislative committee meetings 
was 353.348 But the increase in meetings of committees whose specific responsibility 
it was to inquire into expenditure, policy and administration - the category described 
by Rush as ‘investigatory’ - was much more dramatic. There were only 38 meetings 
of such committees in 1947-48 and just 40 in 1961-62, but there were as many as 376 
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meetings of investigatory committees in 1976-77. This represents a nearly tenfold 
increase in 15 years. By another, broader measure of select committees as a whole 
(including domestic and administrative select committees which would not always be 
investigatory but which would be cross-party in operation), the scale of the advance is 
also obvious. Whereas in the two full (non-General Election) sessions of 1960-61 and 
1961-62 there were a total of 566 select committee meetings, in the equivalent full 
sessions of 1975-76 and  1976-77 there were no fewer than 1498 such meetings -  
nearly three times as many.349  
 
Figures for Members’ actual attendance at committee meetings followed a similar 
pattern. Rush’s figures show that the percentage of government backbenchers 
attending legislative committees rose very slightly from 62.7 percent in 1947-48 to 
64.9 percent in 1961-62 and more noticeably to 79.8 percent in 1976-77 (with similar 
figures for Opposition backbenchers).350 But the figures for attendance at investigatory 
committees, although still lower, rose much more strongly. Whereas in 1947-48 a mere 
7.1 percent of government backbenchers attended one or more of the ‘investigatory 
committees’, by 1961-62 the figure was 14.5 percent and by 1976-77 the proportion 
was 29.8 percent. Similarly, 6.5 percent of Opposition backbenchers attended 
investigatory committees in 1947-48, a proportion that rose to 12.4 percent in 1961-
62 and as much as 26.5 percent in 1976-77. The combined effect of the ‘Crossman’ 
reforms and the introduction of new committees in the 1970s on the life of Parliament 
was clearly substantial, though it is ignored in many accounts of the twentieth century 
development of select committees.  
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These statistics have interesting implications for the relationship between Parliament 
and the Executive; while committee work of all sorts increased in volume, the most 
substantial growth was not found in those legislative committees whose work was 
determined by the demands of the government’s legislative timetable (and influenced 
by the whips351) but in the investigatory committees where the influence of party 
business managers was much less obvious.  
 
But perhaps even more significant was the clear rise, from a very low base indeed, in 
the numbers of those MPs who appear to have had a serious commitment to 
investigatory work, demonstrating it by turning up regularly to committee meetings. 
Regular attendees at select committees are the bedrock of a committee, who, by 
helping provide the committee with a quorum week-in week-out, enable it to function. 
Rush notes a steady rise in the proportion of government backbenchers who attended 
20 or more investigatory committee meetings from 1.2 percent  in 1947-48 to 2.9 
percent in the 1961-62 Session, but a much steeper increase, to 9.7 percent, in 1976-
77. The 1960s and 1970s saw a more notable increase in the proportion of Opposition 
backbenchers with high attendances: the percentage of ‘20 meeting plus’ attendees 
was 1.0 percent in 1947-48 and just 0.9 percent in 1961-62, but by 1976-77 12.8 
percent of the total of Opposition backbenchers were attending 20 or more 
investigatory committee meetings.352 Even though the numbers were still fairly small 
in 1976-77, there is clear evidence of the emergence in the previous decade of a group 
of reliable committee men and women, a group which had been almost non-existent 
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in 1960 - mainly because the investigatory committees did not exist in large numbers. 
The statistics demonstrate clearly that the advances in select committee activity 
achieved in the 1960s were being substantially consolidated in the 1970s. 
 
There was some contemporary recognition of the strong growth of committee activity 
during the 1970s. Nevil Johnson acknowledged the sheer scale of the material 
produced in the previous decade and a half. He noted that, including sub-committees, 
the numbers of select committee ‘operating units’ in Sessions between 1972-73 and 
1975-76 varied between 28 and 40 per Session.353 Johnson described the quantitative 
growth of pre-1979 committee work as ‘intimidating’ and expressed admiration (of 
sorts) at the ‘nearly six feet of library shelf space’ taken up by recent committee 
reports.354 Between 1970 and 1974, Johnson noted, ‘well over 300 civil servants had 
to attend select committees’, although only 14 Ministers appeared during that same 
period.355  
 
In examining the whole landscape of scrutiny, it is instructive to assess the scale of 
select committee activity in some major policy areas - defence, external affairs, home 
affairs, and Treasury and related matters; Appendix A has the detailed breakdown. 
Along with ad hoc committees on specific subjects and relevant Crossman-era 
committees, all meetings of Expenditure sub-committees are included, such as those 
covering Environment and the Home Office, even though Home Office matters might 
only have taken up a small part of the committee’s business at some meetings; this 
therefore slightly overstates the actual amount of committee activity in those fields. 
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These totals demonstrate a high degree of select committee activity in key policy areas. 
There were no fewer than 38 meetings of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-
Committee in the earliest full Session of the Expenditure Committee, 1971-72, and 28 
of the Race Relations and Immigration Committee. Altogether, there were 111 
meetings of committees and sub-committees touching on these four policy areas in 
1971-72, a figure that rose to 185 in 1975-76. There were 133 meetings on these 
subjects in 1976-77. This was a considerable volume of activity, and, as noted in the 
next chapter, would compare well with the figures for the reformed post-1979 
equivalents.  
 
Select committees were apparently also getting better during the 1970s at the 
techniques required to make the system work properly. Evidence provided to the 
Procedure Committee in 1977 by the Clerk’s Department identified a number of 
changes which had been introduced in the previous decade which had ‘transformed 
the style of some select committees’ operations’. Public evidence session had ‘led 
witnesses, on the whole, to be more forthcoming and to have prepared their evidence 
better’, the employment of specialist advisers had helped committees to a ‘better 
understanding’ of complicated evidence, and visits abroad had enabled them to ‘draw 
usefully on foreign experience’.356 
 
Above all, select committees were by the mid-1970s quite prepared, on occasion, to 
challenge government unwillingness to provide evidence for their inquiries. The case 
of Harold Lever and the Chrysler motor industry inquiry in 1975 and 1976 was a clear 
demonstration of this. Lever, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, who had acquired 
                                                          
356  Procedure Committee 1978, Vol. II, p. 113 
136 
 
an influential but somewhat ill-defined role in matters of industrial and financial 
policy, was involved in discussions with other Ministers, especially the Industry 
Secretary, Eric Varley, about the provision of substantial government financial support 
to Chrysler’s ailing British subsidiary. The support given to Chrysler was very 
controversial at a time of severe financial stringency and there were strong rumours of 
ministerial splits. The Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the Expenditure 
Committee wanted Lever to give evidence because of his alleged involvement (the 
subject of many, often speculative, press stories) in the spending of such large sums 
of public money, but the Prime Minister, Wilson, refused to let him appear, as he was 
not the responsible Minister. The issue was brought up at Prime Minister’s Questions 
in January 1976 by Margaret Thatcher, the new Leader of the Opposition, when she 
stated the proposition that requests to Ministers to appear before select committees 
should be regarded as ‘mandatory’.357 Wilson brought up the case in Cabinet the next 
week, betraying his anxiety when he said that select committees pressing for a variety 
of ministers to appear risked the Opposition, and ‘even some Government 
backbenchers, seeking to divide the Cabinet by probing into the processes of collective 
decision-taking, which could cause even greater damage than Ministerial leaks’.358 
The minute also notes the view of Cabinet members that there was ‘some danger of 
Chairmen of Select Committees seeing themselves as comparable to the Chairmen of 
the powerful Senate and Congressional Committees in the United States’. 
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The Lever case continued to be followed in many sections of the press, where there 
was support for the Committee’s stance in editorials and opinion pieces.359 The furore 
did not abate, with Varley as a consequence suffering the humiliation of having his 
salary reduced by £1000 after a vote in the House - a form of censure that remarkably 
had not been applied since 1921.360 In the event, the Sub-Committee did not insist that 
Lever should appear after his original refusal, on the grounds that ‘Subsequent 
evidence [had] made the appearance of the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, quite 
simply, unnecessary’. The Committee had been politically pragmatic, but its report 
restated the principle that Ministers should attend.361  
 
This episode foreshadowed in some ways the much more celebrated case of Westland, 
when, ten years later, on another sensitive issue of industrial policy, there was a similar 
stand-off between government and a select committee over attendance at an evidence 
session. But it also throws into sharp relief just how far select committees had come 
in their dealings with Ministers. The press noticed Chrysler and the Sub-Committee’s 
inquiry on it, because the issue said a lot about one of the key policy questions of the 
1970s - the extent to which government should support struggling industries. This was 
not the only case of select committees standing up for their rights in the 1970s; for 
example, a senior industrialist, Sir Charles Villiers, Chairman of the British Steel 
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Corporation, was summoned to appear before the Nationalised Industries Committee 
in 1978.362 
 
As Prime Minister from March 1976, James Callaghan was also disturbed by the 
demands of select committees for evidence. In February 1978, in a Prime Minister’s 
‘personal minute’ on ‘Disclosure of Cabinet Committees’, Callaghan warned of the 
risks of acknowledging the existence of such committees.363 Personal minutes were 
rare, so it is very significant that this one was prompted by ‘evidence that Select 
Committees would like to interest themselves in the [Cabinet] Committee system and 
may be seeking to erode the present convention [which was firmly against disclosure]’. 
The particular demand had come in the form of a recommendation by the Overseas 
Development Select Committee that there should be a ministerial Cabinet Committee 
whose remit would be to coordinate ‘inter-departmental consideration of the 
interaction of domestic and overseas policy’.364 A Cabinet Committee with such a 
remit (RD) did in fact already exist. The fact of RD’s existence was awkward, because 
acknowledging it would set a precedent. Crucially, the issue also trod on sensitive 
ground recently disturbed by the Lever/Chrysler case. Callaghan feared that if the 
names of Cabinet Committee chairmen were disclosed, select committees would try 
to summon them ‘to give evidence in addition to the responsible Minister’. The Prime 
Minister came down in favour of maintaining the convention of non-disclosure and no 
acknowledgement was made. But, by stepping into machinery-of-government 
questions, and raising tricky issues around individual and collective ministerial 
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responsibility at a time when there were Cabinet tensions, the Overseas Development 
Committee had got under the skin of a usually-imperturbable Prime Minister. This 
was no longer the world of Morrison and Butler, where select committees could be 
largely ignored.    
 
Policy Influence 
This thesis has already argued that policy influence via accepted recommendations is 
not by any means the only determinant of committee effectiveness. But it is clearly 
important. Figures calculated for this thesis suggest that the Expenditure Committee 
did reasonably well in terms of winning government acceptance of its 
recommendations. Over the nine years or so of its existence, 130 of the Expenditure 
Committee’s recommendations were fully accepted and 298 partially or implicitly 
accepted by government, while about 150 recommendations were fully or partially 
rejected. About 210 recommendations were neither accepted nor rejected. Therefore, 
out of a total of about 800 recommendations made by the Expenditure Committee over 
half were accepted to one degree or another and less than 20 percent were rejected. 
 
These 1970s select committee recommendations were sometimes wide-ranging. Often 
they touched on policy; MPs were generally as resistant to being restricted to ‘dry and 
repulsive’ financial scrutiny work as they had been for decades. The First Expenditure 
Committee Report of 1971-72 was on Probation and After-Care.365 It contained 
conclusions on the effect of policy on expenditure, but it also urged that the prison 
welfare system ‘should be thoroughly examined at an early date’.366 This 
recommendation was accepted, an example of the Expenditure Committee’s ability to 
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play a part in the debate on policy rather than simply to assess policy’s effect on 
expenditure. It is worth noting, though, that the Home Office accepted the 
recommendation in terms that suggested that such a review was already being 
conducted in one form or other; the causation of policy change is always difficult to 
identify.367 
 
Nevertheless there were occasions during the 1970s when policy influence by select 
committees can be more clearly identified. The Expenditure Committee Report on the 
Employment of Women 368 published in the spring of 1973 was based on an inquiry 
carried out by the Employment and Social Services Sub-Committee chaired by the 
Labour Member Renee Short. The Report contained a range of policy 
recommendations, many of them aimed at improving the employment chances of 
women of all ages. Recommendations mostly covered detailed issues such as the 
inequality in the level of training grants between men and women, but there were also 
a number of major recommendations to change the face of work for women. These 
would involve, for example, changes to encourage flexibility in working patterns and 
the rapid expansion of day nurseries and nursery school provision. The government 
responded to the Committee by agreeing to remove the inequality in the level of 
training grants - a direct committee effect on policy.369  
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Wider Political and Constitutional Impact 
So much for the relatively rare occasions on which there was, or appeared to be, a 
direct and provable influence on policy; what about wider impact? This was also 
significant at times during the 1970s.  Select committees of the early 1970s were, for 
instance, quite prepared to carry out inquiries into areas that caused embarrassment to 
the Conservative government.  
 
The Expenditure Committee did not just settle on topics which avoided direct party 
controversy; there was substantial voting on party lines for instance on a report on the 
controversial issue of NHS Facilities for Private Patients.370 The Committee’s 
consideration of the report involved 15 divisions, all on party lines. While the report’s 
recommendations were bland and gave a clean bill of health to the government’s 
policy on pay beds, the amendments proposed by some of the Committee’s Labour 
members, but not accepted by the Conservative-majority Committee, were strong in 
their criticisms, and were reported in the Minutes of the Committee. 
 
The way the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of Expenditure addressed 
the defence part of its remit was often confident and challenging. In the 1971-72 
Session the Expenditure Committee published a major report on ‘a general survey of 
the whole field of defence expenditure’, based partly on evidence taken by the Sub-
Committee at the Headquarters of the British Forces in Germany at Rheindahlen and 
private discussions in Brussels with no less a figure than NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander, General Goodpaster.371 The report was quite explicit about the intentions 
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of the Sub-Committee, its first paragraph containing this: ‘The Sub-Committee believe 
an important part of their function is to stimulate public discussion of defence matters 
and to bring to the attention of the House informed opinion from sources outside the 
Government.’ The report went on to stress that ‘British defence policy cannot be 
viewed solely from a one nation standpoint. Our defence policy can only be judged in 
relation to our membership of various defence alliances’.372 This was a Sub-
Committee which had a sense of its constitutional significance and political credibility.  
 
The record of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee on foreign affairs was 
much less policy-oriented than its record on defence, although the foreign affairs work 
of the sub-committee certainly adhered more closely to the restricted remit of the 
Expenditure Committee. There were occasionally inquiries which addressed serious 
issues of foreign policy, including one in 1977 on the implementation of the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 
Accords. These Accords were an attempt by the Western powers and the Soviet bloc 
to come to agreements on issues such as security, trade and, most controversially, 
human rights.373 The report on this inquiry, in tackling issues such as ‘the 
interdependence of detente and human rights’, went well beyond the apparently 
narrow remit of the Expenditure Committee.  But many of the foreign affairs inquiries 
of the Sub-Committee concerned ‘housekeeping’ issues such as the sale of diplomatic 
property. Nevertheless there were other committees that addressed aspects of foreign 
affairs. One inquiry with serious foreign policy implications was carried out by the 
Expenditure Committee’s Trade and Industry Sub-Committee in 1973-74. It 
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concerned the treatment by British firms of their South African workers.374 This 
inquiry resulted in the numbers of appearances by outside witnesses on foreign affairs 
topics in 1973-74 rising to 108 (compared with 39 official witnesses). Witnesses 
included representatives of unions and a number of large British companies operating 
in South Africa. Press coverage of the inquiry was extensive.375 Some MPs who were 
not members of the Sub-Committee were sufficiently incensed at its disregard for its 
remit to raise the issue on the floor of the House. The inquiry led the Conservative MP 
William Clark to complain to the Speaker that the Expenditure Committee is 
‘exceeding its authority and the authority of the House by asking for extensive 
information  ... which could be construed as an interference into the affairs of a foreign 
Power’.376  
 
The Nationalised Industries Committee continued to be one of the more successful 
and active parliamentary bodies. At a time when these industries accounted for a 
substantial proportion of the UK’s industrial base and there was growing criticism of 
their performance from Conservative politicians and other bodies,377 the Committee’s 
role was likely to be important. While continuing to inquire into individual industries, 
the Committee addressed some of the broader industrial issues which were arising, 
such as the relationship between government, Parliament and the management of 
nationalised industries.378 The figures for attendance at meetings of the Nationalised 
Industries Committee show how popular it was with its members. The main 
                                                          
374    Fifth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1973-74, Wages and Conditions of 
African Workers Employed by British Firms in South Africa (116) 
375    To take a small sample, there was extensive coverage in The Times, 5 April, 4 May, 17 May, 5 
July, 24 October 1973; and The Guardian, 17 May, 23 May, 21 June, 27 June 1973 
376    Hansard, HCD, cols 1020-21, 14 May 1973 
377    See for instance The Times, ‘The NEB [National Enterprise Board]:problems of a split 
accountability’, 1 July 1976 
378    Second special report from the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, Session 1976-77,  
Comments by nationalised industries on the National Economic Development Office report (345) 
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Committee and its three sub-committees achieved average attendances of  over 75 
percent in 1977-78, with sub-committee C having attendance of nearly 90 percent.379  
 
But what of the select committee response to the most significant constitutional 
development of the 1970s - the accession of the UK to the European Economic 
Community in 1973? In a patchy and uncoordinated way, committees responded 
actively and assertively to the transfer of sovereignty. Unpublished working papers of 
the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee, chaired by 
William Rodgers (Labour), reveal how determined the committee was to extend 
scrutiny to the very gates of the Commission. Within two months of accession, on 19 
February 1973, the Sub-Committee visited Brussels and took oral evidence for over 
two hours at the Commission office.380 Among the witnesses was the former Labour 
Cabinet Minister George Thomson, at the time a Commissioner of the European 
Community. According to Tim Milne, the clerk of the Sub-Committee, the session 
seemed not unlike a day in Westminster: ‘The proceedings opened with a little speech 
by Mr Thomson, but subsequently continued with the normal questioning by 
Members.’ Milne noted with some perhaps slightly surprised approval that ‘In general 
the Commission were encouragingly forthcoming (rather more so than many 
Whitehall witnesses)’. Milne also reported that ‘The meeting had attracted some 
advance publicity, and had been described in the Press as “an unprecedented extension 
of British Parliamentary practice to the new circumstances of Britain in Europe”’.381 
 
                                                          
379    Returns of Select Committees 
380    Parliamentary Archives [Hereafter PA] HC/CP/3694 ‘Note ... by Tim Milne’, 21 February 
1973  
381  Ibid. Milne was more used to working behind the scenes; he was a retired MI6 officer, a close 
friend and colleague of ‘Kim’ Philby, the British double agent whose work for the Soviet Union 
was deeply damaging to the operation and reputation of British intelligence during the Cold War. 
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This was no flash in the pan. In July 1973, Milne wrote to Rodgers to explain the 
reasons for a ban by the Commission on verbatim reporting of select committee 
hearings with Commission officials. It had not been connected with the February 
events concerning the Sub-Committee: ‘The reason was that the Commission were 
worried that things were getting a bit out of hand, with too many Parliamentary 
committees asking to take evidence, whereas the prime responsibility of the 
Commission was to the European Parliament.’382 It is also worth noticing that the 
demands of European accession prompted another extension of committee work. The 
Select Committee on European Secondary Legislation, although not a classic 
investigatory committee, did produce many reports - 38 short reports in 1974-75 alone.  
 
These developments, hardly noticed by most writers about select committees, 
demonstrate clearly how far the House’s select committees had increased in 
confidence in dealing with European matters since the struggles of the Agriculture 
Committee over their Brussels visit in 1967. Most importantly, there was never any 
chance that the government would wreak revenge on the Expenditure Committee for 
its temerity in challenging the Commission’s bureaucrats and the FCO’s diplomatic 
sensibilities, by closing the Committee down. The fate of the 1960s Agriculture 
Committee would not be repeated in the new climate. Assumptions about the powers 
and scope of action of select committees in this constitutionally key area had altered 
fundamentally in six years.  
 
Select Committees and Cabinet 1970-1974 
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One key arena where political significance is demonstrated is the Cabinet room, and 
the Cabinet Papers in the National Archives continued to be a rich source of evidence 
on ministerial attitudes to select committees in the 1970s. References in Cabinet papers 
could sometimes be merely fleeting, included for information only. However many 
references record substantive Cabinet discussions about select committees, and some 
suggest that constitutional boundaries were being tested, if not actually moved. The 
figures for post-1960 select committee mentions in Cabinet papers - mainly Cabinet 
Conclusions and Memoranda circulated to Cabinet colleagues by Ministers - suggest 
a growing salience. While there were 110 mentions of the phrase ‘select committee’ 
in the decade 1950-59, the number fell to 91 in the 1960s (surprisingly in view of the 
Crossman reforms) but rose to 175 in the 1970s.  
 
The 1970-74 Conservative Cabinet several times discussed the work of the Select 
Committee on Science and Technology. In 1971, the Committee gained full and 
supportive press coverage for a report urging the government to increase by ten times 
the level of spending on computer research and development.383 Similar issues arose 
over the 1972 White Paper, Framework for Government Research and Development, 
which was the subject of ‘severely critical’ comment from the Chairman of the Science 
and Technology Committee, Airey Neave.384 Cabinet on 20 July heard that the 
Committee was expected to invite the Lord Privy Seal, Lord Jellicoe, to give evidence 
soon. In the discussion it was suggested that ‘On balance, it would probably be unwise 
for such an invitation to be declined’. However this request raised a point of principle, 
                                                          
383  Select Committee on Science and Technology, Fourth Report of Session 1970-71, The 
Prospects for the UK Computer Industry in the 1970s (621), p.lx. On press coverage, see for 
instance The Times, ‘Giving computers the national blessing’ 19 November 1971; The Guardian, 
‘Massive support for computer industry urged’, 19 November 1971; The Financial Times, 
‘Substantial Aid Urged for U. K. Computers’, 19 November 1971 
384    TNA, CAB 128/50/38, ‘Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet’ 20 July 1972, p. 3 
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which was that it was questionable ‘whether a Select Committee ought to examine a 
Minister on a White Paper before the House of Commons itself had considered it’.385 
This was a thorny issue, demonstrating the subordinate position of select committees 
in relation to the Chamber at the time, and the Leader of the House, Robert Carr, was 
asked by Cabinet to consider the constitutional point and to ‘discuss with the Chairman 
of the Select Committee on Science and Technology how the matter might be 
handled’. In the event, Lord Jellicoe gave evidence to the Committee.386 Three points 
emerge from this episode. Firstly the views of a Chairman of a select committee, even 
without the formality of a committee report, or even an inquiry, were taken seriously 
by Ministers; secondly Ministers were still trying to see how select committees fitted 
in to the usual procedures and prerogatives of Parliament; and thirdly a committee 
whose remit extended across a number of departments could attract the attention of 
several senior Ministers.  
 
Another body which crossed the path of the Cabinet was the Nationalised Industries 
Committee. The Committee’s 1973 report into the future of broadcasting called for a 
wide-ranging independent inquiry before the expiry of the BBC Charter and the 
Television and Sound Broadcasting Acts in 1976.387 In a Memorandum to Cabinet of 
January 1973, Robert Carr, by now Home Secretary, stated his belief that the value of 
such an inquiry was ‘open to question’.388 When Carr’s Memorandum was discussed 
at the Cabinet meeting of 13 February, his approach to the inquiry was generally 
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endorsed, but it was said that ‘public opinion might react adversely to a decision to 
reject considered arguments in favour of an independent inquiry into a matter which 
raised wide issues of public importance’.389 Carr was asked to ‘reinforce the arguments 
rejecting the proposal for a wide-ranging independent inquiry’. In such small ways, 
select committees were winning skirmishes even if they did not always win battles.  
 
The Labour Government and select committees 1974-79 
As we have seen, the Labour Government elected in 1974 faced similar problems to 
its predecessor, and the heated political environment was inevitably reflected in the 
work of Parliament’s committees. The Nationalised Industries Committee for instance 
continued to test procedural and sometimes constitutional boundaries. In a move that 
was highly unusual at the time, the Committee held extensive pre-legislative hearings 
in 1977-78 on proposed government legislation to re-organise the electricity supply 
industry.390 A number of questions were also raised in relation to the Select Committee 
on Nationalised Industries’ critical report during the same Session which related to the 
management of the nationalised British Steel Corporation. This expressed the 
Committee’s frustration that neither the Corporation nor the government had provided 
accurate financial forecasts, thus, in the view of the Committee, preventing Parliament 
from controlling the Corporation’s borrowing.391 The episode raised serious questions 
as to whether select committees could force witnesses to produce evidence. The 
Committee was obliged to issue an Order for the production of the necessary 
information, but in time the forecasts were provided. Poole concludes that the episode 
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left ‘honours fairly even’ because the Committee had not immediately obtained 
everything it wanted, but it had nevertheless eventually enforced its Order.392 Poole 
notes that ‘this unusual, but formal, reassertion of  [select committees’] traditional 
powers ... briefly made headline news’, with a front page picture in The Times of the 
Commons official who had just served the Order. An important select committee 
principle had been stated and accepted by government, in the full glare of publicity - 
another significant advance for a pre-1979 committee.  
 
Less confrontational, but also making an impact from time to time, was the General 
Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee. In 1980 a clerk, Andrew Kennon, 
provided an analysis of its work which usefully distinguished between direct policy 
influence and other political impact.393 Kennon stressed that as the Sub-Committee 
‘included a broad spectrum of economic opinion in the House’ it did not make specific 
policy recommendations, focussing instead on the ‘content and presentation of the 
Government’s expenditure plans and their economic background’. He pointed to 
significant improvement in the amount and presentation of information contained in 
the 1979 Public Expenditure White Paper compared with its predecessors, as a result 
not only of critical remarks about the ‘obscurity’ of the White Paper in an Expenditure 
Committee Report but also of ‘the dialogue which continued, both formally and 
informally, between [the Sub-Committee] and the Treasury throughout the 
Parliament’.394  
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The General Sub-Committee was assiduous in pressing for evidence even on highly 
sensitive financial matters, a case in point being the European Monetary System, 
established in 1979, which was intended to reduce currency fluctuations between 
European countries. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, told his Cabinet 
colleagues in October 1978 that the Sub-Committee had decided to summon Treasury 
and Bank of England witnesses on the subject and had sought a memorandum from 
the Treasury.395 Healey himself gave oral evidence on 3 November 1978. When 
Cabinet discussed the EMS - at length - on 2 November, James Callaghan and his 
colleagues reflected the anxiety of Ministers at the intrusion of the Expenditure 
Committee into this sensitive area. The Cabinet Conclusions note that the Chancellor 
was to give evidence the next day and that he ‘would do so in a neutral way: the extent 
to which Parliamentary Committees were seeking to involve  themselves in future 
policy decisions of the Government was disturbing’. 396 The scope of select committee 
operations in the 1970s was certainly recognised in Whitehall, notably in 1978 by a 
committee of senior officials whose work was reported to Cabinet. The Official 
Committee on Parliamentary Procedure (PPO) was set up to advise Ministers on their 
response to the Procedure Committee report of 1978. PPO’s report acknowledged that 
‘Since the great bulk of the work of spending Departments has some link with 
expenditure, the Sub-Committees have in practice found no difficulty in ranging freely 
over Departmental policy and administration’.397 
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From a different perspective, some references in the Cabinet papers of the later 1970s 
reveal a government considering the creation of a select committee, or the use of an 
existing one, to further a policy objective. One example, very relevant to the impact 
of European accession, was the establishment of a select committee on direct elections 
to the European Assembly which was set up in 1976. This was seen as a matter that 
was ‘primarily for the House of Commons’, but the experience seems to have been 
generally a good one for the government. Cabinet papers from the spring of 1976 note 
that the government encouraged the establishment of the select committee and that it 
was widely welcomed in the House.398 In October 1976, the Home Secretary Merlyn 
Rees urged his Cabinet colleagues to accept a variety of proposals from the Select 
Committee, including one for early legislation. Rees noted that the Labour Party 
Conference had voted against the principle of direct elections, but he argued that that 
key recommendation should be accepted, cautioning that ‘If it becomes apparent that 
we are not introducing an early Bill, questions will be bound to be asked and our good 
faith may be challenged in Brussels’.399 Cabinet a few days later accepted that a 
commitment to legislation was needed, though it was argued that direct elections, a 
costly exercise, were not popular in the Labour Party, or relevant to people’s problems. 
The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, summed up the discussion and judged that that 
no indication of timing was to be given. This was a case of Callaghan and his senior 
colleagues using the work of a select committee to ensure that the minimum necessary 
would be done for diplomatic purposes.400  
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Ad hoc committees were rarely if ever established as a result of backbench pressure. 
However, after they were set up, several of the late 1970s ad hoc committees, those 
on home affairs issues for example, were unafraid to challenge constitutional 
conventions. The Select Committee on Violence in Marriage of 1974-75 was 
important this field. On 2 July 1975, the Committee took evidence from High Court 
judges - said to have been only the second time in the twentieth century that judges 
had appeared before a select committee.401 The significance of this is that Article 9 of 
the Bill of Rights 1689, ‘That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in 
Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament’ has formed a basic principle of the constitution since the seventeenth 
century; even in the second decade of the twenty-first century, it was unusual for 
judges (themselves jealous of their own independence) to give evidence in Parliament. 
On the very same day in 1975, the Committee took evidence from Barbara Castle, the 
Secretary of State for Social Services, who had been prevailed on to attend although 
she had, according to the Chairman Willie Hamilton, been reluctant to add to the 
evidence already given by her junior Minister, Michael Meacher. Castle gives a 
typically pointed account of the occasion in her Diaries, expressing resentment at the 
tough questioning she endured at the hands of Hamilton. This was ironic, as ‘the 
setting up of the committee had been my idea, which I had had to process through the 
department against the objections of my officials’.402 Thus within a matter of hours 
this short-lived ad hoc body had laid down two markers for select committees; first, 
that judges could attend without upsetting the constitution, and second, that Ministers 
should try to accommodate requests for oral evidence from select committees even 
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though, as Members of the House, they were not (and are still not) obliged to give such 
evidence. Despite her discomfiture on the day in 1975 when she gave evidence to the 
domestic violence ad hoc committee, Castle accepted in her Diaries that ‘it is right for 
Ministers and civil servants to be put through the hoop, however unfairly. It does force 
them to check up on facts. And it does force Ministers to insist on being surrounded 
by reliable civil servants’.403  
 
The ad hoc Select Committee on Cyprus of 1975-76 was another case in which 
committees proved embarrassing for Ministers.  Established soon after the Turkish 
invasion of the island in the autumn of 1974, the inquiry paid a seven day visit to 
Cyprus and Greece, meeting leading politicians including the Greek Cypriot leader 
Archbishop Makarios.404 The Report of the Cyprus Committee was described by the 
Prime Minister James Callaghan in the Cabinet meeting of 20 May 1976 as 
‘misleading and biased, and in a number of respects inaccurate’.405 Cabinet colleagues 
were recorded as saying that the selection of committee members ‘open to strong 
constituency pressures was a matter of some concern’.406 In a significant phrase, it was 
said that a debate ‘would also help to establish the right relationship between Select 
Committees and the House of Commons as a whole’. The Prime Minister’s advice was 
that the government should not ‘resist pressure for a debate’ on the report, but ‘to take 
advantage of one to rebut the report’.407  
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These ad hoc committees were often also highly conscious of public interest in their 
proceedings. There was heavy coverage of the 1975-76 Select Committee on 
Abortion,408 which came up with proposals which were seen by many MPs as aimed 
at unravelling the 1960s reforms of the law on the issue. The Times was among the 
papers that ran stories on the travails of the Committee, including the resignation of 
six pro-abortion MPs.409 The reaction to its Report was unsurprisingly mixed and often 
hostile, and it had no discernible effect on policy.410 But the political impact of the 
Committee’s work was undeniable. 
 
Select Committees and the Chambers  
Although many commentators in the mid to late 1970s were sceptical of the 
achievements of select committees, members of both Houses apparently showed 
increasing interest in them. In the Chambers the use of the term ‘select committee’ 
was continuing to grow, with the number of such references rising strongly from 7400 
in the 1960s to 14000 in the 1970s. In addition, references to ‘Expenditure Committee’ 
in the Chamber Hansards for both Houses in the 1970s amounted to 2475, a 
significantly higher figure than the 1594 recorded for the equivalent committee, 
Estimates, in the 1960s. The figures for individual years emphasise the point; while in 
the calendar year 1952 there were 525 references to ‘select committee’ and in 1962 
there were 613, in 1970 (a short General Election year) there were 912 references, 
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with 1282 in the year 1972. The middle of the decade saw a clear rise in chamber 
references, with 1628 in 1975 and as many as 1996 mentions in the year 1976.   
 
Debates on select committee reports in the House of Commons were, however, rare in 
the early 1970s; there were for instance only nine debates on Expenditure Committee 
reports in the four years between 1972 and 1976.411 This was, nevertheless, a modest 
increase on previous periods - as noted above, there were a mere seven debates on 
Estimates Committee reports in the 15 years between 1945 and 1960.  
 
More broadly, it is possible to see, in the febrile political scene of the 1970s, a 
favourable environment for bipartisan committee work. For example, a key facet of 
the many-sided crisis of governance in 1974-79 was the absence, for almost the whole 
period, of an effective government majority in the House of Commons. Ministers kept 
their focus on party survival through day-to-day tactical stratagems, maintaining the 
support of Labour’s own backbenchers and Members of other parties, whether the 
Liberals or the nationalists in Scotland and Wales. Parliament’s influence was mostly 
exercised through backbench rebellions on legislation that forced the government to 
think again.  There was a clear post-1970 increase in dissent in votes on the floor of 
the House. During the brief 1974 Parliament alone there were 17 defeats in the 
Commons and 15 in the Lords. In the 1974-79 Parliament there were 42 defeats in the 
Commons and 347 in the Lords.  
 
Combining with the other side on Chamber votes took some courage; but doing so in 
the relative calm and obscurity of the committee room would be much easier. There 
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were many instances of cross-party voting on reports during the 1970s, and in general 
the whips tolerated the dissent.412 Nevil Johnson comments that Members regarded as 
‘unsound and even troublesome’ in the wider House could, on select committees, 
‘voice their commitments in ways which causes little embarrassment to the party 
leaders’.413 Philip Norton considers that there was a clear relationship between the 
Chamber-based backbench dissent of the 1970s and the establishment of departmental 
select committees, saying that they had ‘their origins in the 1974-9 Parliament. 
Members’ frustrations, and the recognition that, through their votes, they had some 
political leverage, led to the most important parliamentary reform of the past fifty 
years’.414 This proposition needs, however, to be seen in the context of the evidence 
in this thesis that the origins of mid-century committee reform should instead be 
located in the 1960s.    
 
Witnesses: Getting outside the Westminster Village 
To what extent did the select committees of the 1970s seek to widen the scope of their 
inquiries and take evidence from people other than civil servants? The record is mixed, 
the Expenditure Committee failing much of the time to take advantage of Whitelaw’s 
suggestion that it should take evidence from Ministers.415 In total Ministers appeared 
before three of the most prominent Expenditure sub-committees just over thirty times 
during the 1970s - a tiny number compared with the figures for the years after 1979. 
This failure to take much ministerial evidence may have been both a result of, and a 
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contributing factor to, the Expenditure Committee’s relatively modest impact in 
Cabinet; during its whole lifetime of about nine years there appear to have been 60 
references to the Expenditure Committee in Cabinet papers. The bulk of references to 
select committees in Cabinet papers and discussions were to other committees. 
 
But 1970s select committees do appear at the same time to have been increasingly 
willing to take evidence outside Westminster and from non-government sources. The 
clerk Michael Ryle observed in 1976 that ‘grass-roots’ inquiries were now taking place 
again, in a revival of nineteenth century practice, with much evidence being heard 
away from London, and some even outside the UK.416 While the tables at Appendix 
B demonstrate that 1970s select committees took evidence from a wide variety of 
witnesses, they also reveal significant differences between committees in the extent to 
which they took oral evidence from non-official sources. Expenditure’s Defence and 
External Affairs Sub-Committee saw a large number of official witnesses – there were 
over 800 official appearances during the life of the Sub-Committee. However, many 
of those appearances were by military witnesses rather than civil servants or diplomats. 
This was not just a Whitehall-bound conversation. And the attempts of select 
committees to reach out beyond Westminster were being noticed. The Guardian was 
especially impressed by the industry of the pre-1970 Education and Science 
Committee, which had visited 25 universities and colleges and heard the views of 500 
witnesses as part of its inquiry into student relations.417  
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An important external development probably underpinned the growth of select 
committee scrutiny - the increase in the number of organisations involved in political 
lobbying. Of 628 groups listed in one 1979 Directory of Pressure Groups and 
Representative Organizations, no less than 40 percent had been founded between 1960 
and 1979.418  Norton also points to the rise, starting in the 1970s, in the number of 
consultancy and lobbying firms who offered their services to businesses.419  There are 
many examples of interest groups following closely the course of 1970s select 
committee inquiries, and making a significant contribution to the evidence. The 
coverage of departments by select committees was still very incomplete, but when a 
major inquiry took place, interest and involvement from wider society could be 
widespread. For example when, during the 1975-76 Session, the Education, Arts and 
Home Office Sub-Committee of Expenditure examined ‘Policy Making in the 
Department of Education and Science’ (the title itself being a vivid demonstration of 
the pre-1979 refusal of select committees to obey the restrictions of their remits), there 
were many contributions from beyond Whitehall.420 Bodies such as the Educational 
Publishers Council, the Society of Education Officers and the National Campaign for 
Nursery Education sent in written evidence along with the National Union of Teachers, 
the North-West Economic Planning Council and the Editors of the Times Educational 
Supplement and the Times Higher Education Supplement. The Church of England 
Board of Education, the Catholic Education Council and the Free Church Federal 
Council submitted an ecumenical joint memorandum while the Association of 
University Teachers and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities also sent 
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individual written evidence. All in all there were over 500 pages of written evidence 
attached to the Report, from about 40 different bodies.  
 
Other Expenditure Committee Sub-Committee work also attracted considerable public 
interest, notably a Report on Preventive Medicine in the 1976-77 Session which 
contained 735 pages of written evidence from nearly 100 different groups and 
individuals.421 Organisations as diverse as the Medical Council on Alcoholism and the 
Doctors and Overpopulation Group provided evidence, as well as the Tobacco 
Advisory Council, the National Pure Water Association and the Pharmaceuticals 
Division of ICI Ltd. The Expenditure Committee’s sub-committees covering home 
affairs were prepared to take evidence from a very wide range of witnesses, on 
occasion. Of the 107 appearances by civil servants before select committees on home 
affairs matters in 1977-78, for instance, 47 were made by staff of prisons (some junior 
staff among them) and a number of the many ‘outside’ witnesses were actually ‘inside’ 
- female prisoners in HMP Cornton Vale near Stirling.422  The Minutes of Evidence 
duly record that ‘Inmates A and B’ were ‘called in and examined’ by the Committee. 
The Sub-Committee also visited the United States and Sweden - ensuring that it 
gathered a real diversity of evidence about penal thinking.  
 
The Expenditure Committee’s treatment of some aspects of home affairs appears 
cursory at first sight, with few inquiries into policing among other important issues, 
but what would be called today the ‘outreach’ work of the Race Relations and 
Immigration Committee needs to be taken into account in assessing the quality and 
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quantity of Commons home affairs scrutiny in the 1970s. In a lengthy inquiry into 
‘police/immigrant relations’ in 1971-72 for instance, that Committee took formal 
evidence from no fewer than 221 witnesses in ten cities and towns in England and 
Wales, with informal discussions taking place with 200 police officers ‘and at least as 
many immigrants and community workers’.423 The report was 92 pages long and 
contained 36 recommendations, a number of which were accepted by the Home Office 
(although the Home Office pointed out in its Observations on the Report that the local 
nature of the governance of policing made it difficult for the government to  implement 
some of them).424 
 
The 1970s ad hoc committees were also often very energetic in seeking diverse views. 
The Select Committee on a Wealth Tax of 1974-75 saw a hugely controversial subject 
addressed with vigour if not ultimately success. There were 51 appearances by civil 
servants and just two by Ministers, but there was evidence from 165 outsiders, ranging 
from the Country Landowners’ Association to the TUC. When it came to consider its 
report, the Committee discussed a plethora of competing draft reports with varying 
emphases on a highly divisive subject.  
 
The contrast between these wide ranging and policy-rich investigations and the 
financially focussed and usually small-scale inquiries of the equivalent Estimates 
Committee of less than 20 years before could hardly be clearer. In terms of scope and 
of involvement with the wider world, the select committee system of the 1970s had 
made large strides in what, in the glacially-slow context of parliamentary history, was 
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a very short time. A new generation of Members was getting used to working in select 
committees. Just as importantly, the outside world was increasingly looking to 
Parliament, through its select committees, to give it a hearing. This widening of 
sources of evidence pointed to a future landscape in which the Civil Service near-
monopoly on policy advice would be increasingly broken and select committees 
would help Parliament to play a part in the process.425    
 
One important element of the wider reach of select committees was media coverage. 
To gain some understanding of the impact of select committees in the 1970s, it is 
interesting to take a snapshot of press reporting and comment on committees in one 
perhaps typical year, 1976. Select committees in 1976 made good or at least frequent 
copy. In The Guardian and The Observer alone, there were 339 references during that 
year to the words ‘select committee’. The Financial Times had 298 references while 
The Times recorded no fewer than 504 during that year. Even the weekly Economist 
saw 48 references. Again it is hard to see these figures as consistent with the notion 
that select committees were ‘eclipsed’ or ‘marginalised’.   
 
There were both opportunities and risks in close contacts between select committees 
and the outside world. According to a clerk who worked with it in the 1970s, the 
Nationalised Industries Committee ‘was extremely likely to be captured by the 
nationalised industries’. This was said to be particularly the case with the gas industry 
(as well as to some extent coal and British Rail) where ‘there would be a very strong 
pro-industry sense on the committee, regarding civil servants in Whitehall as bungling, 
interfering amateurs, driven by Ministers with short-term political horizons’. The 
                                                          
425   Derek Hawes, Power on the Backbenches? The Growth of Select Committee Influence, pp. 88-
92 
162 
 
industries knew how to lobby to advance their cause. It was said by the clerk to be 
‘quite striking’ how a figure like Sir Denis Rooke, Chairman of British Gas from 1976, 
‘would be talking the same language as the trade unions in addressing the 
Committee’.426 
 
Select Committee Problems and Progress  
The main 1970s select committee, the Expenditure Committee, was certainly not 
always happy in its work. In its first full year, the Committee reported on its 
operation427 and complained about the sub-committee procedure which made it 
difficult for the whole Committee to give proper attention to the reports which were 
published in their names. There was also criticism that the reports of the Committee 
were treated in an ‘off-hand’ manner by government because notice of replies was not 
given.428 Government observations were not being published in a timely fashion - 
rarely less than four months after the publication of the Committee’s report. In 
addition, throughout the 1970s, Expenditure Committee’s scrutiny of one of the great 
Departments of State, the Home Office, was regularly shuffled between sub-
committees, so that in one session it shared with Environment and in the next Session 
it shared with Education, Arts and Science. This Expenditure Committee was far from 
achieving Haldane’s ideal of a committee system to match Whitehall’s departmental 
structure.  
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On 15 January 1974, a small number of Members took part in a Commons chamber 
debate on the role of the Expenditure Committee.429 Most of those who spoke were 
members of the Committee themselves. The overall verdict of the Committee 
Chairman, Sir Henry d’Avigdor-Goldsmid, was that its record was ‘not outstandingly 
good, but the system is going about right’.430 William Rodgers, Chairman of the Trade 
and Industry Sub-Committee, said that it had been ‘a thoroughly rewarding experience 
for me, even exhilarating at times’.431 Others were less content with the performance 
of the Expenditure Committee, several of them because it did not really look at 
expenditure. Robert Sheldon, who had transferred from the Public Accounts 
Committee to the General Sub-Committee, criticised the Expenditure Committee for 
failing in the task set for it by its order of reference - including to ‘study ... expenditure 
projections’.432 Others made similar criticisms and there were calls for many more 
debates in the Chamber on Expenditure Committee reports.433 Edmund Dell, 
Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, called for select committees to examine 
legislation.434  
 
Other criticisms of the Expenditure Committee were made a few years later by the 
constitutional scholar and former Minister Lord Crowther-Hunt and the journalist 
Peter Kellner. In The Civil Servants they traced the shortcomings of the process by 
which officials were questioned by the Expenditure Committee’s General Sub-
Committee.435 Their case study of an oral evidence session on the public expenditure 
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white paper in February 1976 contains a list of factual and statistical questions about 
economic policy and performance which were effectively not answered by the senior 
Treasury officials who appeared. The MPs were not satisfied by the response, and after 
that the House as a whole rejected the White Paper itself, surviving a subsequent vote 
of confidence. According to Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, the government simply 
carried on ‘applying (and amending) the policies of the white paper as if nothing had 
happened’.436A scathing Expenditure Committee report on the process came out, but 
‘in the short term its strictures went unheeded’. The next white paper in 1977 
‘contained even fewer details than the 1976 one’. Yet Kellner and Crowther-Hunt 
acknowledge that ‘In the longer term, the Expenditure Committee has had some 
impact; by 1979, the amount and variety of information contained in the annual 
expenditure white paper had increased to take account of the Committee’s criticisms’. 
Nevertheless economic policy was still out of reach for the Committee: ‘on the 
fundamental issues of economic analysis and forecast, the Treasury remained as tight-
lipped as ever’.437     
   
The tightness of Treasury lips was partly motivated by the 1970s atmosphere of almost 
continual economic crisis. As noted above, there was also a crisis in the division 
lobbies of the Commons, with close votes the norm and the whips working hard. The 
whips’ problems of the mid-1970s seem indeed to have been a major factor in an 
important development for select committees. For its first few years the Expenditure 
Committee had been, like most select committees of the time, appointed anew at the 
beginning of each annual Session, which meant that inquiries had to be decided on 
very quickly and carried out in a few months, so that the report could be published 
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before the session came to an end less than a year later. Simple logistics were 
important, as a clerk who had experience of the select committees of the time made 
clear later: 
If you had a committee that had to be appointed each session, you were very 
much in government’s hands as to when they put the nomination down [at 
the beginning of the session, usually in late autumn], even if they were going 
to put all the same members down [as in the previous session] ... and you also 
knew that you had to finish by July because you weren’t quite sure when the 
session was going to end. It was a very truncated scrutiny period ... it was 
very limiting. If governments were not particularly keen on something they 
could take slightly longer to set ... [the committees] up.438 
 
The result of this rushed schedule was that many committees produced just one or two 
reports before they were discharged. However in 1974 the Labour government 
introduced into the House motions to make the Expenditure Committee’s appointment 
permanent for the whole of the Parliament, first for the 1974 Parliament439 and then 
for the 1974-79 Parliament.440 The same measure was applied to the Nationalised 
Industries Committee, the Overseas Development Committee, the Science and 
Technology Committee and the Public Accounts Committee for the 1974-79 
Parliament.441  
 
On the surface it is surprising that the whips conceded this element of their power in 
the mid-1970s. But one plausible reason for the move was suggested in later years by 
a clerk who worked with select committees at the time; the clerk said that: ‘The 
political complexities of the 1974 Parliament ... led to the decision that members of 
select committees would be members for the rest of the Parliament ... it was a response 
to the difficulty of negotiating, fighting through, party proportions committee by 
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committee ... it was done for a very specific political purpose’.442 This was then 
apparently a purely pragmatic decision by the whips, of both main parties; they did 
not want select committee issues to divert their energies from the much more pressing 
task of ensuring that their parties made the most of their numbers on key and very tight 
votes in the Chamber.  
 
But this rather casual conversion of the main select committees to a semi-permanent 
status was surprisingly important for the development of the system, a point 
recognised by the reforming Procedure Committee of 1977-78. It was said by that 
Committee to have reduced the period of low (in fact of no) select committee activity 
at the beginning of sessions and the rush to complete inquiries at the end of sessions. 
This helped committee members and staff to plan their programmes better.443 A 
measure of coherence, continuity and stability was thereby provided for all the key 
select committees. The change was also perhaps important because members of a 
committee appointed for the whole Parliament were more likely to acquire knowledge 
of a subject and also to act independently of party feeling, without fearing removal 
within a year at the hands of irritated party managers. As one clerk put it years later, 
looking back after witnessing several decades of committee development, the change 
to Parliament-long committees made ‘a huge difference’ to the way committees and 
their staffs felt; they were now ‘part of a permanent and enduring institution’. The 
clerk described it as ‘one of the very significant features of the 1979 onwards 
committees that had its roots in the 1970s’.444 
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Another clerk with experience of serving committees both before and after 1979 put 
it just as strongly: ‘The changes in 1979 were very important, but I don’t think they 
were half as important as [the 1974 switch to appointment of committees for the whole 
Parliament]. It had a fundamental impact on what we did and I think that is actually 
ignored quite often.’445 Assumptions about the life chances of select committees appear 
to have changed quite considerably since the late 1960s; a further clerk with 
experience of select committees at the time later said of the 1970s, ‘I don’t think 
anybody thought the Expenditure Committee was going to be snuffed out overnight, 
or Science and Technology, or Nationalised Industries.’446   
 
Nevertheless, there remained a mismatch between the ambitions of Expenditure 
Committee sub-committees to scrutinise their parts of Whitehall and the resources and 
time available to carry out that scrutiny. One clerk who worked on such sub-
committees in the late 1970s later said that their ‘huge portfolios’ continued to hamper 
their work, with a single sub-committee of eight or nine members and perhaps three 
staff responsible for several government departments. The result seems to have been 
that programme planning could still be difficult; that clerk characterises this approach 
as rather ‘gentleman amateur’ with systematic investigation not really possible.447 For 
instance the Education, Arts and Home Office Sub-Committee covered a sizable and 
disparate group of departments, while the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee had to 
scrutinise the work of the Department of Trade, the Department of Industry, the 
Department of Energy, Department of Prices and Consumer Protection and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Such groupings inevitably stretched 
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resources and perhaps left sub-committees and their staffs with a sense of inadequacy. 
However this may not have been a problem right across the Expenditure Committee. 
The remits of other sub-committees were less thinly-spread and better-focussed; the 
Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee and the General Sub-Committee each 
‘marked’ a manageable part of Whitehall, and the Social Services and Employment 
Sub-Committee had just two (admittedly large and busy) departments to cover.  
 
Given the severity of their difficulties in the Chamber, it might seem likely that Labour 
Ministers would feel grateful that substantial numbers of Members were engaged in 
report drafting on the Committee Corridor rather than going into the dissenting voting 
lobbies downstairs. Yet gratitude was not evident when in January 1976 Cabinet 
discussed proposals for a committee on parliamentary reform produced by Edward 
Short, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons.448 The 
Conclusions of the 15 January Cabinet meeting show that Short’s colleagues saw the 
review as above all an opportunity to ease their parliamentary burdens while they 
tackled the crises confronting their government. For this Cabinet, the main 
parliamentary matters that were in special need of review included long hours of work, 
improvements to smooth ‘the legislative process ... including the possibility of 
automatic timetables for all Bills,’ as well as ‘the impact of the arrangement of 
Parliamentary business on the operation of the Government’.449 When this Cabinet 
meeting turned to the question of select committees, it became obvious that several 
Ministers felt that committees had become too numerous and too time-consuming. 
Cabinet was exercised by ‘The division of business between the floor of the House 
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and Committees, and the growing Committee structure and the development of the 
work of Select Committees, with the resultant pressure on the time of MPs and 
devaluation of debate on the floor’.  Ministers simply wanted fewer select committees, 
not more of them. 
 
There were certainly calls in the mid-and late-1970s for Parliament to do more to 
question the actions of Ministers; at the time the senior Conservative Lord Hailsham 
of St Marylebone famously warned against the ‘elective dictatorship’ of governments 
exercising wide powers based on a (sometimes narrow) majority. MPs should clearly 
have a role in challenging such a ‘dictatorship’.450  However, select committees were 
not widely seen as a key part of a solution to such problems. There was certainly no 
wider late-1970s wave of demands for root and branch select committee reform; 
neither in the House nor outside was there much call to expand or strengthen the 
system and improve scrutiny. On 2 February 1976, when the House debated Commons 
procedure, many members recognised the rapid growth of a committee culture.451 
Some indeed felt that there were already too many of them. The Conservative front 
bencher John Peyton for instance complained of ‘one phenomenon of our modern 
Parliament’: 
 As the number of Committees is increased, fewer Members find it possible 
to attend debates on the Floor of the House. The public are inclined to assume 
very readily that hon. Members do not take an interest. The public are not 
aware of the enormous amount of business that is conducted in Committee.452  
 
Several Members called for the establishment of a more coherent system of select 
committees to replace the current patchwork, but the majority of them were seeking a 
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greater and more formal role for select committees in considering legislation, or, as 
with the General Sub-Committee, scrutinising expenditure plans. The Conservative 
Sir Derek Walker-Smith in fact criticised the current pattern of Commons select 
committees because ‘Even though we have what has been called a proliferation of 
Select Committees, we have only a shadow of such a system today in that their 
function is largely investigatory and interrogatory and does not impinge directly on 
the legislative function’.453 There was little call for an expansion of the type of 
departmental committee that emerged in 1979, almost exclusively devoted to scrutiny 
of policy and administration and the production of reports.  
 
Some might also have been frustrated by the fact that the nature of scrutiny was 
different from what had been planned at the end of the 1960s. The Procedure 
Committee reformers of 1968-69 had envisaged that the Expenditure Committee 
would operate largely to assist the Treasury in its control of public expenditure, but in 
reality, like almost all its predecessors, it became instead a scrutineer of policy and 
administration. David Pring, who as Clerk of Committees was responsible for 
overseeing the work of the officials who serviced the whole system, agreed with 
Kenneth Baker MP, who said during an oral evidence session of the 1976-78 
Procedure Committee that ‘the House has already in effect a series of specialist Select 
Committees; we happen to call them sub-committees of the ... Expenditure 
Committee’. Baker then went on to suggest to Pring that ‘the net effect of the system 
since 1968-69 [including the already existing select committees] has not been to 
concentrate on the expenditure side as the previous Procedure Committee expected it 
would, but in fact one has created machinery to stimulate Government expenditure 
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rather than to restrain it’ - and again Pring agreed, though he said that this did not mean 
that the government had in fact spent more money.454   
  
It is clear that Pring felt that Members themselves had frustrated the intentions of those 
who had advocated the establishment of an Expenditure Committee which would 
strengthen the House’s power of the purse: ‘I think one of the lessons we have learned 
from this is that many Members do not feel that control and scrutiny must be directed 
from an expenditure or financial point of view’.455 Pring also complained that most 
Commons Chamber debates on select committee reports were ‘very sad occasions’, 
ill-attended and lacking a votable motion, which could give point to the proceedings 
by providing an opportunity for the House as a whole to express a view on a 
committee’s thinking. He called this ‘a distressing aspect of committee work’.456  
 
Prompted by the experience of the 1970s, some MPs were nevertheless calling for 
select committee reform on more ordered lines; the General Sub-Committee of the 
Expenditure Committee recommended such reform in its report on the Civil Service 
published in July 1977.457 The report laments the fact that ‘the House does not possess 
a comprehensive set of committees relating to each Department of State such as exists 
in, for example, the United States and EEC countries’. It proposed that such a system 
should be established, adding significantly that, to restore to the House its former 
control of the process of appropriating public expenditure, the new select committees 
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be required to consider relevant appropriations.458 This was both a call for a Haldane-
style reform on departmental lines, and a demand for a more rigorous approach to 
parliamentary control of spending, of the sort that had been intended by the Procedure 
Committee of 1968-69 when it proposed the establishment of the Expenditure 
Committee, but was not achieved. 
 
But, in general, the light of committee reform seems to have burnt rather dimly in the 
mid- and late-1970s; in 1978 John P. Mackintosh MP, a leading advocate of a more 
effective legislature, characterised the public mood in respect of the public sector, 
including Parliament, as ‘not innovative or reforming’. Parliament, according to 
Mackintosh, had not taken a lead on positive change; the work of the Procedure 
Committee itself had been disappointing, failing to produce ‘any clearcut analysis of 
the problem or proposed list of reforms’.459  In August 1976, the clerk Michael Ryle 
commented, along with S. A. Walkland, an academic supporter of reform, that the 
Procedure Committee had started its work ‘with no clear directions or guidelines’.460 
Even this most confirmed of clerk-reformers thus did not see this Procedure 
Committee as a prime opportunity for a major step forward on committee reform. Ryle 
was in fact impressed by the recent progress of select committees, noting that there 
had been ‘a truly significant extension of the work of select committees of enquiry, 
not only in number but also on the range and depth of their investigations’.461 Neither 
did the most senior House officials suggest there was a pressing need for committee 
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reform, like some of their predecessors. Whereas Sir Gilbert Campion gave oral 
evidence to the 1945-46 Procedure Committee as well as working behind the scenes 
for reform, Sir Richard Barlas, Clerk of the House in the late 1970s, provided no oral 
evidence to the 1977-78 Procedure Committee.   
 
Press reporting when the Procedure Committee was first established also indicates that 
the select committee reform dog did not bark, at least to begin with. The strong 
impression from The Guardian’s coverage of the 2 February 1976 debate is that the 
main theme was how to ‘streamline’ the House, as The Guardian put it, with the 
emphasis on better legislative processes to involve backbenchers more, and with only 
a relatively modest role for specialist committees.462 The US committee model was 
reported by The Guardian as being explicitly rejected by Short. In June 1976, Peter 
Hennessy, then Lobby Correspondent of the Financial Times but later a distinguished 
contributor to the academic literature on committee reform, listed some of the likely 
main themes of the Procedure Committee as being ‘the streamlining of the legislative 
process, more suitable working hours and improved research services for MPs’. He 
said that ‘Perhaps the most fruitful area the committee will scrutinise is the possibility 
of increasing the amount of framework legislation that comes before the Commons’.463 
This was seen as helping MPs to take a more strategic role and leaving the details to 
statutory instruments. In the summer of 1976, within government and within 
Parliament and outside, it is clear from the evidence that the assumption was that the 
Procedure Committee had been set up above all to ease the passage of legislation while 
also focussing legislative scrutiny on the most important issues. The Economist 
mentioned the idea of more specialist committees among a number of other issues for 
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reform in May 1976, but it was by no means at the top of the list, coming well below 
time limits on speeches and the number of supply days for the opposition parties.464  
 
Analysis of the written evidence sent to the Procedure Committee for its wide-ranging 
1976-78 inquiry suggests that few Parliamentarians, and fewer outsiders, were much 
exercised by the state of the committee system. Of 56 submissions made to the 
Committee only about a quarter, 15, concentrated largely on select committee issues, 
seeking a consolidation, rationalisation or expansion of the system. Of these, eight 
came from Members of Parliament and four from the Clerk’s Department, giving a 
strong impression that, on select committee issues, the House was talking to itself 
rather than listening to voices of outsiders calling for reform. Again the main demand 
was for select committees to be given a fuller role in the consideration of legislation. 
There was little call for the extension of the administrative and policy scrutiny work 
of committees which was ultimately the most prominent outcome of the Procedure 
Committee’s work. The evidence in this Chapter suggests why; although there were a 
number of complaints from those who believed the Expenditure Committee was not 
achieving what it had been intended to do to control spending, its work and the work 
of other select committees was accepted as moderately useful.  
 
Only one submission on select committees was sent to this Procedure Committee from 
interest groups - a joint paper from the Council for the Protection of Rural England 
and Friends of the Earth, which called for a standing select committee on roads. Of 
greater interest to those submitting evidence to this Procedure Committee was 
improvement to legislative processes; there were 25 submissions dealing with that. 
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Interest groups such as the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the National 
Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux and the Consultative Committee of 
Accountancy Bodies contributed their views on improvements to legislation.  
 
In the spring of 1977, however, one sign emerged of increased parliamentary interest 
in work on select committees. Over half of the House, an unusually large number of 
MPs, signed an early day motion (No. 222) urging the establishment of a foreign 
affairs select committee. The Conservative MP Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler was 
the chief and persistent advocate for the committee, but other signatories of the EDM 
included ‘a considerable number of Privy Councillors and former Ministers’.465 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Ministers and officials were in support of the idea, 
with the Foreign Secretary David Owen telling Michael Foot in March 1977 that such 
a committee could ‘provide the Government with a welcome opportunity to explain 
and justify its policies to a Parliamentary forum’.466 Inevitably, Foot was less enthused 
by the idea of a foreign affairs committee, and the fact that the Procedure Committee 
had not finished its work gave Foot the perfect excuse to swat away the enthusiastic 
Mr Brocklebank-Fowler when he pressed his case in June 1977.467 Little more was 
heard of the idea until the Procedure Committee reported in the summer of 1978. 
  
The select committee system as a whole appeared to be working fairly well, according 
to the Expenditure Committee, which gave itself a reasonable report in assessing its 
achievements in 1979.468 It claimed, among other advances occasioned by the 
                                                          
465   Hansard, HCD, col. 1406, 7 April 1977 
466   TNA, PREM 16/1268 ‘Proposal for a Select Committee on Foreign Affairs – Letter from the 
Foreign Secretary to the Lord President’, 25 March 1977 
467   Hansard, HCD, cols. 580-81, 16 June 1977 
468   Third Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1978-79, Work of the Expenditure 
Committee during the First Four Sessions of the Current Parliament (163) 
176 
 
Committee’s work in the 1974-79 Parliament: additional information included about 
housing and defence spending in the Public Expenditure White Paper, an ‘impetus 
towards remedial action’ in the implementation of fishing regulations, improvement 
in defence medical services, and the reversal of a decision to cancel an order for 
medium-lift helicopters.469 There was also a significant case in which, according to 
the Committee, an Expenditure Committee report formed ‘a focus and catalyst for 
informed opinion outside Whitehall’. This was the report on the National Land Fund, 
which was given ‘unanimous support’ by heritage organisations. But this report also 
prompted Members of both Houses to present their own Bills to implement some of 
the Committee’s recommendations. The resultant legislation, the National Heritage 
Act, duly became law in 1980 - an example of the Expenditure Committee directly 
influencing policy.470  
 
The impression of a gradually re-awakening Parliament of committees is reinforced 
by developments at the other end of the Palace of Westminster. The 1970s saw 
something of a revival in select committee activity in the Lords as well as the 
Commons. Rhodri Walters observes that from 1970 onwards, the Lords began for the 
first time in decades to set up its own committees on public policy other than Bills; in 
1974 came the establishment of a more permanent select committee to examine 
European legislation.471 This and succeeding committees, Walters says, were to ‘form 
the core of a permanent Lords committee system’. In addition, the Lords began from 
about 1977 onwards to establish ad hoc committees on significant policy issues, 
including a Bill of Rights and Unemployment.   
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Committee activity on the scale described needed substantial human resources to 
support it, and the House of Commons tried to keep up with demand during the 1970s. 
In total 53 full-time staff (including 25 clerks) serviced the seven Committees which 
had external investigatory roles, including 11 working for the European Legislation 
Committee.472 Laugharne observes that ‘In the 1970s the practice of appointing 
specialist advisers was expanded and consolidated’.473 
 
There are indications, however, that the House was still struggling to provide the staff 
to do the select committee job during the 1970s; a substantial number of current or ex-
Whitehall staff acted as clerks during the decade. The contribution of the former MI6 
officer, Tim Milne, has already been noted. Four of the seven clerks serving 
Expenditure and the clerk of the Public Accounts Committee in 1977 were formerly 
civil servants, and four of the five on European Legislation were seconded from the 
Service. The term used by many clerks to describe the retired civil servants who joined 
them was ‘retreads’, perhaps a gentle and classically clerkly pun on ‘retired’. The word 
was usually employed with a certain affection; retreads usually came and went after a 
few years and usefully helped to fill gaps as select committees became more active 
after 1960 - but they did not pose any threat to career progression among the permanent 
cadre of clerks.474  
 
Some of the 1970s retreads were also very senior. David Hubback, Clerk of the 
General Sub-Committee in the late 1970s, had retired in 1976 as Deputy Secretary in 
                                                          
472  Procedure Committee 1978, vol. III Appendix 37, p. 118 
473  Laugharne, Parliament and Specialist Advice, p. 43 
474  Help from Whitehall had of course been a regular feature of select committee life since at least 
the 1930s. See Chapter One 
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the Department of Trade and Industry. John Marnham, Clerk of the Trade and Industry 
Sub-Committee at the end of the 1960s, had been Assistant Under-Secretary of State 
in the Colonial Office and from 1966-1967 in the Foreign Office. He had been British 
Government Representative in the West Indian Associated States in 1970-1973 and 
Ambassador to Tunisia from 1973-1975. In some ways, the personal links between 
some senior Whitehall people and the House’s committees were therefore already 
fairly substantial before the departmental system was established. Pragmatism in 
response to the demands of the busy select committees trumped any constitutional 
purism, helping to oil the wheels of the slowly improving select committee machinery. 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has noted the shortcomings of the select committees of the 1970s, 
including their patchy coverage of government business, the irrational and 
complicated format of the key Expenditure Committee and the small number of 
Chamber debates which committees succeeded in securing for their reports. But the 
Chapter also contains qualitative and quantitative evidence of 1970s committees’ 
vigour and willingness to address complex and difficult issues. It is surprising that this 
is the first time that such evidence has been collected in this form and quantity. 
 
Those involved as clerks in the work of the pre-1979 select committees today express 
a variety of views about the committees’ effectiveness, and in some cases have a clear 
sense that the system was still not up to the job. However, assumptions were changing. 
The move to Parliament-long composition for select committees was an advance that 
left a permanent mark, a recognition that the late-1960s ministerial meddling in the 
work of the Agriculture and other committees was no longer possible. By the late 
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1970s select committees were also being judged by expectations that were much 
higher than they had been just 20 years before, which accounts perhaps for some of 
the complaints about their effectiveness. The case of Harold Lever and Chrysler also 
demonstrates that select committees could make political waves in ways that would 
have been unheard of in the 1950s. The Labour Cabinet’s January 1976 irritation with 
burgeoning select committees may, indeed, have been influenced by the simultaneous 
stand-off over Lever’s possible appearance before the Trade and Industry Sub-
Committee.   
 
The figures suggest that increasing numbers of MPs took part in committee inquiries 
during the decade and that they attended select committee meetings in reasonable 
numbers. More specialist advisers were appointed, augmenting the expertise available 
to committees; more evidence was take in public and committee visits, important 
occasions for committee bonding, appear to have become more common. Committees 
sometimes pressed for evidence to be given even when Ministers were unwilling to 
provide it. It is also clear that some senior politicians, including Cabinet Ministers, felt 
that there were already too many committees and that they held too many meetings. 
Yet very little of this 1970s activity and institutional progress has registered with those 
who have written on the development of select committees. 
 
This Chapter has suggested that this paradox may be explained in part by the political 
situation of the time. The tight arithmetic of party balance in the House, especially in 
the late 1970s, meant that public and political attention was focussed largely on 
whether the government would survive a key vote in the Chamber; the deliberations 
of select committees did not seem of great interest to the public or the press. Yet it was 
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that very government vulnerability that appears to have facilitated a key advance for 
committees during the decade; the decision taken in 1974 to appoint select committees 
for a whole Parliament, which was highly significant in assuring their independence 
and helping them plan their work better. In this sense, Norton is correct to identify the 
dissent of the 1970s as important in the development of select committees. However 
his account requires some modification. While Norton claims that the dissent led MPs 
to press for the select committee change that took place in 1979, in fact the effect of 
dissent was more immediate and the transmission mechanism was different. In 1974 
the whips eased their burden straight away by giving the existing select committees a 
new institutional permanence, thereby incidentally insulating them from interference. 
This was sensible party management rather than a peasants’ revolt.  Like the 1960s, 
the 70s were a decade of modest but significant steps forward in the development of 
select committees.     
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Chapter Four: The Process of Select Committee Reform, 1978-79 
 
This Chapter considers the process by which the 1979 reform of select committees 
came about. It begins by tracing how the Procedure Committee decided to make its 
recommendations for reform of the select committee system, and continues with an 
examination of the wider response to those recommendations in Parliament and 
government. This and the preceding chapter provide clear evidence that assumptions 
in Westminster and Whitehall about the role of select committee had changed 
fundamentally since the dismissive days of the late 1950s. MPs, Ministers and civil 
servants in the late 1970s mostly accepted that investigatory select committees were 
there to stay. The 1978 Procedure Committee recommendations thus fell on fertile 
ground. The main research questions to be addressed in this Chapter concern: the 
motivation behind the Procedure Committee’s call for substantial restructuring and 
reform of the system of select committees; the extent to which select committees 
changed as a result of the reform; which factors determined the nature and extent of 
the change to the operation of the select committee system; and which roles were 
played by Parliament and Whitehall in establishing the new system. 
 
The Procedure Committee gets to work  
The Select Committee which was appointed in June 1976 to carry out the review of 
Procedure seemed at first to offer little challenge to government. The Chairman chosen 
by the whips was a solid government loyalist, Sir Thomas Williams, Member for 
Warrington.475 Williams was a barrister who continued to work during his time as a 
                                                          
475   The Government had initially considered someone very different as Chairman of the Procedure 
Committee: on 4 March 1976, Short had written to Edward Heath, the former Prime Minister, 
asking whether he would wish to chair the Committee.  TNA, PREM 6/1788, ‘Letter to Rt Hon 
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Member and who in 1981 was appointed a circuit judge and left the House. Williams 
was thus in some ways the embodiment of the ‘gentleman amateur’ part-time MP and 
thus unsuited to lead a reforming committee. Williams was an amiable presence but 
not regarded as a dynamic or reforming one. He was also unwell for much of the 
Committee’s life and his place in the chair was regularly taken by the senior 
Conservative Sir David Renton. The choice of Enoch Powell, now an Ulster Unionist 
and still a procedural traditionalist, as a member of the Committee, indicated that any 
reform, especially select committee reform, would have a hard time. 
 
However the procedural conservatives were not to have it all their own way. For one 
thing, the closeness of the parliamentary arithmetic meant that the new Committee’s 
composition was finely balanced between government and non-government Members, 
and a core of back benchers of ability and independence and relative youth had 
escaped the attentions of the whips to join the Committee.476 The most assiduous 
attendees included the Conservative Kenneth Baker and Labour’s George 
Cunningham, John Garrett and Michael English. Baker, a future Home Secretary, was 
Chairman of the Hansard Society, which had been advocating parliamentary reform 
for some time, and Garrett was already known as a prominent parliamentary and 
administrative reformer, with experience of advising the 1960s Fulton Committee on 
the Civil Service among other bodies. English was the Chairman of the General Sub-
Committee of the Expenditure Committee which was undertaking a major inquiry on 
the Civil Service at around the same time. Another Labour Member, Giles Radice, was 
                                                          
Edward Heath from E. W. Short, 4 March 1976’. Heath’s reply was presumably negative but is not 
known  
476     Almost half of the members of the Committee had first entered the House in or after 1970. 
W.A. Proctor, ‘The House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure, 1976 to 1979’, The Table, 
47 (1979), p. 17  
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to acquire a reputation as a doughty parliamentary reformer. Norman Lamont was a 
Conservative member who was to hold senior positions in the Thatcher and Major 
governments of the next two decades. The solid quality of the Committee’s 
membership provided a good basis for cross-party backbench reformism. 
   
However there was little interest in the Committee at higher political levels. Michael 
Foot told Callaghan on 2 December 1976 that ‘the official Opposition, through the 
usual channels, expressed very limited enthusiasm for the Committee and would 
happily have seen it forgotten.’477  When Foot gave evidence to the Procedure 
Committee on 20 December 1976, almost all the questioning, as agreed, centred on 
the legislative process and how it could be improved. There were few questions about 
the scrutiny and investigative role of select committees, although Foot said that he was 
‘suspicious of select committees, partly because they work on a non-partisan basis’.478  
 
The priority which the Procedure Committee originally gave to the question of 
legislative efficiency is clear; it was only in May 1977, fully eleven months after it 
had been established, that the Committee held its first hearing specifically about select 
committees. At around this time, there was a change in the committee secretariat, with 
Bill Proctor, a young clerk from the Journal Office, taking over from Clifford Boulton 
(who was later to become Clerk of the House). Soon the Committee made perhaps its 
most important decision on the nature and functions of select committees. It had heard 
evidence in January 1977 from the Clerk of the Canadian House of Commons, Alistair 
                                                          
477   TNA, PREM 16/1788, ‘Minute to the Prime Minister from Michael Foot: Select Committee on 
Procedure’ 2 December 1976  
478   Procedure Committee 1978,Vol II, p. 68 
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Fraser.479 Impressed by Fraser’s account, the Committee resolved to explore the 
possibility of reproducing at Westminster the ‘standing committees’ of the Canadian 
House, which examined legislation and the financial estimates as well as scrutinising 
the administrative activities of ministries. In this way the Canadians had gone some 
way to establishing the system of all-purpose committees envisaged by Harold Wilson 
in his 1964 Stowmarket speech, but later rejected in the Crossman reforms and ignored 
in subsequent developments. A Procedure Committee Sub-Committee on the issue, 
led by Kenneth Baker, visited Ottawa in June 1977. But the Sub-Committee gave a 
negative verdict on the Canadian committees, reporting in July 1977 that they were 
expected to do three things but in fact this resulted in them ‘not doing all three well’. 
The report feared that if the system was imported that would ‘almost inevitably mean 
the suffocation of some of our select committees by legislation and a great diminution 
in the financial and more general work presently done by them’.480  
 
The Procedure Committee now moved swiftly to decision.  In the middle of October 
1977, while the House was still in recess the Procedure Committee met (in itself a sign 
of the Committee’s capacity for work and engagement with the issues) and agreed in 
outline, ‘after lengthy discussion’ the proposals it would put to the House about the 
future structure of select committees. They were broadly that ‘the Expenditure 
Committee and its sub-committees, together with most other existing investigative 
select committees, should be replaced by a series of twelve new select committees 
“each charged with the examination of all aspects of expenditure, administration and 
                                                          
479    Ibid., pp. 97 to 112. Evidence from foreign witnesses, although rare, was not unheard of in the 
early 1970s. For instance, for the experience of the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee 
of the Expenditure Committee, see Chapter Three 
480    Procedure Committee 1978, Vol. I, Appendix A, p. 4. Report to the Select Committee on 
Procedure by Sub-Committee A: ‘The Process of Legislation in the House of Commons of Canada’ 
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policy in a field of administration within the responsibilities of a single government 
department or two or more related departments”’.481   
 
Having reached this important decision of principle, the Procedure Committee 
completed its evidence-taking sessions in November 1977 and embarked on a lengthy 
period of drafting. There were in total 68 separate meetings of the Committee and on 
average 13 out of a total of 16 Members of the Committee attended - a remarkably 
high proportion.482 There was much discussion about details of drafting and many 
votes took place, but the general approach on select committees was agreed. This 
concentration on drafting was a highly unusual way of working for a select committee; 
most committees spend the bulk of their time in taking oral evidence rather than 
deliberating on reports. The Committee was also prepared to flex its constitutional 
muscles. Just before Christmas 1977 Bill Proctor wrote on behalf of the Committee to 
the Head of the Home Civil Service, Sir Douglas Allen, asking him to submit to the 
Committee a Memorandum ‘explaining what general advice and guidance the Civil 
Service Department give to other Government departments and agencies about the 
treatment of requests from House of Commons select committees for the provision of 
papers and records ... and for the attendance of departmental witnesses’.483 Proctor 
also asked for copies of ‘all circulars or other papers’ containing such guidance. After 
some discussion, the most recent Guidance was provided to the Committee, which 
published it in its Report, in the spirit of openness.484 But it was clear that the request 
                                                          
481    Proctor, ‘The House of Commons Select Committee on Procedure’, p. 20 
482    Ibid., p. 18 
483    TNA, PREM 16/1788, ‘Select Committee on Procedure: Letter to Sir Douglas Allen from W. 
A. Proctor’, 14 December 1977 
484   Procedure Committee 1978, Vol. I, p. 38, Appendix D, ‘Memorandum of Guidance for 
officials appearing before Select Committees’. This was known as GEN 76/78. The origins of the 
Guidance are rather obscure; the relevant House of Commons Library Standard Note 
(SN/PC/2671) merely states that ‘Earlier drafts of the Rules had clearly existed in the 1970s’.   
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had put the Chairman in a difficult position. Julian Moore, Private Secretary to Lord 
Peart, former Leader of the House of Commons reported that Williams had said the 
request for the memorandum had been ‘imposed on him by his Committee (one or two 
of whom wanted to instigate a trial of strength)’.485 This was an important victory for 
an assertive Committee. 
 
The Procedure Committee reports 
When the Procedure Committee reported on 3 August 1978, its key judgment on 
select committees echoed the sentiments of the 1918 Haldane Report in saying that 
the House ‘should no longer rest content with an incomplete and unsystematic 
scrutiny of the activities of the Executive merely as a result of historical accident or 
sporadic pressures’.486  Therefore ‘there should be a reorganisation of the select 
committee structure to provide the House with the means of scrutinising the 
activities of the public service on a continuing and systematic basis’.  The Procedure 
Committee recommended the establishment of the following select committees, each 
covering the expenditure, administration and policy of one or more departments:  
• Agriculture 
• Defence 
• Education, Science and Arts 
• Energy 
• Environment 
• Foreign Affairs 
• Home Affairs 
                                                          
485   TNA, PREM 16/1788, ‘Select Committee on Procedure – CSD Memorandum of Guidance: 
Letter from J. K. Moore to K. R. Stowe’, 27 January 1978 
486   Procedure Committee 1978, Vol. I, p. lii 
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• Industry and Employment 
• Social Services 
• Trade and Consumer Affairs 
• Transport 
• The Treasury (including for these purposes the Civil Service Department)487   
One interesting feature of this recommended pattern is that it is not strictly 
‘departmental’; several of the proposed committees would, like their Expenditure 
Committee predecessors, cover the activities of two or even more departments. This 
was the case with the suggested committees on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Consumer 
Affairs, Home Affairs and Treasury. In this sense, although it was much more 
comprehensive in its coverage, the Procedure Committee’s system was similar to the 
pattern of the Expenditure Committee. In the event, as noted below, the new 
committee system which emerged was slightly different from that proposed by 
Procedure.   
    
Other key Procedure Committee recommendations were aimed more directly at the 
heart of the constitutional relationship between the House and the government. These 
included the proposals that nominations for the membership of the new committees 
should be entrusted to the all-party Committee of Selection rather than the whips, and 
that all departmental Estimates should be referred to departmental select committees 
(but not that Estimates should be formally approved by them, which would have 
imposed too much of a burden). It was also recommended that select committee 
chairmen should be paid an additional salary, that they should be able to appoint 
specialist advisers and seek advice from the Exchequer and Audit Department (the 
                                                          
487   Ibid., p. lv  
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forerunner of the National Audit Office) and that the House should allot eight days per 
session to debate on the Reports of select committees.488 There was a significant 
recommendation that standing committees examining legislation should be able to 
take evidence in public, like a select committee, before moving on to consider a Bill 
clause by clause. The Report also recommended that select committees should be 
given strengthened powers and clearer enforcement procedures to help them in the 
vital task of securing access to information held by the government. Select 
committees’ exercise of the existing powers in this area were, the report said, 
hampered ‘by their inability to order the attendance of Ministers or to order the 
production of papers by at least the great majority of government departments’ and by 
the absence of ‘any effective means’ of enforcement.489   
 
This was a comprehensive set of proposals. Having made them, the Committee then 
ensured that the report’s message came through loud and clear. The report, and 
especially the introduction, had been designed to be trenchant enough to attract media 
interest. The Introduction sounds a clear alarm, warning that ‘the balance of advantage 
between Parliament and Government in the day-to-day working of the Constitution is 
now weighted in favour of the Government to a degree which arouses widespread 
anxiety and is inimical to the proper working of our parliamentary democracy’. The 
capitalisation of the word ‘Constitution’ is enough to demonstrate that this warning is 
to be taken seriously. Nevertheless the report’s recommendations on select committees 
                                                          
488   During the 1970s, the number of Chamber debates on select committee reports was usually in 
single figures, with about half considering ‘domestic’ committees which were responsible for the 
House’s internal administration and services. Only a small number concerned ‘policy and 
administration’ issues 
489   These powers, highly complex in operation, hedged about with exceptions and with 
enforcement subject to the whip-influenced agreement of the House, were seen by some as one of 
the key issues for reform: The Observer, ‘The battle for Whitehall’, 6 August 1978. Procedure 
Committee 1978, pp.xciii-xciv 
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built firmly on existing practice. The report goes on to make this clear: for instance it 
says ‘a new balance must be struck, not by changes of a fundamental or revolutionary 
character … but by changes in practice of an evolutionary kind, following naturally 
from present practices’.490 While the call to constitutional arms raised the report’s 
profile, the Committee’s underlying gradualness was very important in ensuring that 
many of the recommendations were accepted by government. Several Procedure 
Committee members, especially Michael English and John Garrett, were, as noted 
earlier in this Chapter, experienced in the ways of reform, and probably aware of the 
patience often required by those who advocated it. In addition, the restrained nature of 
the reform also helped the House adjust step-by-step to more active select committees. 
For all its restraint, however, the report had an immediate media impact, with a 
succession of news and comment pieces drawing special attention to the key 
recommendations on select committees.491  
 
Media coverage of the inquiry had been steady before, but it increased substantially 
with the publication of the report. Substantial news pieces were accompanied by 
supportive editorials across the serious ‘broadsheets’. This level of interest in a report 
on the procedure of the House was unusual, if not unprecedented. But there were some 
dissenting voices in the media. Writing in July 1979, the respected commentator Alan 
Watkins of The Observer lamented the demise of the Nationalised Industries 
Committee, which he saw as constitutionally important because it enabled Parliament 
                                                          
490   Ibid., p. viii 
491   There was an outbreak, rare at the time, of pre-briefing of the media: for instance The 
Observer, ‘MPs seek tighter grip on Whitehall’, 30 July, 1978; On publication, The Times, 4 
August 1978, said that the Report ‘may prove to be a historic document in British parliamentary 
history’; The Economist 5 August 1978, called it ‘a milestone of parliamentary reform’. The 
Guardian, 4 August 1978, reported that ‘MPs seek more control over government machine’ 
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to monitor companies for which there was no direct ministerial responsibility.492 More 
broadly, Watkins wondered whether ‘perhaps it does not greatly matter how the 
committees are organised’. This is a point to which this thesis will return. 
  
The Clerk of the House from 1976-79, Sir Richard Barlas, was a supporter of reform, 
although much more cautious than his predecessors Campion and Fellowes. It was 
highly unusual for a Clerk to give a public interview, but Barlas did so in The Times 
in the autumn of 1978.493 Barlas indicated that the men (and a few women) whose 
professional responsibility it would be to make the departmental committee system 
work were in favour of change. When The Times journalist Peter Hennessy asked 
Barlas for his views of the proposed departmental committee system, he said: ‘I think 
the clerks on the whole were impressed by the report of the Procedure Committee. The 
present set-up is not planned at all and something must be done about it’. The timing 
of  Barlas’s  clear statement of support is a little surprising; he was speaking publicly 
as an official at a time when the government had still not stated its position on the 
Procedure Committee recommendations.  It is also worth noting the clerkly precision 
with which Barlas chose his words in the interview; when he said that the clerks were 
‘on the whole’ in favour of reform, he hinted at the doubts of some in his own ranks 
about the new system. Neither was Barlas in favour of giving committees the powers 
and functions of their hyperactive Washington counterparts, or of ‘aping the worst 
practices of Washington’s Capitol Hill’, to use Hennessy’s words. The 1950s era of 
                                                          
492   The Observer, ‘New watchdogs - but don't expect too much’, 1 July 1979. Apart from the 
Nationalised Industries Committee, the report called for the abolition of the Committee on Science 
and Technology, the Overseas Development Committee, the Race Relations and Immigration 
Committee and the Committee that oversaw the work of the Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Administration (the Ombudsman). The latter committee was not in fact abolished. In each case, the 
Procedure Committee recommended that the work of an abolished committee should be taken on 
by one of the new departmental committees 
493   The Times, ‘Discreet skill that keeps the parliamentary show rolling’, 7 November 1978.  
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the U.S. Senate Sub-Committee notoriously chaired by Joseph McCarthy was still 
quite fresh in the mind, and for the same article The Times was told, unattributably, 
that the clerks were determined to avoid ‘shades of Cohn and Schine’, a reference to 
the work of McCarthy’s assiduous assistants in his search for Communism in the U.S. 
government.  
 
Despite the Procedure Committee’s enthusiastic public reception, select committees 
of all types continued to be regarded with suspicion by some senior political figures. 
On 18 September 1978 the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, produced for his Cabinet 
colleagues a Memorandum on the question of inquiries into the breaking of sanctions 
against the illegal Rhodesian regime of Ian Smith during the 1960s.494 There had 
already been one report into the matter, by the senior lawyer Thomas Bingham, but 
there was pressure for a further inquiry. There was naturally concern among Labour 
Ministers that the actions of the Labour governments of the late 1960s would come 
under scrutiny. Using ministerial arguments that had almost acquired the status of holy 
writ since the Marconi affair six decades before, Callaghan gave short shrift to the idea 
of a select committee of inquiry: ‘the overriding objection [to such inquiries] is that 
almost certainly any such Select Committee would be likely very quickly to divide on 
Party lines and thus defeat the purpose of a dispassionate objective inquiry’. But 
Callaghan went further, warning that ‘producing Cabinet papers to a Select Committee 
would establish a very significant and dangerous precedent, e.g. would it be possible 
thereafter to refuse the Expenditure Committee permission to see the relevant Cabinet 
papers underlying a policy decision?’ On 21 September 1978, the Cabinet agreed with 
Callaghan’s opinion, the Conclusions for that day recording candidly that there was 
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among Ministers ‘wide support for the view that a Select Committee of the House of 
Commons would be an unsatisfactory form of inquiry. It would be difficult for the 
Government to control’.495  
 
The Government Responds 
The Procedure Committee had spoken trenchantly and its proposals had achieved a 
high profile. But there was still no guarantee that the key recommendations on 
departmental committees would be supported by the government. Indeed all the 
evidence is that the fundamental contention of the report - that Parliament was weak 
and the government strong - was completely at odds with the opinions and current 
experience of almost all the Cabinet, and especially of the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the House of Commons. The government response occurred in two quite 
distinct phases - first the upper echelons of the Civil Service accepted it in a stately 
and unhurried fashion, and then it was agreed by Ministers - but it was to be a new set 
of Ministers.  
 
On 2 August 1978, Sir John Hunt wrote to Ken Stowe in the Prime Minister’s Office, 
preparing the way for the publication of the Procedure Committee report. Hunt’s 
minute shows that he was determined to ensure that the Civil Service would be able 
to put its stamp fully on the government’s response. He said: ‘the Committee has 
operated over a period of increasing interest in the powers of Parliament vis-a-vis the 
Executive, in procedural matters generally and in such related matters as open 
government and official information. We may therefore expect early pressures in the 
autumn for a response to its recommendations’. The Prime Minister was happy enough 
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with Hunt’s plans for producing a response, but he noted drily in a manuscript 
comment on the Committee’s proposals: ‘Not much here I would agree with (whether 
in Govt or Opposition!).’ 496   
 
Neither did the Civil Service speak with one voice. Sir Douglas Wass, Permanent 
Secretary at the Treasury, expressed his anxieties about the idea of a system of 
departmental committees in a letter to Sir Ian Bancroft, who had succeeded Douglas 
Allen as Head of the Home Civil Service on 1 January 1978. Wass said that the 
Procedure Committee’s recommendations could imply ‘major’ and ‘irreversible’ 
changes in the constitutional relationship between Parliament and the Executive, and 
in the role of the Civil Service.497 Wass later recalled that he had himself always been 
‘treated courteously by select committees’, but that he was anxious that if other staff 
with less experience of giving evidence were asked about economic and financial 
policy, ‘and put in a difficult position, it could be very awkward’.498 Wass’s attitude 
to the idea of a system of departmental committees had, he said, been heavily 
influenced by an incident in June 1975 involving a Treasury Deputy Secretary, 
Lawrence Airey (later Sir Lawrence). Appearing before the Trade and Industry Sub-
Committee of the Expenditure Committee, on the issue of the future of the British 
Leyland Motor Company, Airey had been subjected to ‘extremely unpleasant’ 
questioning; he had, said Wass, been ‘put over the barrel’ and had returned to the 
Treasury ‘a very shaken man’.499  
                                                          
496   TNA, PREM 16/1789, ‘Procedure Committee Report: Minute to K. R. Stowe from Sir John 
Hunt, 2 August 1978’ 
497   TNA, CAB 164/1424, ‘Letter to Sir Ian Bancroft from Sir Douglas Wass, 1 September 1978’ 
498   Author’s interview with Sir Douglas Wass 
499   Fourteenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1974-75, The Motor Vehicle 
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Writing to a Cabinet Office colleague on 8 September, Sir John Hunt said that ‘The 
Treasury are clearly in a very negative mood about the Report’.500 But Wass and his 
Treasury colleagues were not alone in Whitehall in being concerned about the 
implications of the proposed committees. The Home Office Permanent Secretary, Sir 
Robert Armstrong, who wrote to Hunt on 4 October, regretted that he was not able to 
be present at the Permanent Secretaries’ meeting, but offered his view.501 Armstrong 
identified ‘a major - perhaps the major - question’ [Armstrong’s emphasis] about the 
departmental committee proposals, which was whether Ministers would be content to 
see the development of a system which would ‘increase the exposure of their 
departmental policies and actions to parliamentary scrutiny, and transfer from them to 
their officials (and presumably not only the very senior officials as hitherto) a 
considerable part of the task of detailed exposition and defence’.502 
 
But those government officials who harboured doubts about the Procedure Committee 
proposals did not generally find that their political masters or indeed the very top 
leadership of the Civil Service had much sympathy. Wass said later ‘I don’t think any 
of us had the feeling that Ministers were very concerned about [the idea of a 
departmental committee system]. They had other things on their minds’. Wass recalled 
that he had briefed Healey about the Procedure Committee report but the Chancellor 
had not said much in response.503 David Faulkner, the Cabinet Office Under Secretary 
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responsible for legislation and parliamentary reform, later indicated that his 
department put parliamentary reform low on its list of priorities, saying: ‘the Procedure 
Committee report slipped through, in a way, without anybody thinking very much 
about it. I don’t remember other people in the Cabinet Office taking it particularly 
seriously’. Faulkner said that he worked on select committee reform ‘without very 
much interference’ from senior officials including Hunt.504  
 
When the permanent secretaries met to discuss the issue in Conference Room A of the 
Cabinet Office on the afternoon of 5 October 1978,505 the Treasury argued that their 
Ministers at least ‘would be likely to be unwilling to accelerate the trend towards a 
wider role for select committees’. The Treasury’s main concern, it was said, was with 
the potentially disruptive effect of new committees on the development and 
presentation of economic and financial policy. The 5 October meeting also recognised 
that safeguards would be needed for the constitutional position of officials under any 
new system; it was argued by one or more permanent secretaries that ‘if the proposed 
new structure were accepted, Ministers might wish to press for the establishment of 
firm conventions governing the relationship between Departmental officials and the 
committees’. Although the record of 5 October does not attribute comments, it seems 
very likely that it was Armstrong who made that general constitutional point, while 
Wass raised the issue of potential disruption to the presentation of economic policy. 
But when Hunt summed up the discussion, he said that most of those present ‘were 
prepared to go along with the proposed system of Departmental select committees, 
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either because they positively welcomed it or because there were no convincing 
arguments which could properly be deployed against it’.   
 
Up to this point the government’s response to the Procedure Committee had been 
almost exclusively considered by civil servants working behind closed doors. 
However party politics intervened on 8 October 1978 when the Conservative Party’s 
Spokesman on House of Commons Affairs, Francis Pym, came out in favour of the 
Procedure Committee recommendations. In a speech to the Cambridge University 
Conservative Association, Pym said that ‘A major objective of the next Conservative 
Government must be to re-establish Parliament’s authority’.506 Among other things, 
Pym promised action on the ‘important proposals’ of the Procedure Committee, of 
which the ‘most significant’ were perhaps the departmental select committee 
recommendations. He gave a ‘clear pledge that in the first session after a general 
election the next Conservative Government will present to Parliament positive 
proposals ... and give the Commons an opportunity to come to a firm conclusion’.  
 
Despite the Treasury’s anxieties, most in Whitehall saw the risks of the proposed 
system as manageable. In a paper prepared for Cabinet in October 1978, the civil 
servants on the Official Committee on Parliamentary Procedure (PPO), judged that the 
Procedure Committee’s report was ‘essentially ... conservative’, putting forward its 
proposals ‘within the context of the existing Parliamentary relationship between the 
Executive and the Legislature’. Indeed the PPO paper almost regarded the Procedure 
Committee’s report as something of a damp squib, a missed opportunity for Parliament 
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to make its case for reform, not touching upon wider constitutional issues and not 
really a ‘fundamental review’ as originally envisaged.507 
 
The paper admits that there was ‘a difference of view’ on PPO about whether the 
Procedure Committee proposals would represent ‘a significant change’ or ‘rather a 
formalisation of existing practice’ with the subject committees of the Expenditure 
Committee. Departments that had not already been regularly and closely scrutinised 
by the Expenditure Committee were more likely to harbour concerns; the Treasury 
had clearly expressed anxiety over the possibility of ‘substantial areas of economic 
and financial management’ becoming the subject of public sessions, especially at a 
time of great economic uncertainty. From this point of view, the timing could hardly 
have been more sensitive. This winter of 1978 -79 became known in the UK as ‘The 
Winter of Discontent’, with trade union disputes in both private and public sectors 
reaching a new level of bitterness. It was felt in the Treasury that public airing of 
uncertainties about the government’s economic management could increase instability 
at home and abroad. Just as importantly, the PPO paper observes that an expanded 
select committee system could affect Ministers’ relations with Parliament. Ministers 
‘do not have the initiative; the choice in timing of business is in the hands of the 
Chairman rather than the Whips’.508  
 
Other changes which would follow in the wake of reform would, according to PPO, 
centre largely on concerns that there would be ‘greater pressure for the release of 
Government information, for example, details of economic projections, which 
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Ministers have hitherto resisted’. This reflected experience of some of the requests of 
the Expenditure Committee and turned out to be prophetic in terms of the demands of 
the future Treasury Committee.509 Reorganisation of select committees, therefore, 
appeared to hold some dangers for civil servants, though they would still be on 
reasonably familiar territory, with cases such as that of Harold Lever and the Chrysler 
inquiry still fresh in the official mind. In general, Whitehall did not see major problems 
with the idea of the new committees; in the spring of 1979, all but one of the 14 
Permanent Secretaries surveyed by Vilma Flegmann believed that the principle was, 
as Flegmann put it, ‘unexceptionable’.510 
 
However, officials were concerned about the implications of some other Procedure 
Committee recommendations, including the proposal that a select committee, as 
distinct from the whole House, should have the formal right to order Ministers’ 
attendance or to instruct them to produce papers. PPO pointed out that Ministers 
‘refusing to comply with such orders and seeking the backing of the whole House for 
their decision would start from a disadvantageous position’.511 PPO considered that 
Ministers might wish to resist the Procedure Committee’s recommendation on this 
point; as noted below, that was exactly what they did. Another area of concern for 
PPO was the Procedure Committee’s suggestion of increased staffing for select 
committees: this might be expensive and the new system might risk ‘an unacceptable 
shift of power to select committees’.512 The actual increase in staffing under the new 
committee system would be fairly modest, but the establishment of arrangements for 
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funding the House through the new House of Commons Commission, entirely made 
up of MPs, rather than directly from a Treasury subvention, might represent a 
significant change, as the government could no longer tighten the purse strings as a 
way of curbing scrutiny.513 
 
This fairly clear steer from officialdom, chiming with support from the official 
Opposition in the form of Pym’s Cambridge speech, was still not enough to persuade 
Michael Foot that departmental committees would be beneficial.514 Other Ministers 
shared Foot’s view. Despite - or perhaps because of - the Conservative Party’s support 
for committee reform, Cabinet members were in October 1978 generally opposed to 
the departmental committees, some arguing, as Cabinet members had in 1976, against 
the basic premise of the Procedure Committee report - that the balance between 
Parliament and government was weighted in favour of government.515 The idea that 
Parliament was at bay before the executive was thus seen by some as ‘a wrong 
assessment’ and the minute records comments to the effect that ‘nothing would be 
achieved by reducing the power of the Executive beyond the limit where it could act 
under our present Parliamentary system’. Callaghan summed up, noting that ‘the 
majority of those who had spoken were opposed to the Procedure Committee’s 
recommendations’ on this issue. Nevertheless, Cabinet agreed to arrange a debate 
‘early in the new Session’. However, in the greater scheme of things, arguments about 
Select Committees were not the top priority of anyone in or around government that 
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day. Neither Tony Benn nor Bernard Donoughue, assiduous diarists both, mentioned 
the Cabinet discussion of the Procedure Committee report in their diary entries for the 
day, giving prominence instead to economic issues, including the European Monetary 
System and what Donoughue called the Cabinet’s ‘huge agenda on public 
expenditure’.516   
 
The House debates reform 
The Procedure Committee report was finally debated on the floor of the Commons in 
February 1979. The Shadow Leader of the House, Norman St John-Stevas, said that 
the ‘function of controlling and checking the Executive is not being performed by 
Parliament as it should be. We have, in effect, a professional Government and we still 
have an amateur legislature’.517 Stevas urged the government to put down motions for 
the establishment of the departmental committees and let the House decide. Michael 
Foot was not persuaded: once again he rehearsed his arguments against a more 
powerful committee system: ‘if we set up the 12 Committees to examine the matters 
proposed in the report on a regular basis we shall have not merely a further draining 
away of attention from the Chamber ... but the strength of Parliament being 
increasingly transferred to such Committees, thereby injuring the position of 
individual Members’.518 Sydney Irving, Labour MP for Dartford, raised a number of 
concerns about the potential effects of a departmental committee system, including the 
risk that some committees would become ‘so intimately involved with their 
Departments that their power to attack, where necessary, would be blunted’.519 Irving 
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also warned against over-specialisation and the growth of a two-tier House, suggesting 
that unless a Member belonged to a committee, he or she would have to be 
‘courageous’ to become involved ‘in a fundamental way on the Floor of the House in 
a debate on a subject on which a Committee had spent a long time in dealing with a 
Department and its problems’.520 Later chapters will assess to what extent Irving’s 
apprehensions turned out to be justified. 
 
However, most Members were in favour of change. The most distinctive contribution 
came from the now-converted Enoch Powell, who emphasised his support for the 
bodies he had criticised 12 years before, saying that ‘the  recommendation on Select 
Committees stands out from the rest of the report as the one section in which all 
elements of that Committee found themselves in almost total agreement’. Powell 
indicated, like others, that the proposals were largely evolutionary, with select 
committees the next step in a lengthy process of rational development, starting with 
the establishment of the Public Accounts Committee in 1861 and moving inexorably 
on to further stages through the Estimates and Expenditure Committees until the 
present day, when the obvious next move was to a coherent system of departmentally-
related committees.521 Some Members, Powell added, feared that the new Committees 
would be ‘like the political branch of the Red Army in which every military 
commander has a politician assigned to him’. But Powell was confident that ‘That fear 
is groundless’. Most other Members who spoke also welcomed the report, including 
the Conservative William Benyon, to whom it was ‘like a breath of fresh air’.522  
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The generally supportive tone of the Commons debate did not bring the Procedure 
Committee proposals any nearer to realisation. The key element missing was support 
from the government, a government that was in any case in its death throes after the 
socially disruptive strikes of the ‘Winter of Discontent’. On 28 March 1979, 
Callaghan’s Government lost a vote of confidence, the catalyst being the failure to 
achieve devolution to Scotland and Wales.523 The election was then set for 3 May 
1979.  It is noticeable that both major party manifestoes for the 1979 General Election 
indicated support of some kind for the Procedure Committee’s proposals. Labour 
promised ‘major improvements in the legislative process, including new methods of 
considering Bills in committee, and of scrutinizing the work of government through 
select committees’. The Conservative Manifesto said that Parliament’s traditional role 
of controlling the Executive had been weakened, and that the party would among other 
things ‘give the new House of Commons an early chance of coming to a decision’ on 
the proposals of the Procedure Committee.524 These pledges led the Civil Service and 
the House administration to conclude that reform was now very likely to happen. 
Representing the permanent officials of the Commons, and reflecting his own 
cautiously positive assessment of the proposals, Sir Richard Barlas asked for a meeting 
with Sir Ian Bancroft, the Head of the Home Civil Service. This took place on 10 
April, while the electoral battle still raged across the country, with ‘Implementation of 
the Procedure Committee Report’ top of Barlas’s agenda.525 Barlas ‘indicated that he 
was expecting any government after the election to implement the main 
                                                          
523    Hansard, HCD, cols. 461-590, 28 March 1979 
524    The Labour Way is the Better Way, Labour Party Manifesto 1979  
Conservative Party General Election Manifesto 1979 [Both accessed on 10 June 2015 from 
Politicsresources: http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man.htm] 
 
 
525  TNA, CAB 164/1426 ‘Note for the Record of a Meeting between Sir Ian Bancroft and Sir 
Richard Barlas on Tuesday 10 April 1979’, 12 April 1979  
203 
 
recommendations of the Procedure Committee’s report and this would have significant 
staffing implications for the House of Commons’. He asked Bancroft to explore with 
him the best way to recruit staff ‘to meet the needs of additional select committees to 
mark Government departments’. The request was for an additional three or four people 
at middle to senior rank, and Bancroft agreed to put out a ‘trawl’ - Whitehall-speak 
for a vacancy notice. 
 
The meeting between Bancroft and Barlas is more interesting for what it reveals about 
Barlas’s underlying attitudes to some of the recommendations of the Procedure 
Committee. While he backed the reorganisation of the committee structure, Barlas 
was, according to the Note of the meeting, opposed to two other important proposals. 
His view of the recommendation that committees should have their own powers to 
send for persons, papers and records was scathing: he believed that ‘it was wrong of 
Select Committees to badger civil servants for papers and information ...  If they 
indicated they could not make disclosure, the right constitutional way for committees 
to proceed was by raising complaints with Ministers on the floor of the House.’ He 
described the suggestion that committees should ‘compel’ Ministers to appear before 
them as ‘insulting, constitutionally doubtful and irrelevant, since Select Committees 
had no penal power’.526 Barlas offered ‘any advice or assistance to CSD (Civil Service 
Department) or Cabinet Office officials briefing on this aspect of the Procedure 
Committee’s recommendations’. Bancroft said he would ‘pass this message on’. 
Barlas also said he was not in favour of the Procedure Committee’s suggestion of 
evidence-taking, select-committee-style Public Bill Committees to examine 
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legislation. No reason is mentioned in the Note of the meeting, but one might speculate 
that Barlas feared that such evidence sessions would hold up the progress of 
legislation. It is clear that Barlas’s reformism was very limited. This exchange also 
demonstrates how close (sometimes) was liaison between House staff and civil 
servants. There was a natural wish to make new systems work, for instance by 
providing staff where necessary. But there was wariness on both sides and a shared 
caution about radical measures. Members of the Procedure Committee might indeed 
not have been happy if they had learned that Barlas was prepared to go as far as 
briefing government officials to help those officials resist their recommendations. This 
was certainly a good example of what Peter Hennessy calls ‘the hidden wiring’ of the 
constitution at work.  
 
Thatcher and the Select Committees 
On 8 May 1979, a few days after she moved into Downing Street in the wake of her 
clear General Election victory, Margaret Thatcher’s Private Secretary Mike Pattison 
wrote to John Stevens in the Office of Norman St-John Stevas, now Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster (and Leader of the House of Commons). Pattison noted that the 
Conservative Party Manifesto had contained a commitment to giving the House an 
early chance of deciding on the Procedure Committee proposals, and sought ‘early 
advice’ on handling. Pattison said the Prime Minister was ‘conscious that there is 
likely to be interest expressed early in the new Parliament about the reorganisation of 
select committees proposed in the report’.527 An Early Day Motion (EDM) urging 
implementation of the Procedure Committee recommendations was soon circulating 
in the Commons and attracting scores of signatories. 
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Pattison’s letter must have come as good news to Stevas, who says in his book The 
Two Cities, ‘From the first, I was a reformer’.528 But Thatcher’s recognition of 
unfinished business did not mean that she placed committee reform high on the list of 
priorities, any more than did her predecessor Callaghan. Although Stevas’s department 
considered a very rapid timetable for the House to debate the establishment of the new 
committees, John Stevens warned Stevas on 10 May that such a timetable ‘would be 
a bit of a “bounce”, which might not matter if the PM were keen to move quickly - as 
she is not apparently’.529 The word ‘bounce’ is a potent sign of Whitehall concern 
about the possible risks of rushing to action while key colleagues were still 
unconvinced. Stevas sent his advice to Thatcher on 24 May.530 In his minute, Stevas 
painted a (perhaps slightly exaggerated) picture of possible Conservative vulnerability 
if the House was not given its promised chance to vote on the proposed committees: 
‘The consequences of going back on our undertakings would be extremely serious for 
the Government politically ... The House would become a hornet’s nest and we should 
have acute difficulty in getting our business through’. To bolster his point, Stevas said 
that he had discussed these matters with the Chief Whip, Michael Jopling ‘who is in 
full agreement with this analysis’.531 However, Stevas’s minute also recognised the 
likely objections of Cabinet colleagues, accepting that the powers of the committees 
needed to be restrained ‘so that matters of security and the safety of the State do not 
come within their scope’. He also recommended against committees ‘being able to 
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“order” the attendance of Ministers or the unrestricted production of papers’. Like 
other advocates, Stevas also stressed that the proposed changes would be ‘evolutionary 
in character’. They would not represent a major shift away from the Chamber, but they 
were ‘right in principle’ and ‘in accordance with Conservative philosophy on the 
protection of the liberty of the subject’, demonstrating the importance of the Manifesto 
commitment on the matter.   
 
Stevas asked for early action, with a paper on the establishment of the committees to 
go to Cabinet on 14 June. His sense of urgency was overwhelming, as he made clear 
later: ‘I realized that I would have to act swiftly ... The Prime Minister did not give a 
high priority to institutional reform and, as a natural executive, looked askance at any 
proposals for strengthening parliamentary power. I knew too that Ministers, as they 
grew established in their departments, would take a similar view’. Crucially, the Civil 
Service machinery to support an early move to departmental committees was firmly 
in place. Stevas later paid tribute to the work of the officials who had paved the way 
with such thoroughness.532  
 
Thatcher was not, however, convinced by Stevas’s arguments. The National Archives 
file shows that Sir John Hunt drafted, in long hand, advice to the Prime Minister on 
the Stevas minute, but that on 31 May Hunt’s private secretary Martin Vile put the 
draft back to the Cabinet Secretary with a note attached.533 Vile told Hunt that he had 
held the draft back from typing ‘in case you wished to amend to take account of obiter 
dicta on Select Committees by the PM to Nick Sanders [Thatcher’s private secretary], 
namely that she does not like Departmental Select Committees; is worried about the 
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implications for defence and security issues; thinks they will stimulate demand for 
more public expenditure; will not have a Committee on Northern Ireland’. It was 
therefore entirely natural that the final version of the minute that Hunt eventually sent 
to Thatcher on 1 June was cautious.534 There was generally little of the tendency to 
‘push her along when she was not quite ready’ which one close observer, quoted by 
Peter Hennessy, identified in Hunt’s relationship with Thatcher in the last six months 
of his career.535  
 
Hunt’s paper set out for the Prime Minister the opposing arguments in a balanced way 
and gave full weight to the risks posed by departmental committees to collective 
ministerial responsibility, and to ‘the importance of the House as a whole’. On the 
other hand Hunt reminded the Prime Minister of the ‘widespread feeling inside and 
outside the House’ that the new committees were necessary to improve scrutiny of 
government. He pointed out the extra burdens on ministers of the new committees, 
though he also said that ‘most departments take a relatively relaxed view about the 
matter’.  Hunt made the important point that ‘these risks which [sic] exist with the 
present Select Committees ... they need become no more serious, provided the powers 
of Select Committees to summon  Ministers and officials, and to call for papers and 
records are not greatly extended’. Hunt had grasped a key point; Whitehall would not 
find it difficult to adjust to committees that had simply been reorganised, but if select 
committees were given substantially more powers to press for, or indeed order, 
evidence from departments, that could have much more serious consequences for the 
balance of forces between Parliament and Ministers. Only in one passage does Hunt 
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appear to ‘push’ the Prime Minister, saying that ‘An early debate on these 
recommendations would do much to relieve the pressure represented by the 250 
signatories of the early day motion.’536 
 
Thatcher and Stevas met to discuss the issue on 4 June, and Mike Pattison minuted the 
meeting in a letter to John Stevens of Stevas’s office on 5 June.537 Stevas is recorded 
as setting out for Thatcher the need for early action and explaining that he saw ‘little 
scope for changing the proposed package for the structure of Select Committees’, 
though he was ‘confident of securing important safeguards in respect of their powers’. 
Other ‘safeguards’ involved limiting numbers of sub-committees and ensuring that 
‘security considerations were properly handled’. The letter recorded that Thatcher 
agreed with Stevas that the question should come before Cabinet on 14 June, but it 
also made clear that there were divergent views on important issues. In forthright style 
the Prime Minister ‘instructed the Chancellor of the Duchy to submit for that 
discussion a thorough paper, which should set out in detail the arguments for and 
against both the existing structure of Select Committees and the proposed new 
structure, and which should also consider some reasonable alternative proposals’.  The 
Prime Minister, the note said, had drawn attention to ‘a number of possible criticisms’. 
She was especially concerned that the new committees would ‘reinforce the rigid 
demarcation of business between departments, and would become pressure groups for 
increased spending by the departments which they monitored’. The latter point was 
perhaps one that carried some weight with Thatcher; she may have been aware that 
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the Expenditure Committee had not really done much to discourage spending, and she 
must have feared that the new committees would be even less frugal. 
  
In addition to managing Thatcher’s scepticism, Stevas had to deal with objections from 
another source. Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, now the Lord Chancellor, wrote to 
the Prime Minister on 8 June, supporting the overall thrust of committee reform, 
saying ‘I agree generally with what he [Stevas] says’. However Hailsham insisted that 
the activities of select committees ‘must not be allowed to threaten the independence 
of the Judiciary’. He urged that the committees’ scope ‘should expressly exclude them 
from discussing the appointment and conduct of the Judiciary, and confidential 
communications between them and the Lord Chancellor on judicial matters’. More 
generally, Hailsham was apprehensive about the ‘additional burden which the new 
system will impose, both on Ministers and on officials’. This was especially a problem 
for small departments such as his own, particularly those that not been subject to 
previous select committee scrutiny. The Lord Chancellor therefore wondered whether 
it would be possible, at least at the beginning of the new scheme, to leave out smaller 
Departments such as his own and the Law Officers’. However, Hailsham emphasised 
that he was not opposed in principle to the eventual inclusion of these departments in 
the committee system.538 His letter was the product of a private conversation with 
Stevas, who wrote later that ‘the price of the Lord Chancellor’s acquiescence [was] an 
agreement to leave his department out of the supervisory system. I did not approve of 
this in principle but felt it was a price worth paying to get the bulk of the reform 
measures through’.539 A similarly pragmatic private conversation led to support from 
the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw - the Minister with prime responsibility for 
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many of the sensitive security issues which had helped to feed Thatcher’s scepticism 
on committee reform.540  
 
Stevas worked rapidly on his Cabinet paper and produced a final version that went to 
Cabinet for the 14 June meeting.541 The paper went through Cabinet without a great 
deal of discussion, as Hailsham’s arguments won the day; the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department and the Law Officers’ Department were to be excluded from the scope of 
the new Home Affairs Committee. So both Thatcher and Hailsham had put restraining 
hands on Stevas’s shoulder.542 More widely at senior ministerial levels, the response 
to the Procedure Committee aroused few strong feelings either way. The senior 
Cabinet Office official David Faulkner said later of the select committee reforms, ‘We 
put papers forward, they went to Cabinet and they were more or less nodded through. 
I don’t remember any significant opposition, nor do I remember any significant 
support’.543 
 
This undramatic Cabinet reality was well hidden when, on 25 June 1979, Norman St. 
John-Stevas opened the House’s debate on the Standing Orders establishing the new 
committees. He said:  
Today is, I believe, a crucial day in the life of the House of Commons. After 
years of discussion and debate, we are embarking upon a series of changes 
that could constitute the most important parliamentary reforms of the century 
... One truth abides and that is that parliamentary government has been one 
of the great contributions of the British nation to the world's civilisation, and 
we would do well to remember that.544  
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However, amid the enthusiasm for the new arrivals, several observers noticed that, in 
some respects, things had not changed very much. Very early in the life of the new 
system, David Judge pointed out the limits of what had been implemented, observing 
that ‘From the outset the government carefully circumscribed the powers of the 
departmental committees. Those recommendations of the 1977-78 Procedure 
Committee which were designed to challenge executive control did not find reflection 
in the standing order relating to the new committees’.545 The clerk R.S. Lankester also 
discerned no fundamental advance in powers when he wrote about the departmental 
committees in their first months.546 In some important ways, the new landscape looked 
very like the old landscape. 
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter has demonstrated that the 1979 reforms were never intended to be 
fundamental. The 1970s was not a period when stronger select committees were a 
prominent demand of parliamentary reformers, other MPs, Ministers or outside 
interest groups. The new departmental committees matched the mood, representing 
incremental change disguised as revolutionary reform, almost a sheep in wolf’s 
clothing. The Procedure Committee report was seen by the Committee’s own members 
as evolutionary rather than revolutionary. That they came to be regarded by some 
commentators as epoch-making was a presentational triumph for the Procedure 
Committee, giving the recommendations a gratifyingly high profile.  
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The Committee’s rhetoric nevertheless did cause some problems for reform. Jim 
Callaghan, Douglas Wass and Robert Armstrong all took the report’s revolutionary 
message at face value and grew concerned at the implications, whether for the 
government’s political programme or for Civil Service neutrality. However, in the 
final analysis these were isolated voices; by 1979, after nearly 20 years of increasingly 
active select committees, most in public life simply accepted select committees as part 
of the landscape, voicing neither enthusiasm nor opposition. Apart from those few 
senior figures who harboured practical and constitutional doubts (soon assuaged), the 
Civil Service believed that the departmental select committees were a sensible 
rationalisation that could be accommodated with modest adjustments. Taken as a 
whole, the final result of the process was to prove even less of a challenge to the status 
quo than that. The outcome of reform was also full of unintended consequences. The 
original objective of the Labour Government of 1974 in setting up the Procedure 
Committee, under the amenable Sir Thomas Williams, had been to make Ministers’ 
lives easier and speed the progress of legislation - a classic ‘efficiency’ reform. In the 
event what they, or rather the successor government of Margaret Thatcher, got was a 
modest and tolerable strengthening of the machinery of parliamentary accountability 
- an ‘effectiveness’ reform.   
 
There were a number of key moments in the process of reform, including the 
Procedure Committee’s pragmatic decision to advocate departmental select 
committees that concentrated on scrutiny rather than trying to replicate the 
overburdened Canadian committees, and the conversion of Enoch Powell to the cause 
of more powerful committees. The decision to restructure the system, rather than to 
expand it substantially, meant that the number of MPs involved in select committees 
213 
 
rose only slightly; backbenchers were not overstretched by the demands of the new 
committees. It was made clear by the Procedure Committee that ‘we do not believe 
that our proposals should impose significantly greater demands on Members as a 
whole’.547 In fact, the Committee envisaged that the new system would initially mean 
an increase of just 15 in the total number of MPs who would be involved in select 
committees at any one time.548 In the event, the figures for actual committee 
membership and attendance in the 1980s would turn out to differ little from the figures 
for the 1970s. Significantly, too, the human resources of the Clerk’s Department could 
grow gradually without causing a staffing crisis. 
 
Although some in the media were excited by the idea of reform, other observers 
recognised how conservative the changes actually were. Ministers, whether Labour or 
Tory, did not generally like the prospect of new committees but were not too worried 
about them. Francis Pym’s Cambridge speech in October 1978 set the tone of 
acceptance and Labour did not disagree. Stevas’s astute and pragmatic discussions 
with Jopling, Hailsham and Whitelaw had reaped their reward, but the window of 
opportunity for even this modest reform had been a narrow one. Writing later, Stevas 
noted that ‘As the weeks and months [of 1979] passed, so my ministerial colleagues’ 
criticisms [of the new committees] grew’549; by the autumn of 1979 ‘both the Prime 
Minister and individual Ministers had had enough of my select committees’.550 It had 
been a close-run thing. 
                                                          
547   That is, a rise from 105 to 120 in the numbers involved in those investigatory select 
committees where change was proposed. Procedure Committee 1978, Vol. I, pp. lxv-lxvi    
548   This is different from the total involved in select committees of all kinds over a whole 
parliamentary session; because of turnover and with the addition of ‘domestic’ and other non-
investigatory committees, that number was always much larger.   
549   Stevas, The Two Cities, p. 57 
550   Ibid., p. 59 
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It is also important to remember precisely what the 1979 reforms did not achieve. 
Many of the key recommendations of the Procedure Committee, including stronger 
and clearer powers for select committees, guaranteed Chamber debates and the use of 
evidence-taking in legislative committees, were either not implemented or not 
implemented fully at any time in the 1980s. These recommendations and others could 
have made a big difference to the relationship between the government and Parliament, 
but, in the event, the new committees basically preserved the constitutional status quo. 
It is indeed interesting and ironic that some of the positive press coverage of the report 
focussed on precisely these challenging but unimplemented Procedure Committee 
recommendations. Some of the big headlines and laudatory editorials of August 1978 
were therefore giving a warm welcome to reforms that did not actually happen for 
many years.551  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
551   Ultimately, most of these reforms did come about, but only 30 years later, between about 2006 
and 2009 
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Chapter Five: Select Committees in the 1980s: Measuring Activity and 
Assessing Progress 
 
This Chapter sets out to answer a number of questions about the impact of the new 
departmental select committees on the political landscape and on the relations between 
Parliament and the Executive. Firstly, it asks what the available statistics tell us about 
the activities of select committees between 1979 and 1990. The other questions 
concern various aspects of the progress made by select committees as institutions 
during the decade, particularly: what resources were available to select committees; 
how did select committees relate to outside interest groups; and whether the 
committees included members with an independent cast of mind.  
 
The Chapter begins with a summary of the relevant literature, including the views of 
those who argue that the 1979 reforms represented a radical and fundamental change 
in the relationship between government and Parliament, and goes on to test these 
propositions against the evidence of the statistics on the activity and impact of select 
committees. 
 
The political significance of select committees in the 1980s 
In 1995 Peter Hennessy rated the 1979 select committee reforms as ‘not just the most 
significant parliamentary development of the postwar period, but the single most 
important clawback in terms of the relative influence of the legislature and the 
executive since the Balfour reforms of 1902’.552 The journalist Hugo Young described 
the departmental committees as ‘a major innovation which ensured that a government 
                                                          
552   Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, p.153  
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which showed great resistance to all forms of openness and accountability was 
sometimes invigilated quite uncomfortably. Before long, the appearance of ministers 
and officials testifying to these committees became a commonplace spectacle’.553 
Philip Norton regarded the new committee structure as having ‘a qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively different nature to previous such structures’.554 This assessment of 
the significance of the 1979 reforms continues to dominate comment on the 
development of committees. For example Meg Russell said in 2011 that ‘The modern 
select committees were established shortly after the 1979 general election, in what is 
widely seen as the last major reform to strengthen the Commons against the 
executive.’555 
 
However, as Chapter Four has demonstrated, some people directly involved in the 
1979 reforms, in both Westminster and Whitehall, saw them in a much more mundane 
light. They emphasised the lack of fundamental procedural innovation and the 
continuing limitations on both powers and resources available to select committees 
even after 1979. Why therefore have so many commentators assessed the new 
departmental select committees as being such an important departure? A clue to this 
divergence between perceptions of the significance of reform lies in the wider 
background of writing about the Thatcher Governments of the 1980s. The core of 
many if not all accounts of the period is the dominance of the government, and of 
Thatcher in particular, especially after victory in the Falklands conflict of 1982. 
Norman St John-Stevas called her ‘the most commanding Prime Minister of modern 
                                                          
553   Hugo Young, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher (London: Macmillan, 1989), 
p.209  
554   Philip Norton, ‘Behavioural Changes’, p.43 
555   Meg Russell, ‘Never Allow a Crisis To Go To Waste’: The Wright Committee Reforms to 
Strengthen the House of Commons’, p.615 
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times ... Convinced of both her own rectitude and ability’.556 Her first Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Hailsham, was surprised by ‘the extent and duration of Margaret Thatcher’s 
hegemony of British politics’ over the decade from 1979.557  
 
Parliament could not avoid being affected by such a determined figure with a clear 
(and eventually commanding) majority. Dissent, so rife in the Chamber of the 
Commons in the 1970s, was much less in evidence there during the 1980s (though 
experience in the House of Lords was very different). There were six government 
defeats in the Commons during the Heath era between 1970 and 1974 and 59 during 
the Labour administrations of Wilson and Callaghan between 1974 and 1979, but that 
number dwindled to just one government defeat in the Commons during Mrs 
Thatcher’s first Parliament in Downing Street, 1979-1983. In the Lords there were 25 
defeats in 1970-74, 362 between 1974 and 1979 and 45 between 1979 and 1983.558 
Where was there for dissenters to go after 1979? It could be argued that, as the 
Chamber of the Commons lost its potency as an arena where government could be 
defeated, committees had the opportunity to take up the fight. Hawes for instance 
asserts that ‘select committees, in a number of notable examples [in the 1980s], 
became the main focus of opposition, especially to some of the radical measures in 
[Thatcher’s] third term’.559 However, as Chapter Six makes clear, dissent against the 
broad principles of government policy was not the predominant feature of the reports 
of select committees in the 1980s. Many committees considered the details of 
implementation rather than confronting key principles of Thatcher’s policies.  
                                                          
556   The Daily Telegraph ‘Prime Ministers rise and fall but the Cabinet abides’, 7 August 1986  
557   Lord Hailsham, A Sparrow’s Flight: The Memoirs of Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone 
(London: Collins, 1990), p.407 
558   Philip Norton, ‘Behavioural Changes’, p. 27. 
559   Hawes, Power on the Backbenches? The Growth of Select Committee Influence, p. 206 
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There were sound institutional and constitutional reasons why the 1980s might have 
been a propitious time for select committees.  The idea that Thatcherism might 
enhance the status of Parliament as against that of other constitutional actors is 
suggested by Brian Harrison, who has argued that ‘As vehicle for articulating opinion, 
Parliament gained substantially from Thatcherism, which firmly asserted 
Westminster’s primacy over other areas of the political system: over party activists, 
pressure groups, local authorities, and the civil service’.560 The constitutional 
battlefield might thus be seen as having been cleared by Thatcher’s rigorous attitude 
to some of the political players and methods of the 1960s and 1970s and by her total 
absence of interest in further constitutional reform. In one sense, Parliament now had 
few competitors as a place where political battles could be fought. This would 
theoretically give the new departmental select committees, along with other 
parliamentary institutions, real political momentum and weight. In theory at least, 
then, the 1980s should have been a time when MPs made very good use of select 
committees to regain a part of the influence they had lost when the Thatcher 
Government was returned. The next section uses quantitative means to help assess 
what actually happened. 
 
The quantitative evidence on the effects of the 1979 reform: statistics of activity 
The previous section has set out some of the arguments of those who believe that there 
were fundamental discontinuities between the pre-1979 committee pattern and the 
departmental select committees of post-1979. Do the statistics relating to committee 
activity and to the response of the wider House and of Whitehall bear out this view? 
                                                          
560   Brian Harrison, The Transformation of British Politics,1860-1995 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. 373.  Similar points are made in Robert Saunders, ‘Crisis? What crisis? 
Thatcherism and the seventies’, in Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (eds), Making Thatcher’s 
Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.34 
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First, the average numbers of Members serving on select committees, and similar 
bodies, rose slightly after the reform, reaching 300 or over in the early years of 
enthusiasm for the new system, especially 1981 and 1982. Although comparisons are 
difficult, however, it is clear that the numbers of members on these committees during 
some sessions in the 1980s may have been only slightly higher or indeed were 
sometimes lower than in the peak sessions of 1974-75 and 1975-76, when there were 
over 290 on such committees.  
Table 1: Number of MPs serving on select committees, Chairmen’s Panel (for 
standing committees) and Court of Referees, 1979-1990 
Session Number of MPs on select 
committees etc 561 
1979-80 277 
1980-81 309 
1981-82 310 
1982-83 267 
1983-84 276 
1984-85 275 
1985-86 307 
1986-87 289 
1987-88 275 
1988-89 262 
1989-90 272 
Source: Returns of Select Committees 
                                                          
561  From 1982-83, figures are for select committees only 
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The number of select committee inquiries increased considerably after 1979; there 
were for instance 41 in Session 1977-78 but 96 in Session 1985-86, roughly equivalent 
years in that neither included a General Election.562 However, the number of meetings 
rose much less, from 413 to 509 in those same Sessions. The average number of 
investigatory committee meetings ‘per sitting day’ in Session 1985-86 was 3.2, only a 
modest rise from the 2.7 meetings per sitting day of the pre-reform Session of 1977-
78.563 This was partly because, although the departmental committees were more 
numerous, they did not usually meet more frequently than their exact pre-reform 
equivalents. Work was perhaps more intense, but the main burden was placed on the 
staff rather than committee members. The Industry and Trade Committee met 38 times 
in Session 1980-81 against the 45 meetings of the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee 
in 1977-78, for example. But the main post-1979 ‘loss’ in terms of meeting numbers 
came with the abolition of the Nationalised Industries Committee, the Race Relations 
and Immigration Committee, the Science and Technology Committee and the 
Overseas Development Committee. These committees had held 167 meetings in 1977-
78, about 40 percent of the total, and although they were partly replaced by sub-
committees of Foreign Affairs and Home Affairs, their work was not all directly 
replicated in the post-reform era.  
 
But the crude numbers of meetings, inquiries and members of select committees can 
never indicate the degree of enthusiasm for their work. The level of members’ 
attendance at meetings is a much better measure of commitment to the cause. In 
December 1982 the Liaison Committee of Select Committee Chairmen published a 
report on the progress of the new system. This contrasted select committee attendances 
                                                          
562   Michael Rush,  Parliament and Pressure Politics, p. 138  
563   Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1868, p. 196 
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in the years before the 1979 reform and the three years after it.564 The average 
attendances for earlier committees equivalent to the post -1979 committees were as 
follows: 
 
Session 1969-70: 64 percent 
Session 1972-73: 65 percent 
Session 1977-78: 57 percent 
 
The report notes that in 1979-80 there was a change to the situation, with the new 
departmental committees achieving overall 79 percent attendance, and in 1980-81 and 
1981-82 the attendance proportions were 75 percent and 73 percent respectively. This 
would appear to be an open-and-shut case of the new system enthusing backbenchers 
who had, before 1979, been distinctly lukewarm about select committee scrutiny. 
However, closer examination of the figures for the whole of the 1980s tells a nuanced 
story. The average attendances in selected sessions from the late 1970s to the later 
1980s for a variety of roughly equivalent select committees are set out in Table 2 
below, which has been collated from the relevant Returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
564   First Report from the Liaison Committee, Session 1982-83, The Select Committee System (92), 
p.8 
222 
 
Table 2: Select Committee Meeting Attendance Averages, Selected Sessions 
1977-78 to 1989-90  
Subject of 
Committee or 
Sub-Comm565 
Ave. 
Att. 
1977-
78566 
(%) 
Ave. 
Att. 
1978-
79567 
(%) 
Ave.  
Att. 
1979-
80 
(%) 
Ave. 
Att. 
1980-
81 
 
(%) 
Ave. 
Att. 
1981-
82 
 
(%) 
Ave. 
Att. 
1984-
85 
(%) 
Ave.  
Att. 
1986-
87568 
(%) 
Ave. 
Att. 
1989-
90 
 
(%) 
Treasury etc 
issues 
73 76 92 88 85 78 70 72 
Defence and 
Foreign 
Affairs 
63 55 72 
(Def) 
81 
(For 
Aff) 
72 
(Def) 
69 
(For 
Aff) 
82 
(Def) 
74 
(For 
Aff)  
74 
(Def) 
75 
(For 
Aff) 
73 
(Def) 
67 
(For 
Aff) 
69 
(Def) 
74 
(For 
Aff) 
Home 
Affairs569 
68 61 92 84 75 76 73 68 
Industry/Trade 65 76 84 81 71 60 71 79 
Soc Services 65 70 73 66 70 66 63 80 
 
                                                          
565    Expenditure Committee Sub-Committee averages do not count the record of the main 
Committee Chairman, who was entitled to attend ex officio 
566   Expenditure Committee Sub-Committees. Before 1979, the Expenditure Sub-Committee on 
overseas affairs was mainly concerned with defence issues, so there  was no real equivalent to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
567  Expenditure Committee Sub-Committees. The General Election of 3 May 1979 curtailed this 
Session 
568  The General Election of 11 June 1987 curtailed this Session 
569  Various sub-committees of the Expenditure Committee and the Race Relations and 
Immigration Committee 
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The amount and quality of media comment at the time of the 1978 Procedure 
Committee report, and the hopes held out for the new system on the backbenches, have 
already been noted. It might be expected that such a positive environment would 
enthuse select committee members and perhaps make them more likely to attend 
committee hearings, especially as the numbers of ministerial witnesses increased 
substantially in the early 1980s. This certainly happened in the very first years of the 
new system, with significant increases in members’ attendance across the board in 
1979-80 and 1980-81. In most cases, the average percentage of committee members 
attending a meeting rose from a figure in the 60s to one in the 70s or higher. The new 
Foreign Affairs Committee saw an average attendance of over 81 percent while the 
Treasury and Civil Service Committee did even better, with 85 percent attendance on 
average. The pattern varies considerably from subject to subject, but it appears 
possible that the novelty of the departmental committees in the first years made these 
committees more popular with their members than the equivalent pre-1979 sub-
committees. However, by the middle of the decade attendances had in some cases 
returned to roughly the level of their Expenditure Committee equivalents; attendances 
for a number of committees were in fact rather lower under the new arrangements. 
Policy areas that were to a some degree new to select committee scrutiny, such as 
foreign affairs and much of home affairs, did well in terms of attendance by Members 
for much of the 1980s. But the reorganisation into departmental committees clearly 
did not in itself do much to promote greater participation by members during the 
1980s.  
 
Another interesting question is the extent to which the first select committees of the 
new era brought in new blood. The number of newly-elected MPs who served on a 
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select committee or similar body in the 1979-80 Session was 47, out of a total of 277, 
or just under 17 percent of the total. There were in all 77 MPs who were first elected 
in 1979, out of a total in the House of Commons of 635 - just over 12 percent of the 
whole House. So the majority of newly-elected Members served on a select committee 
during 1979-80, and the proportion was slightly higher than one would expect from 
the numbers of new entrants in the House as a whole.  
 
Thus the supply side of select committee operations, their activities in terms of 
inquiries and the involvement of MPs, expanded after 1980. Members were slightly  
more productive than in the 1970s, though they probably did not spend a great deal 
more time on select committee work, because meetings did not increase greatly in 
number. On the other hand there is evidence that the demand side - the readiness in 
the wider Commons and Lords political and policy ‘marketplace’ to consume material 
and ideas from select committees -  did not change much.  
 
Committees and the Chambers of the Lords and Commons 
Parliamentary committees can be solipsistic and inward-looking bodies. The physical 
separation between the committee room and the floor of the House can be highly 
significant. Both Enoch Powell and Michael Foot had of course argued at various 
times during the 1960s and 1970s that a proliferation of select committees would 
distract and enfeeble the House, dulling the necessary edge of party contention and 
lulling backbenchers into acceptance of tame compromises. Powell changed his mind 
as the 1977-78 Procedure Committee pressed on. But the fears expressed in 1978 and 
1979 by, among others, Sydney Irving were real. Irving was apprehensive that the 
House would divide itself into two - on the one hand a specialised body of 
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knowledgeable committee Members producing erudite reports that were of little or no 
interest to the bulk of their colleagues or the wider public, and on the other a Chamber 
of ‘second-class’ non-experts, debating generalities. In his gloomy vision, the two 
sides of Parliament would have little connection with each other, and as a consequence 
Parliament as an institution would become ever more irrelevant to the outside world. 
To what extent were Irving’s fears justified? 
 
The numbers, calculated for this thesis from the Hansards of the day, are clear. There 
were 14000 chamber references (in both Houses) to the precise phrase ‘select 
committee’ in the 1970s, but 21000 in the 1980s. This is hardly surprising given the 
high profile of the new system but does not tell us much in itself. The figures for 
individual years reveal a little more. The last complete year of the old dispensation, 
calendar 1978, saw 1705 references to ‘select committee’ in both Chambers. It might 
have been expected that 1980, the year when the new departmental committees really 
set to work, would have seen a large number of Chamber references as Members 
considered the implications for parliamentary life. However, there were only 1664 
mentions in that year, with a small increase to 1899 references in 1981 and just 1811 
in the year 1982. Thus in the first years of the new system committee reform does not 
seem to have excited the imagination of a large number of Members, beyond those 
who were directly involved with the work of a select committee. 
  
After the Election year of 1983, with its unsurprising fall to 1663 Chamber references 
to ‘select committee’, the year 1984 saw a modest increase to 1971. It is worth pausing 
at this point to compare that figure with the level of interest shown in the ‘pre-reform’ 
year of 1976 when there were actually more chamber references to the words ‘select 
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committee’, a total of 1996. Thus, the crude quantitative evidence from the 
parliamentary chambers suggests that eight years of consideration and wide-ranging 
committee reform had not had a great deal of wider parliamentary impact. The reforms 
of the 1960s and early 1970s seem, by this measure, to have been more important in 
focussing political attention on committees than the introduction of the 
‘departmentally-related’ system in 1979.  
   
The furores of the mid-1980s, associated with the aftermath of the Falklands and the 
Westland affair, certainly seem to have made an impact on the chambers; in 1985 there 
were as many as 2736 chamber references to ‘select committee’ while in 1986 there 
were 2679 references. But after the untypical 1987 with its General Election and only 
1885 mentions, the trend in ‘select committee’ references declined gently again in 
1988, with 2284. A small increase took place in 1989, to a total of 2466 references. So 
the chambers were, by the late 1980s, rather more alive to select committees than they 
had been in the mid-1970s, but the underlying upward trend was fairly slow. 
  
So much for the broad measures of parliamentary interest. What sort of impact did 
select committees have on the more senior echelons of the political elite, and 
specifically on the Chamber work of Cabinet Ministers in both Houses? Figures for 
1981 show an increase on the 1970s in the extent to which Cabinet Ministers 
mentioned the words ‘select committee’ in their parliamentary contributions in debates 
and questions, with 146 references, very roughly 30 percent more than the average for 
the late 1970s. However, a large proportion of the references tended, as in the 1970s, 
to be made by the Leader of the House, with 55 in the name of Francis Pym (who took 
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over from Stevas on 5 January 1981).  Few other Cabinet Ministers made substantial 
reference to select committees.  
 
What is revealed by a closer analysis of references of all kinds in the Chamber of either 
House of Parliament to the committees covering the four key policy areas examined 
here in slightly more detail - defence, external affairs, home affairs, and Treasury and 
related matters? To take one example, the total of Lords and Commons Chamber 
references to the Home Affairs Committee (including those which described it in 
different ways, such as ‘the Select Committee on Home Affairs’) rose quickly from 
1981 onwards. There were 73 references in 1980, 117 in 1981, 139 in 1982 and even 
114 in the Election Year of 1983 (when the House was dissolved for several weeks 
and there was a further gap until the committees were appointed). In 1985 there were 
131 references, but in 1988 there were just 100 references and there were 127 in 1989. 
Interest in the Home Affairs Committee therefore seems to have increased rapidly in 
the early part of the decade, but perhaps eased off towards the end.  The Foreign 
Affairs Committee made less of an impact in the Chambers, being mentioned 64 times 
in 1985 and only 37 times in 1989. This was despite continuing high productivity in 
terms of reports.  
 
It is also worth noting that the departmental select committees were not the only such 
bodies that had an impact on the Chambers during the 1980s. References in the Lords 
and Commons Chambers to the phrase ‘Public Accounts Committee’ rose strongly, 
from 1173 in the 1970s to 1928 in the 1980s. This may have had something to do with 
the PAC’s own 1980s reform, the passage of the National Audit Act 1983, which 
widened the scope of the work of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to include 
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‘value-for-money’ studies, examining the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of 
public spending. These studies had the potential to raise politically-interesting 
questions about administration that were not strongly encouraged by the much 
narrower previous legislation. The PAC’s work probably became more interesting to 
MPs as a result. 
What of more extensive and detailed references to select committees in the 
parliamentary chambers? Debates specifically about, or merely mentioning, select 
committee reports, had been a fairly regular occurrence before 1979, with between 
two and four debates each session on reports by a variety of committees including 
Expenditure and Nationalised Industries. The level of participation in these debates by 
both members and non-members of committees was not high, although in 1977-78, 
during debates on select committee reports, in one case 12 non-members referred to 
the work of the Nationalised Industries Committee on the British Steel Corporation, 
and in another case nine non-members spoke on the work of the Expenditure 
Committee on preventive medicine.570 In this respect the 1979 reforms appear to have 
made little immediate difference, with numbers of debates on committee reports 
hovering between three and five per session until 1983. In 1984 a clerk, Malcolm Jack, 
lamented the small number of debates in the Chamber, saying that ‘The lack of the 
automatic right for debate on committee reports in the House of Commons itself is 
undoubtedly one of the major weaknesses that at present remains unremedied. It is 
essential that the work of committees should find its way to the House - they work for 
the House rather than themselves. It is no use if committee work remains isolated and 
detached from the mainstream debating in the chamber’.571 This was in some respects 
                                                          
570    Hansard, HCD, cols. 1624-1754, 9 March 1978; cols. 659-792, 12 June 1978  
571   Malcolm Jack, ‘Parliament’s role as a check on Government’, Parliamentary Affairs, 38/3 
(1985), p. 303. Jack was Clerk of the House from 2006 to 2011 
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the purist view of a clerk who was setting out the strictly-defined role of committees 
in reporting to the Commons as a whole. However, it also chimed with the call of the 
1978 Procedure Committee for eight allocated committee debates on the floor of the 
House in each session. 
There were certainly occasions after 1979 on which select committee reports attracted 
widespread attention from Commons colleagues. The Social Services Committee’s 
report on Perinatal and Neonatal Mortality was debated in December 1980 and there 
were contributions from ten non-Committee members.572 But this early impact may 
have represented a high point. Table 3 shows that the average number of non-
committee members who mentioned a select committee report in each Commons 
chamber debate on a report was hardly changed by the reform of 1979.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
572   Hansard, HCD,  cols. 532-97, 5 December 1980   
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Table 3: Commons Chamber debates on select committees, 1980s - participation 
by non-committee members 
SESSION  Debates on floor of 
the House related 
to departmental 
select committee 
reports 
Total numbers of 
non-committee 
members 
mentioning  the 
relevant 
committee in the 
debates  
Average number 
of non-
committee 
members 
mentioning  the 
relevant 
committee in the 
debates  
1979-80 3 12 4 
1980-81 4 18 4.5 
1981-82 5 21 4.2 
1982-83 5 8 1.6 
1983-84 15 47 3.1 
1984-85 13 57 4.4 
1985-86 15 50 3.3 
1986-87 4 14 3.5 
1987-88 20 55 2.8 
1988-89573 19 50 2.6 
 
Changes to procedure on supplementary estimates, giving opportunity for more 
debates on select committee reports, came into effect in 1983-84, which accounts for 
                                                          
573  Up to 17 October 1989 only 
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the increase in debates. However, despite the 1979 reforms, most Members appear to 
have shown very little interest in using the reports of select committees as the basis 
for further policy discussion. Many Commons select committee debates of the 1980s 
were still sparsely-attended ‘sad occasions’, to echo David Pring’s words of 1977.574 
 
In addition, for most of the decade, the House authorities did little to fire enthusiasm 
for debates on select committee reports. After the dismissal of Norman St. John-Stevas 
early in 1981, successive Leaders of the Commons proved lukewarm supporters at 
best. Francis Pym, who had been instrumental in promoting the idea of a new system 
within the Conservative Party, was unimpressed with the reality when he succeeded 
Stevas as Leader; the general verdict, he told Contemporary Record in 1987, was ‘a 
reserved one: the committees had not added much strength to Parliament vis-a-vis the 
executive or produced any very tangible results’.575 On the other hand, Pym 
acknowledged that they had helped to widen knowledge and created ‘a store of 
information on numerous topics of current interest’. Over the intervening years, Pym 
said, the committees had ‘developed and matured’ and had become ‘a permanent 
feature of parliamentary activity’. But neither Pym, nor his successors as Leader of 
the House, John Biffen and John Wakeham, showed much keenness for giving select 
committees more time in the Chamber. In general, the unenthusiastic post-Stevas 
Leaders of the House experienced little difficulty in fending off requests for debates 
on committee issues. Statistics contained in an answer to a Parliamentary Question on 
10 December 1984 by the then Leader, John Biffen, for example, reveal that not one 
                                                          
574   See above, p.171 
575   Contemporary Record, Spring 1987, p.16 
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report of a departmental committee had been the subject of a debate in the Chamber 
during the previous Session.576 
 
But there is also the issue of quality as well as quantity of impact. Did the inquiries 
carried out by these committees after the reforms of 1979 in fact significantly 
strengthen the capacity of the House to hold Ministers to account, perhaps by 
providing new information which was used in debates? The evidence here is mixed, 
to judge by the evidence of the pre-1979 Expenditure Committee Sub-Committees on 
home affairs and its successor Home Affairs Committee.  Because reports on home 
affairs were relatively infrequent during the era of the Expenditure Committee, the 
subject was raised rarely in the Chamber during the 1970s. The greater productivity 
and higher profile of the Home Affairs Committee brought it to the attention of both 
Houses in the 1980s. On occasions, as with the ‘sus’ law inquiry, a Home Affairs 
Committee report would be widely seen as having at the very least encouraged 
government to change the law.577 But most exchanges on the floor of the House about 
select committees continued to be routine rather than illuminating. Backbenchers, of 
either main party, do not seem during the 1980s to have had the resources or perhaps 
the inclination to make full use of the increasingly large amounts of material that 
issued from select committees. 
 
Whitehall’s response to the new committees 
The Whitehall system mobilised quickly to ensure that departments took action both 
to minimise the risk of falling foul of the new committees, and to increase the chance 
                                                          
576   See Hansard, HCD, col.648, 23 February 1981; Hansard, HCD, col.76W, 1 March 1983; 
Hansard, HCD, col. 366W,10 December 1984  
577   Gavin Drewry, in The New Select Committees, 1989, p. 199 
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that amicable working relationships would develop. One clerk who was involved at 
the time suggested later that, in the early days of the new system, Whitehall was ‘dead 
nervous’ about the departmental committees, and recalled that committee members 
and staff were summoned by Secretaries of State in the first few weeks after 
appointment in 1979, for ‘a meet and greet, with sherry and sausage rolls’. This 
marked a change in attitude. Significantly, the clerk said ‘I don’t think that would have 
happened to the old [committees]’.578  
 
Peter Hennessy, citing his own ‘audits’ as a journalist at the time of select committee 
operation and impact on Whitehall, said that the departmental committees had ‘raised 
the level of the Whitehall game’ compared with the 1970s, with increased 
departmental workloads and better preparation for sessions. He quotes a phrase used 
by the senior official Sir Leo Pliatzky, who said in August 1980 that it was his 
impression that ‘the pips are beginning to squeak in the Treasury in meeting all these 
demands, not simply for appearances but for asking questions and submitting 
memoranda’.579 The following section tests this proposition.  
 
What do the figures reveal about the response of Whitehall to the work of the new 
committees? Again the pattern varies from subject to subject; some departments were 
assiduous, for instance, in producing memoranda for departmental committees. The 
Foreign Office sent the Foreign Affairs Committee an average of 50 memoranda per 
Session between 1979 and 1983, with a further 30 on average going to the Overseas 
Development Sub-Committee.580 Other departments who provided generously 
                                                          
578   Interview with clerk (on condition of privacy),  1 May 2015 
579   Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, pp.332-33 
580   Hansard, HCD, col. 368W, 10 December 1984  
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included those covered by the Trade and Industry Committee, which sent an average 
of 43 memoranda annually, and the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, also with 
43 a year. The Home Affairs Committee received just nine on average a year, although 
its Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee merited 15 annually. Compared 
with these substantial numbers, other committees did less well; the Employment 
Committee received just two on average a year, and the Environment Committee 12. 
It is difficult to account for these wide variations; some departments may already have 
provided adequate information in published sources, and committees may therefore 
have been satisfied with fewer specially-compiled memoranda. Some committees may 
have been particularly persistent, or particularly lax, in following-up on questions that 
were not fully answered in oral evidence.  
 
What of oral evidence from government departments? There were 238 appearances by 
civil servants before the TCSC in the 1979-83 Parliament but that was only a small 
increase on the 223 officials who appeared before the General Sub-Committee of the 
Expenditure Committee and ad hoc select committees on Treasury topics between 
February 1974 and March 1979.  The Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee 
of the Expenditure Committee took evidence from a total of 479 civil servants between 
1974 and 1979, while its successor committees, Foreign Affairs and Defence, saw a 
combined total of 598 officials in the next Parliament between 1979 and 1983, a 
significant but not huge increase. In some instances the new committees of the 1980s 
actually took evidence from fewer civil servants than did their predecessors. This was 
the case for example with committees dealing with trade and industry matters. The 
Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee and the relevant 
Nationalised Industries sub-committee took evidence from about 170 civil servants 
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between 1974 and 1978-79, while the Industry and Trade Committee in the 1979-83 
Parliament saw just 57.581 In some policy areas, officials were less exposed in the early 
1980s than they had been in the 1970s. The anxieties of Armstrong and Wass about 
the greatly increased exposure of civil servants to the new committees were thus not 
borne out.  
 
Away from the excitements and pressures of oral hearings, the numbers of Whitehall 
staff dealing routinely with select committees did not appear to have risen very much, 
if at all, after 1979. There is a shortage of detailed information about most 
departments’ staffing for select committee work, but the Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, two of the busiest departments in 
parliamentary terms, always assigned just a handful of middle-rank and junior officials 
to select committee liaison during the early and mid 1980s.582 Margaret Thatcher told 
the House in January 1986 that ‘six individuals are reported by Departments to have 
spent more than half their time solely on this work [departmental committee liaison]’ 
in the previous year. The workload had not ‘changed markedly’ since the last major 
survey in 1980-81.583 One statistic in particular demonstrates the comfortable way in 
which Whitehall accommodated change; in 1975-76 the Ministry of Defence deployed 
four officials mainly on Expenditure Committee business, while in 1981 only three 
MoD officials were similarly engaged on Defence Committee matters. Those numbers 
then decreased further, from three to two, at one point during the decade. Even at a 
time of reductions in Civil Service manpower, this was a modest and consistent 
                                                          
581  The pre-1979 figures are the author’s. The 1979-83 figures are from Geoffrey Lock, in Drewry, 
The New Select Committees, 1989, p.327 
582  Hansard, HCD, col. 641W, 16 January 1986; Hansard, HCD, cols. 114-15W, 7 May 1981; 
Hansard, HCD, cols. 246-7W, 5 April 1982  
583  Hansard, HCD, col.628W, 16 January 1986 
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burden, mostly felt at middle to junior level, and some Departments, such as the MoD, 
found it slightly easier to manage select committees in the 1980s than they had in the 
previous decade.  
 
One aspect of select committee life did change radically after 1979; in many policy 
areas, there were more ministerial appearances in front of select committees after the 
reform than before it. For example Foreign Office Ministers appeared just 12 times 
before the Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee between 1974 and 1979, 
while 27 appeared before the new Foreign Affairs Committee in the next Parliament 
up to 1983 - a significant increase under the new system. Ministerial appearances 
before the Treasury-focussed select committees also increased substantially, with only 
six Ministers appearing before the General Sub-Committee in the 1974 to 1979 
Parliaments, but 21 between 1979 and 1983 in front of the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee. For other subjects the change was, however, less noticeable. There were 
15 ministerial appearances on trade and industry matters before the Trade and Industry 
Sub-Committee of Expenditure (which also took in agriculture and fisheries) and the 
equivalent parts of the Nationalised Industries Committee between 1974 and 1978-79, 
against 20 for the Industry and Trade Committee in the 1979-83 Parliament. The new 
Defence Committee saw nine Ministers in the 1979-1983 Parliament, while its 
predecessor had taken evidence from eight Ministers in the late 1970s. The strongest 
impression that emerges from these figures is that government Departments did not 
find liaison with the new committees a serious extra call on their resources. Flegmann 
found in 1984 that officials believed that ‘The burden of giving oral evidence to select 
committees has shifted dramatically from civil servants to Ministers since 1979.’584  
                                                          
584    Vilma Flegmann, Public Expenditure and the Select Committees of the Commons, p. 36 
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The Whitehall pips may have squeaked when the new committees arrived in 1980, and 
Ministers were undoubtedly busier in the committee rooms, but the evidence is that 
Whitehall was not unduly stretched by these demands. 
 
The length of time taken by departments to respond to committee reports in the 
Sessions between 1980 and 1984 also gives a flavour of how relatively easily 
Whitehall adjusted to the new phenomenon. In evidence to the Procedure Committee 
of 1977-78 the Clerk’s Department noted in frustration that in the 1970s ‘the delay in 
awaiting the [government] reply is often such that public interest in the report 
evaporates’.585 But the new committees sometimes received a response fairly quickly; 
Defence Committee reports in the early 1980s receiving responses taking between 69 
and 116 days, while responses to the Foreign Affairs Committee took between 52 and 
153 days. The heritage of a highly active Expenditure Committee Defence and 
External Affairs sub-committee may well have helped to speed replies -these 
departments may just have been used to working with committees.  The Trade and 
Industry departments, which worked hard at producing memoranda, were also prompt 
at responding to reports - they took between 47 and 150 days. On the other hand, 
responses to Agriculture Committee reports took much longer, with intervals ranging 
between 89 and 279 days. In general, however, the reports produced by the new 
committees did not place a major extra burden on Whitehall. 
  
What about the impact of the 1979 committee reform at the very highest political level 
- the Cabinet? The figures for references to the words ‘select committee’ in Cabinet 
papers (memoranda submitted and Cabinet Conclusions recorded) in the 1970s were 
                                                          
585    Procedure Committee 1978, Vol. II, p. 114 
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impressive: 230 between 1970 and 1979.  Between 1974 and 1979 there were 150 
references. But in the early 1980s, the numbers of Cabinet references to ‘select 
committee’ actually fell, by more than 50 percent. Between 1980 and 1986 there were 
just 66 references to those words.  
 
It might of course be possible that, while the quantity of Cabinet references fell after 
the 1979 reforms, the quality of those references improved. Sometimes a document 
would be included in Cabinet circulations of papers purely for information (examples 
in this period include attaching the final versions of White Papers or responses to the 
Ombudsman which had already been agreed in principle). But at other times a 
memorandum would require agreement by Cabinet and would make substantive 
mention of the views of select committees which needed to be taken into 
consideration. However these nuanced figures for substantive references tell the same 
story as the crude statistics. Between 1974 and 1979, there were as many as 70 
substantive references to the term ‘select committee’ in Cabinet papers, along with a 
number of routine mentions. But there were only 37 substantive references to ‘select 
committee’ made in Cabinet papers between June 1979 and the end of 1984. Thus the 
statistical evidence at least suggests that the Labour Cabinets of the late 1970s were 
twice as likely to consider select committee matters as the Conservative Cabinets of 
the early 1980s.  
 
It appears also that, while the public profile of select committees was enhanced by the 
Westland inquiries, the impact of that affair on Cabinet discussion was limited. The 
Cabinet papers for 1985 and 1986 made public in 2014 contain very few references to 
select committees. Even if Cabinet references to the departmental select committees 
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up to the end of 1986 are included in the count, the numbers are small – three 
references to the Home Affairs Committee, one to the Industry and Trade Committee, 
four to the Foreign Affairs Committee, six to the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee and no references at all to the Social Services Committee or the Transport 
Committee. This suggests a contrast in style between two Prime Ministers, neither of 
whom had much  interest in, or sympathy for, select committees; whereas in the late 
1970s an irritated Callaghan was forced to consider select committee issues of various 
sorts in Cabinet, in the early- and mid-1980s Thatcher was able largely to ignore them. 
 
But this is surely about more than the different personalities of the two Prime 
Ministers. The lack of Cabinet references to departmental committees in the 1980s is 
an interesting and surprising finding, especially in light of the large claims that have 
been made for the political importance of the 1979 reforms. Select committees appear 
to have had more impact on the work and thinking of senior Labour Ministers before 
the reforms than they had on leading Conservative Ministers afterwards. Judged by 
this imperfect measure of recorded Cabinet exchanges, therefore, the impact of select 
committees at the highest political level appears actually to have decreased with the 
advent of the new system. At the very least, these figures cast doubt on the 
conventional account of the political effects of the 1979 select committees. 
 
Select committee developments during the 1980s 
This section looks at various aspects of the development of select committees as 
institutions during the 1980s. There is certainly evidence that they were in this respect 
more active, if not more influential, at the end than at the beginning of the decade, but 
the picture is mixed.  
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Resources 
After the upheaval of the 1979 reform, the House became more interested in the work 
of the committees and what they cost, and Sessional Returns of statistics of committee 
activity rapidly became more elaborate during the early 1980s. This was probably 
prompted by the public interest generated by the Procedure Committee, and a related 
concern that the new departmental committees should not be too expensive. The 
Return for 1978-79 listed only the numbers of meetings and the attendance records of 
the members of each committee.586 From 1979-80 onwards the returns recorded the 
costs incurred by each committee, and by 1987-88 the return covered also staff, 
specialist advisers, witnesses, details of visits including numbers of both Members and 
staff who took part, the number of divisions during committee proceedings, and the 
number of Chamber debates.587 With an average of between four and five staff, not all 
of them qualified to advise on policy, furthermore, the new committees still lacked the 
resources to compete in the policy sphere with government departments and the 
growing number of pressure groups and think-tanks.  
 
Whereas the resources provided for select committees by the Clerks Department (not 
all of them clerks with a policy role) rose only modestly, the specialised expert 
resources available to Committees increased strongly as soon as the new bodies were 
established.  In June 1981 Francis Pym, the new Leader of the House, told the 
Commons that the cost of specialist advisers to select committees had risen from just  
£ 26,662  in 1977-78 and £ 27,092 in 1979-80 to as much as £126,937 in 1980-81.  
The number of days worked by the specialists increased from 944 in 1977-78 and 939 
                                                          
586    Select Committee Returns 1978-79.  
587    Select Committee Returns 1979-80. Sessional Return 1987-88  
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in 1978-79 to 2,425 in 1980-81.588 These advisers had a wide variety of working 
patterns - some were frequently involved in briefing and report-drafting whereas 
perhaps the majority had a much more peripheral role, being consulted regularly but 
not every week. The numbers of days worked is therefore much more important, as a 
gauge of the impact of advisers on the work of committees, than the global total of 
advisers employed. Interestingly, these figures suggest that costs increased over four 
times while days worked rose by less than 150 percent. That might indicate that more 
senior (and expensive) advisers were being employed than was the case before 1979. 
This increase in permanent, and, most particularly, part-time staff was out of all 
proportion to the increase in the numbers of Members involved on select committees 
and to the rise in the level of their attendance. This may not have put advisers ‘on top’ 
rather than ‘on tap’ for committees, but it was certainly a noticeable development.589 
 
Perhaps more important than the number of staff, permanent and temporary, deployed 
on committees, was their attitude to their work. A clerk who served one of the new 
committees sensed that there were much higher expectations for the departmental 
system than for the old; he later described a meeting in the very early days of the new 
era at which David Pring, Clerk of Committees, surprised his clerkly colleagues by 
saying that in serving the new committees they should ‘kick some ass ... be sharper-
elbowed, call people in, be a bit more American’. Some clerks were said to have 
‘blinked’ at this unaccustomed language from the ‘elegant’ Pring.590 This was of course 
the same man who had helped to set out detailed proposals for a departmental system 
as long ago as 1961; Pring could have been forgiven for betraying his excitement at 
                                                          
588    Hansard, HCD, col. 195W, 25 June 1981   
589    See Chapter Six below for evidence of the prominence of the specialist advisers who worked 
for the Treasury Committee during the 1980s 
590   Interview with clerk (on condition of privacy),  1 May 2015 
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the arrival of the reform he had himself foreshadowed nearly two decades before. 
Another clerk who worked on select committees at the time spoke later of a sense at 
the time that the new committees ‘didn’t need to be hidebound in terms of how to do 
the job ... there was a feeling that they could innovate and that this was entirely to be 
encouraged’.591   
 
The outside world – select committees, interest groups and the media 1980-1989 
This section examines the evidence for two aspects of relations between the select 
committees and the outside world; interest groups and the media. Austin Mitchell MP, 
who chaired the Sub-Committee of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee for a 
time during the decade, optimistically believed that the new committees had developed 
‘a real strength and a permanent role by linking MPs up to the only sector which really 
influences government policies - that “lobby” of specialised opinion, expertise and 
sectional interests which clusters around each area of policy’.592 This suggests that the 
new select committees were more influential than their predecessors because they 
made better use of the influence of outside organisations and lobbies. The enthusiasm 
of Mitchell for the role of departmental committees in focussing the parliamentary 
activities of interest groups must however be set against the judgement of one 1980s 
author who wrote at some length about ‘Pressure Group Politics’. Writing in 1989, 
Michael Moran cautioned against the use of the term ‘lobby’ in respect of pressure 
and interest groups: ‘That term derives from the practice of entering the lobby of the 
legislature to accost Parliamentarians. Nowadays Parliament is of only minor 
                                                          
591   Interview with clerk (on condition of privacy),  21 April 2015 
592   Austin Mitchell, ‘Inside the Commons Treasury Committee: The Report on the Civil Service’, 
Parliamentary Affairs, 40/4 (1987), p. 468 
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importance to many powerful groups. “Lobbying” has become a useful shorthand to 
describe the general attempts made by groups to influence government’.593  
 
Other writers have been unimpressed by the evidence for departmental select 
committees in the 1980s as arenas for the interplay of interest groups and policy. 
Jordan and Richardson, in their 1990 study of the activities of pressure groups, hardly 
mention select committees in a chapter on Groups on Parliament, devoting much space 
instead to more informal all-party groups, which are often specifically established and 
funded by commercial or charitable organisations to promote discussion of issues of 
special concern to the organisation. Jordan and Richardson describe these groups as ‘a 
means of group support of sympathetic members’.594 They also identify ways in which 
interest groups worked with opposition parties during the standing committee stages 
of Bills to press for amendments. The authors describe the campaign mounted by the 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities in the middle of the decade against abolition 
of the Authorities. There is no mention of select committee inquiries as a means of 
exerting influence on policy.595 
 
The experienced select committee member Alf Dubs could still advise lobbyists in 
1988 that ‘Generally speaking there is no point in asking MPs to support a particular 
[committee] investigation where (i) there has already recently been a full enquiry by, 
say, a royal commission or (ii) where there is no perception that a real problem exists, 
or (iii) where the issue is at the centre of controversy between the main political 
                                                          
593    Michael Moran, Politics and Society in Britain: An Introduction, Second Edition (Basingstoke 
and London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 122 
594    A. G. Jordan and J. J. Richardson, Government and Pressure Groups in Britain(Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), p.254  
595    Ibid.,p. 25 
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parties’.596 The numbers tend to bear out this judgement. A survey of ‘outside 
organisations’ carried out in the summer of 1986 suggested that such organisations 
were likely to regard individual backbench MPs as their most important parliamentary 
contacts (nearly 50 percent of organisations placed them first in this respect). For these 
public organisations seeking to influence Parliament, select committees came second 
in terms of importance, but they were a long way behind individual backbench 
Members (only 15.9 percent ranked select committees as first in importance in 
Parliament).597 All this is further put into perspective when one examines the ranking 
of ‘sources in influencing public policy’ by the organisations which took part in this 
1986 survey. Parliament is seen as the most important influence on public policy by a 
mere 7.6 percent of these bodies, outstripped by Ministers, civil servants, the media 
and ‘public opinion’.598  
 
But perhaps the most important development in the field of outside influence in the 
1970s and 1980s was the growth of commercial lobbying companies providing a 
service for a fee to corporate clients.599 According to one prominent paid lobbyist, the 
influence of many select committees at the end of the 1980s was relatively weak. 
Charles Miller, whose book on lobbying went into two editions in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, gave select committees a mixed review. On the one hand he said that their 
expertise was ‘improving’ with the influx of more specialist advice and that they 
provided ‘useful scrutiny of public bodies’ but on the other hand the ‘executive may 
                                                          
596   Alf Dubs, Lobbying: An Insider’s  Guide to the Parliamentary Process (London: Pluto Press, 
1988), p.114 
597   Rush,  Parliament and Pressure Politics,  p. 254 
598   Ibid., p. 272 
599   The main repository of information about the House, Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 
included a section on Parliamentary Consultants (basically lobbyists) for the first time in 1987.  By 
1989, there were 36 names on the Dod’s list, three times the original number. 
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ignore their work’ and they ‘usually work too late to influence policy’. Committee 
reports were ‘rarely debated’ and ‘the extent to which they can influence Whitehall 
depends largely on the forcefulness of the Chairman and the media’s own pressure’. 
For this prominent professional influencer motivated by the need to provide 
commercially sound advice to his (often corporate) clients, select committees were 
just one channel of influence, and not by any means the most effective. 
 
Miller indeed provided a table to present his own, subjective, judgements of the 
relative usefulness to those of various Whitehall and Westminster players, and select 
committees mainly achieved just 3 out of 10 on the scale of influence, on the same 
level as the Parliamentary Private Secretaries who supported Ministers in the House 
and special advisers to Ministers (this was the pre-Blair era when such advisers had 
not acquired their later prominence). Backbench party committees achieved an 
influence rating of 6 whereas all-party groups (very often established by interest 
groups) rated only 2. Ministers received a 7 and officials an 8 - showing the importance 
of implementation detail and the lower priority of broad policy for most corporate 
clients. The only occasions when select committees were seen by Miller to deserve a 
higher rating - a 6 - was when they were able to ‘attract public attention to their 
reports’.600  Again the importance of media coverage to select committees is strongly 
suggested. 
 
Miller’s ratings are hardly scientific, but they do suggest a general order of magnitude. 
For the busy public affairs executive, select committees were a sensible target and a 
useful arena, but if a choice had to be made between a visit to a relevant departmental 
                                                          
600    Charles Miller, Lobbying: Understanding and Influencing the Corridors of Power, Second 
Edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 40, 55 
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official and lunch with a committee chairman, Miller’s guidance would have been to 
go for the official - a sign of the relatively weak direct influence of select committees 
on policy. The popularity of Miller’s work suggests that he was listened to in the 
burgeoning ranks of the public affairs industry. Miller’s views also show the 
significance of timing. The pre-1979 committee inquiries were often criticised for 
taking too long and turning into ‘Royal Commissions’. The 1979 reforms did not 
remove the risk completely; the time taken over the procedure for committee inquiries 
continued in the 1980s to lead in some instances to a loss of influence as the caravan 
of policy formulation and public attention moved on.  
 
So much for relations between select committees and interest groups. What of the 
impact of the committees on the media? As a starting point, the annual average number 
of references to the words ‘select committee’ in The Times between 1970 and 1979 
was 328, while the average number of references in The Guardian and The Observer 
in those years was 265. After the 1979 reforms interest from these serious ‘broadsheet’ 
newspapers rose noticeably. During the 1980s, the average annual number of Times 
references rose to 398, while on average The Guardian and The Observer referred to 
‘select committees’ 401 times a year during that decade. The increase in interest in 
The Times was modest, but the rise in coverage in the liberal or left-leaning papers 
was very substantial - more than 50 percent. It might be tentatively suggested that 
select committees offered to the left an opportunity to criticise a dominant 
Conservative Prime Minister; the usually Conservative-supporting Times might have 
been less enthusiastic.   
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Table 4 below shows the immediate and longer-term effects of the new committees on 
the parliamentary coverage of these two newspapers; there was a clear rise for both in 
1980 and 1981 was also a good year for select committees, in The Times at least. The 
decrease in references in 1982 may have been a result of coverage of the Falklands 
conflict elbowing committees out of the parliamentary pages, and naturally enough 
the figures fell in the Election years of 1983 and 1987, when committees did not exist 
for large parts of the year. But  there was certainly a wave of media interest; one clerk 
who worked on committees at the time later described the initial press attitude to the 
new bodies as ‘extremely generous’ because ‘almost anything you did they said was 
wonderful whereas the Expenditure sub-committees they had paid no attention to at 
all’. Some journalists, the clerk said, acted as ‘cheerleaders’ for the new system, even 
where committees perhaps did not perform as well as had been hoped.601 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Selected newspapers, references to the phrase ‘select committee’ 1980-
1989 
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 Interview with clerk (on condition of privacy),  1 May 2015 
248 
 
Year Times  Guardian and Observer 
1980 546 473 
1981 502 323 
1982 357 316 
1983 264 283 
1984 377 407 
1985 463 486 
1986 423 551 
1987 273 263 
1988 311 359 
1989 467 513 
 
The pattern of press interest as indicated by these figures (which have been collated 
for this thesis from the online newspaper archives) fluctuated considerably; there was 
for example a clear ‘Westland’ effect. For the highest-profile of the ‘Westland’ select 
committees, Defence, there was a clear increase in press interest in the middle of the 
decade, but it was not sustained through the decade. Whereas in 1984 The Times 
mentioned ‘Defence Committee’ or ‘Defence Select Committee’ on 43 occasions, the 
number of references rose to 51 in 1985 and 76 in 1986; however, the figure went back 
down to 50 in 1987 (at least partly an effect of  the General Election) and to 62 in 1988 
and 40 in 1989. The Guardian and The Observer showed even more interest in 
Westland; numbers of references to the Defence Committee in the two papers rose 
from 83 in 1984 to 106 in 1985 and a staggering 164 in 1986. However, in 1987 
numbers fell to 85 and there were 65 Guardian and Observer references in 1988 and 
73 in 1989. Given the deep uncertainty of the geopolitical situation in the late 1980s, 
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with rapid changes in Europe including the fall of many communist regimes, and 
doubts being cast over the future of NATO, this lack of media interest in the work of 
the Defence Committee is particularly striking evidence of the failure of committees 
to make themselves routinely relevant to current events. When there was a strong 
select committee story, like Westland, the media were very interested, but there was 
little sense in the 1980s that committees were seen as continuous sources of news and 
authoritative comment.602 
 
Membership 
One thing that might have affected the atmosphere in select committees during the 
1980s would have been active management by the Prime Minister and her whips to 
prevent dissidents being appointed to committees. It is first worth putting this question 
into a wider context. There was for instance little sign of Mrs Thatcher being a 
‘reward/punisher’ when it came to appointing to ministerial posts; she did not seem to 
exclude from office Members who had a reputation for dissent.603 The picture for 
select committees is however slightly more complex. Several leading social liberals 
from the Tory benches held places on select committees for long periods during the 
1980s. These included Nicholas Scott, described by the doyen of parliamentary 
biographers Andrew Roth as ‘a hero of the Tory wets’ who ‘fought with his 
characteristic mixture of charm and principle to fend off Margaret Thatcher's more 
radical schemes and was the initial host of "Nick's Diner", the dining club where wets 
                                                          
602    One commentator suggested in 1992 that the press was ‘lukewarm and somewhat inattentive’ 
towards select committees.  Ralph Negrine, ‘Reporting Parliamentary Committees: the 
Investigation of the Rover Group Sale to British Aerospace’,  Parliamentary Affairs , 45/3 (1992), 
p. 400 
603    J. Richard Piper, ‘British Backbench Rebellion and Government Appointments, 1945-87’  
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16/2 (1991), p.227 
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let off anti-Thatcher steam’.604 Scott was a member for two years of the Environment 
Committee, which covered such sensitive left-right issues as local government finance 
and housing.605 Robin Squire, a former Council leader once described as ‘a user-
friendly Tory wet’,606 was a member of the same committee throughout the 1979-83 
Parliament.  The even more sensitive Treasury and Civil Service Committee included 
during the same Parliament the ‘outspoken and populist’ Anthony Beaumont-Dark 
who ‘did not always confine his aspersions to his political enemies’. Beaumont-Dark 
once said of the Cabinet Minister Leon Brittan: ‘Some ministers do not know where 
the sparking plug goes, yet they are made Secretary of State for Industry’; Lord Young, 
Employment Secretary from 1985 to 1987, was, according to Beaumont-Dark not ‘in 
touch with reality… if he thinks this country can survive on service industries and 
tourism and import all its manufactured goods’.607  
 
Another independent-minded member of the TCSC from 1979 was Richard Shepherd, 
who was a leading rebel on a number of issues, notably freedom of information, and 
sufficiently admired for his independence to be crowned as The Spectator’s 
Backbencher of the Year in 1985. Kenneth Baker was an active Conservative member 
of the reforming Procedure Committee of 1977-78 who joined the TCSC in 1979.  It 
was therefore not surprising that the Committee was so awkward during the 1983 
General Election. Indeed, the tendency for independent-minded members to make 
their way on to the TCSC continued. After the 1987 Election, Beaumont-Dark was 
joined on that committee by Nicholas Budgen (Backbencher of the Year 1984) who 
                                                          
604   ‘Obituary: Sir Nicholas Scott’, The Guardian, 7 January 2005 
605    Scott was an assiduous Committee member with a 97 percent attendance rate. Drewry, The 
New Select Committees, p. 161 
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was described at the time of his death as ‘an incorrigible rebel’, though he came from 
a theoretically Thatcherite right-wing tradition as an adherent of the views of Enoch 
Powell.608  
 
Yet it would be misleading to conclude from this evidence of Thatcher’s (and the 
whips’) tolerance towards Conservative select committee dissenters that it was the 
departmental system that was itself responsible for giving government backbenchers 
the opportunity to be awkward. Chapter Three notes the independent-minded makeup 
of the Procedure Committee of 1977-78, while the Expenditure Committee of the time 
had its share of Labour mavericks, including Brian Sedgemore and Michael English. 
Other 1970s select committee members were hardly conventional by the standards of 
the time; Maureen Colquhoun, who was the first openly lesbian MP at a time when 
attitudes were still far from progressive, was a member of the Expenditure Committee 
from 1975, replacing the prominent left-winger Jo Richardson. These may be isolated 
instances, but they show that governments had been finding it hard to exercise 
complete control over select committee membership for some time - or perhaps that 
governments had not cared too much. Whatever the reason, select committees in the 
1970s were certainly not made up exclusively of trusted loyalists. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that although independent-minded MPs (and possibly also 
those with the most determined mindset) could win places on select committees, the 
whips still played a big role in the selection of committee members. The Procedure 
Committee of 1977-78 had sought a new and more independent system of select 
committee appointment through the Committee of Selection; but the evidence is that 
                                                          
608    The Guardian, ‘Arch-rebel Budgen dies at 60’, 27 October 1998 
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selection for the new committees did not work out like that. In the 1999-2000 Session, 
the Liaison Committee complained that the pre-1979 practices had continued into the 
new era, and ‘the Committee of Selection - itself heavily influenced by the Whips - 
has nominated Members to serve on select committees in the same way as Members 
to serve on standing committees or private Bill committees - primarily on the basis of 
lists supplied by the Whips’.609 Chairmanships were especially prized under the new 
system, as under the old, and Labour’s John Golding, first Chairman of the 
Employment Committee from 1979, acknowledged that ‘At the beginning the 
chairmanships were to a considerable extent stage-managed by the Whips’ Office.’610  
 
Nevertheless committee membership was one area in which small-scale but significant 
procedural reform continued on its incremental way. In early 1980 the membership 
boundary between select committees and the front benches was clarified when the 
Committee of Selection removed an Opposition front bencher, Alan Williams, from a 
place on the Welsh Affairs Committee. Williams resisted, but the House upheld the 
Committee’s decision. At the same time a Parliamentary Private Secretary, an aide to 
a Minister, was removed from the Energy Committee.611 These decisions drew a clear 
constitutional line between the exclusively backbench membership of (almost all) 
select committees and members of the front benches. Small though they were, these 
decisions importantly preserved a distinct sphere for backbenchers on committees.  
 
                                                          
609    First Report from the Liaison Committee, Session 1999-2000, Shifting the Balance (300),  p. 
ix 
610    John Golding, ‘The Chairman’s View-2’ in Dermot Englefield (ed.), Commons Select 
Committees: Catalysts for Progress?: Understanding the New Departmental Select 
Committees,1979-83 (Harlow: Longman, 1984), p.28 
611  ‘Parliamentary Developments, January-March 1980’, Parliamentary Affairs, 33/1 (1980), p. 
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Conclusion 
The advent of the new departmental committees almost coincided with the beginning 
of Margaret Thatcher’s period in power. When assessing the impact of the committees 
in their first decade, it is important to remember that crucial political fact. As this 
Chapter has shown, the contrast between the dominance and executive-mindedness of 
the new government and the newly reorganised and consensus-driven committees was 
obvious. The statistics demonstrate that members of the committees were assiduous 
attenders for the first few years of the new system, and were keen to trumpet early 
successes, especially when, like the changes to the ‘sus’ law, they showed the House 
defying the general direction of Thatcherite policy. Inquiries, reports and committee 
visits multiplied during the decade, while the Chamber of the House heard more 
references to select committees, and parts of the media gave them enthusiastic 
coverage. For some backbenchers, 1980s select committees seem to have provided an 
opportunity to exercise again the sort of influence they enjoyed on occasions in the 
Chamber during the 1970s, but usually without the attendant risk of offending the 
whips. Some clerks welcomed the new system and were keen to make it work 
effectively to hold Ministers to account. The fact that the committees were much more 
likely than their predecessors to take evidence from Ministers shows that this was 
generally achieved.    
 
However the picture was still very mixed. The figures and the analysis of them 
presented here indicate that the 1980s as a whole saw no real long-term boost to 
numbers of MPs on committees or to their attendance rates. This suggests that it is 
right to be sceptical about claims for the distinctiveness of the post-1979 committees. 
Staffing resources for committees improved somewhat over the decade, but the 
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numbers of permanent staff did not increase much; a large part of the greater 
productivity of committees may have been a result of the work of specialist advisers, 
who cost the House a lot more in the 1980s than they had in the 1970s.  The 1980s 
saw an increased flow of reports but no substantial rise in the numbers of meetings; 
committee members were working at about the same level but seemingly on a wider 
variety of topics. Yet the vigour of the supply side of the committee system was not 
matched by increased demand or interest in the wider political world. Debates in the 
Chamber on committee reports continued to be relatively rare and normally sparsely 
attended during the 1980s. After an anxious first few weeks under the new system, 
government departments found that it was fairly easy to monitor and plan their 
responses to select committee activities. Above all, the evidence presented here 
suggests, unlike some previous studies, that the impact of committees at the very 
highest political level was limited; the significant drop in Cabinet references to 
committees in the early- and mid-1980s indicates that the departments were doing a 
good job in managing the issues raised by committee inquiries, without the need for 
discussion at senior level.  
 
There is also a point about sources. The widespread interest shown in the 1980s in the 
new pattern of committees, not least by the Study of Parliament Group which asked 
Gavin Drewry to produce his comprehensive survey of the new system, brings its own 
problems for the historian.612 As Chapter Three makes clear, select committees were 
often highly active during the 1970s, and at times they could make an impact on the 
political scene. However, much of their activity was not recorded because the interest 
                                                          
612   Drewry’s book paid due attention to previous committee history; it contained a summary of 
select committee developments before 1979. Priscilla Baines, ‘History and Rationale of the 1979 
Reforms’, in Drewry, The New Select  Committees, 1989, pp. 13-36  
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in the costs of the Expenditure Committee and other committees never reached a wide 
public audience. Things were very different with the post-1979 pattern of committees; 
aware of the higher public profile created at the time of the Procedure Committee, the 
House authorities went to great lengths to record committee activity and what it cost. 
Annual returns of information on select committees became ever fuller and more 
detailed during the 1980s. Faced with this weight of new evidence of committee 
activity, it is perhaps not entirely surprising that some historians have tended to 
exaggerate the significance of 1979.  
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Chapter Six: The Influence and Impact of Select Committees on Political Issues 
during the 1980s  
 
The previous two chapters have explored aspects of the transition between the pre- 
and post-1979 system of select committees: firstly, the political and administrative 
process by which Parliament and government came to make the reform, and second, 
the statistical comparisons between committee and related activity in the 1970s and 
1980s. This Chapter presents some 1980s case studies of committees at work, 
including examples of clear influence by select committees on the policy landscape, 
as well as instances where committees appear to have had a less impressive record on 
major issues. 
 
The main research questions to be addressed in this Chapter concern three main issues 
in respect of select committees in the 1980s. First, it looks at the choices of inquiry 
made by the new departmental committees and secondly it considers the influence the 
committees exerted on public policy and on the wider political landscape. Finally, it 
assesses the performance of   select committees in dealing with some of the main 
domestic and international issues during the decade.   
 
Committees’ choice: Policy influence or the Power of the Purse? 
The new departmental committees enjoyed a great deal of discretion in their choice of 
subject, as the Procedure Committee had recommended. The committees’ orders of 
reference allowed them to examine departmental spending, administration, policy or 
all three. As this Chapter makes clear later, the committees interpreted this as also 
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allowing them to investigate allegations of scandal and failure. There was something 
of a campaign in favour of the first category of inquiry; in the late 1970s John Garrett 
MP was prominent among those who argued for a more financially effective select 
committee system, one based on rigorous and meticulous examination of the spending 
and therefore the work of departments, but which would inevitably perhaps downplay 
consideration of policy. In a Memorandum to the 1977-78 Procedure Committee 
Garrett had set out his proposal for committees, replacing both the Expenditure 
Committee and the PAC, to be set up to ‘parallel the organisation of government 
departments’ which would, among other things examine ‘accounts for proper 
authorisation and regularity ... the financial administration and expenditure control 
systems of reporting organisations ... expenditure plans and programmes and to assess 
their objectives and results ... the efficiency and effectiveness of the management of 
reporting organisations ... [and]  issues of  national policy raised by the activities of 
the reporting organisations’.613 This was a development of the original concept for the 
Expenditure Committee, which had been undermined during the 1970s by Members’ 
incorrigible tendency to favour examination of policy over scrutiny of expenditure and 
administration. On the introduction of the new departmental system Garrett must have 
hoped for more rigour in the scrutiny of spending and performance by the new 
departmental system. But experience of the new era was clearly discouraging; in 1982 
Garrett complained that select committees ‘go for events and issues of the day’ such 
as the ‘sus’ law. But they tended to avoid the ‘slow grinding task’ of examining matters 
such as prison spending programmes.614 A 1984 survey of MPs carried out by Vilma 
Flegmann confirmed that Members ‘did not rate their achievements in improving the 
parliamentary scrutiny of public expenditure very high’. Whitehall officials told 
                                                          
613    Procedure  Committee, 1977-78, Vol. III, p. 148 
614    Hansard, HCD, col. 91, 15 February 1982  
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Flegmann in the same year of their ‘disappointment’ at the lack of interest shown by 
committees in departmental expenditure, despite the improvement in government 
financial information provided through the Financial Management Initiative 
programme which was introduced in the early 1980s.615   
 
Although Garrett was relatively pleased by the financially rigorous approach taken by 
the Treasury and Civil Service Committee (TCSC) his remarks reveal a great deal 
about the persistent conservatism of MPs in using select committees. As noted above, 
in the 1970s, the inquiries carried out by the General Sub-Committee of the 
Expenditure Committee, TCSC’s predecessor, had put the emphasis on such 
ostensibly technical subjects as the government’s expenditure plans and financial 
accountability to Parliament. There was some reference to economic policy, especially 
in the report on expenditure plans, but it was not prominent in the inquiry titles or 
recommendations.616  
 
In his 1982 remarks, Garrett was showing the frustration of those reformers who 
sought a more coherent approach to scrutiny based on the ancient and fundamental 
parliamentary power of the purse. Others who shared Garrett’s vision of structured 
and financially-based scrutiny included Edward du Cann, an experienced committee 
chairman, the clerk Michael Ryle who had been promoting such ideas since the 
1960s,617 and the academic Ann Robinson (soon to be a Conservative candidate) who 
                                                          
615   Flegmann, Public Expenditure and the Select Committees of the Commons, pp. 31,.37 
616   See for example the Second Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1977-78, The 
Government's expenditure plans 1978-79 to 1981-82 (Cmnd 7049) (257) 
617   Ryle later expressed frustration that committees argued for more spending on their departments 
rather than trying to impose financial discipline. Second Report from the Select Committee on 
Procedure, Session 1989-90, The Working of the Select Committee System (19) [hereafter 
Procedure Committee 1989-90], p. xi 
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at the time expressed mild exasperation at the apparent lack of interest of MPs in ‘the 
control and scrutiny of public expenditure’.618 There were other comments urging 
financial rigour along similar lines, the Liaison Committee in 1983 saying, ‘The 
examination of departmental Estimates has been the bedrock of the House’s earlier 
committee systems, and should be of this one’.619 But by the end of the decade, the 
1989-90 Procedure Committee had to note with disappointment the limited efforts of 
select committees in pursuing the power of the purse:  
Just over half [of the departmentally-related Select Committees] claimed in 
their memorandum to have devoted some attention to the scrutiny of 
expenditure, whilst the rest did not make any direct mention of the subject ... 
The coverage of expenditure by the departmentally-related Select Committee 
system as a whole appears to have been rather patchy.620 
 
The culture of the House of Commons continued to be resistant to structured and co-
ordinated scrutiny. The view taken by the 1989-90 Procedure Committee of the 
Ryle/Garrett/Robinson idea of select committees systematically examining public 
spending was summed-up in the dismissive conclusion of its report: 
We are sceptical, however, about Mr Ryle’s other suggestion, that the 
Treasury Committee should assume functions akin to those carried out by the 
Treasury itself in seeking to elucidate, if not resolve, some of the main 
competing interdepartmental spending priorities. Such an exercise, by 
appearing to subsume the role of Government, could become very political 
in the broadest sense and would therefore be likely to degenerate into a purely 
partisan debate. 621    
 
Realistic though it is in the light of the preferences of MPs, this passage appears timid; 
the Procedure Committee regards as risky the very suggestion that the House of 
Commons should attempt to examine the overall shape of public expenditure. Yet 
                                                          
618   Ann Robinson, ‘The Financial Work of Select Committees’, in Drewry, The New Select 
Committees, 1989, p. 318  
619   First Report of the Liaison Committee, Session 1982-83, The Select Committee System (92), p. 
11 
620   Procedure Committee 1989-90, p. x 
621   Ibid., p. xii 
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examining estimates and granting supply is and has always been recognised as 
constitutionally a central task for the Commons. In its wording the Procedure 
Committee passage harks back 30 years, closely resembling the equally curt and 
equally irrational dismissal by the 1958-59 Procedure Committee of the notion of a 
committee on colonial affairs.   
 
What might be called ‘Garrett’ scrutiny - a systematic update and extension of the old 
power of the purse for the twentieth century - contrasts with what might be termed 
‘Gadfly’ scrutiny, which emphasises policy influence, and very importantly, the 
ability to respond quickly to events in the political world.  The departmental 
committees could have chosen to take the structured route advocated by Garrett, Ryle 
and Robinson, but instead followed events and made policy and administration their 
main targets. This speaks directly to one of the main themes of this thesis - the question 
whether the creation of a system of departmental select committees actually made as 
much difference as its advocates have claimed. Garrett’s evidence to the 1977-78 
Procedure Committee suggested that a departmental system of select committees 
offered the opportunity to establish a rigorous approach to scrutiny based on a 
methodical and painstaking dissection of expenditure. That chance, if it had ever 
existed, was not taken. In the 1980s the House arranged its committees into rational 
bodies covering government in a superficially structured way, but they did not work 
as organised Garrett-style accountability mechanisms. In fact, the new committees, in 
favouring policy analysis over financial scrutiny or performance accountability, 
mirrored in many ways the piecemeal approach of the 1960s and 1970s committees. 
Thus they chose freedom of manoeuvre ahead of coherence of approach, as the rest of 
this Chapter makes clear. 
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Select committee influence and impact in the 1980s: some case studies 
There are some examples of 1980s select committees that exerted a specific influence 
over the direction of policy, or a less direct impact over the political environment. 
These were cited at the time as demonstrating the distinctive value of the new 
departmental system.622 However the reality is often slightly more complicated.  
The Canadian constitution 
There was an important intervention in the early 1980s by the Foreign Affairs 
Committee (FAC) in the issue of the ‘patriation’ of the Canadian constitution - the 
process by which the Westminster Parliament disentangled itself from direct 
involvement in the affairs of that country.623 The fact that Canada’s constitution was 
set out in a nineteenth-century Act of the Westminster Parliament was anathema to the 
Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, who pressed the UK government to 
renounce Westminster’s hold over Canada. Various problems emerged with the 
proposed legislation, including difficulties over a possible Canadian Bill of Rights and 
concerns over protection of the interests of Canada’s provincial governments 
(especially that of the French-speaking province of Quebec) and native Americans. 
During a lengthy inquiry, the Committee revealed unease at several aspects of the U.K. 
government’s original proposals for patriation, and they were significantly changed in 
the final Canada Act 1982.624 This raising of the alarm by the Committee was seen by 
                                                          
622   See especially the appendices to the report of the Procedure Committee 1989-90, which 
include assessments by committees of their own effectiveness 
623   For a broader perspective on the Canadian background to the 1982 patriation, see Alain-G 
Gagnon, ‘Canada: Unity and Diversity’, Parliamentary Affairs, 53/1 (2000), pp. 12-26.  
624    See these FAC reports on the issue: First Report, Session 1980-81, British North America 
Acts: the Role of Parliament (42); Second Report, Session 1980-81, Supplementary Report on the 
British North America Acts:the Role of Parliament, (295); First Report, Session 1981-82, Third 
Report on the British North America Acts: the Role of Parliament, (128)  
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many MPs as highly valuable. For example Labour’s George Foulkes paid tribute to 
the FAC for having ‘fired the warning shots to the peoples and Government of Canada, 
indicating that the original package would not have been passed by the House and 
Parliament’.625 From the government side, the Lord Privy Seal, Humphrey Atkins, 
welcomed the Committee’s ‘lucid’ report.626 
Writing in The New Select Committees survey volume a few years later, C. Y. Carstairs 
concluded that in the development of the patriation legislation the government had 
provided ‘enough time for the FAC to go into the matter in depth’. This may, according 
to Carstairs, have ‘played a significant part in bringing about the result that the Bill 
which eventually came before Parliament did so in a form different from, and less 
objectionable to much Canadian opinion than, the [original] measure adumbrated in 
1980’.627 But Carstairs does not accept that this significant level of legislative 
influence was a distinctive result of the introduction of the new system, saying that 
‘These circumstances owe nothing in principle to the 1979 changes. The action taken 
by the FAC [over Canada] could equally have been taken by the Defence and External 
Affairs Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee, had it still existed’.628 Carstairs 
might also have cited the mid-1970s Select Committee on Cyprus as an actual recent 
example of a Commons select committee that tried (without in its case any success) to 
influence key political and military developments in a Commonwealth country.629  
                                                          
625    Hansard, HCD, col. 353, 17 February 1982  
626    Hansard, HCD, col. 294, 17 February 1982   
627    C. Y. Carstairs, ‘The Foreign Affairs Committee’, in Drewry, The New Select Committees, 
1989, p.175 
628    Ibid. 
629   The Government’s generally negative  Observations on the Cyprus Select Committee report 
are contained in Cmnd 6579 Miscellaneous No. 26 (1976) of Session 1975-76, Report from the 
Select Committee on Cyprus 
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But the FAC’s work on Canada also echoed a much earlier precedent which has been 
noted above - the select committees of the 1920s and 1930s which examined questions 
of Imperial political development. In a way, the FAC’s Canadian inquiries in the early 
1980s were therefore a revival of a 50-year-old tradition by which committees were 
given the responsibility to clarify thorny questions about the relationship between the 
UK and its imperial or former imperial possessions. The 1979 reforms established an 
effectively permanent committee to look specifically at foreign affairs - a highly 
significant development. But there was Commons scrutiny of such major and delicate 
questions well before 1979.  
The ‘sus’ law 
The ‘sus’ law inquiries of the Home Affairs Committee in 1979-80 also attracted 
appreciative comment as an example of an early success for the new system. The issue 
was the perception of discriminatory use of section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824 to 
arrest ‘suspected’ persons who were allegedly loitering with intent. Young black men, 
for example, felt strongly that the police were treating them unfairly in their 
application of this section. After a rapid Home Affairs Committee inquiry (carried out 
by its Race Relations and Immigration Sub-Committee) in the first part of 1980 the 
Committee concluded that ‘sus’ did indeed operate unfairly in relation to black people 
and that the Committee ‘do not consider that the public interest is best served by an 
offence which inevitably leaves a significant proportion of those convicted with a 
sense that their conviction was unjust’. Following a strong Committee 
recommendation for a change in the law, the Home Office accepted the need for 
amendment of the Vagrancy Act.630 The Criminal Attempts Bill which repealed the 
                                                          
630    Second Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 1979-80, Race relations and the 
"Sus" law (559), p. xii; Hansard HCD, cols.1763-1821, 5 June 1980. The history of this episode is 
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‘sus’ law was enacted on 27 July 1981. The example of the ‘sus’ law was also 
significant in that the government agreed to establish a ‘special’ standing committee 
which took evidence from witnesses in ‘select committee’ mode before turning to 
detailed consideration of clauses. This was a rare 1980s instance of the implementation 
of a 1977-78 Procedure Committee recommendation that such evidence-taking 
sessions should be used to improve scrutiny of legislation.   
This policy intervention by the Home Affairs Committee was seen by some 
commentators as a distinctive feature of the new system, and it is noticeable that it 
might be seen as a liberalisation of legislation in this field at a time when the 
government were generally taking a much firmer line.631 The Criminal Justice Act 
1982, for instance, introduced what became known popularly as the ‘short, sharp 
shock’ for young offenders - a tougher penal regime. The ‘sus’ law reform promoted 
by the Home Affairs Committee thus represents something of a counterpoint to the 
generally rightward trend of criminal justice policy, lending credibility to the claims 
of the new system to be effective in influencing the direction of events.632 It may also 
have helped that the Committee were perhaps knocking at a half-open door; one 
observer later suggested that William Whitelaw, the then Home Secretary, was 
thinking of abolishing ‘sus’ anyway. The Committee’s inquiry may thus have helped 
Whitelaw to increase pressure on the police to accept that change was needed.      
But such initiatives were not altogether new. As noted in Chapter Three above, the 
Race Relations and Immigration Committee had examined ‘police/immigrant 
                                                          
set out in Gavin Drewry, ‘The Home Affairs Committee’, in Drewry (ed.), The  New Select 
Committees, 1989, p.199 
631    For example, the then Speaker, George Thomas, in the First Hansard Society Lecture in 1982; 
reproduced in Parliamentary Affairs, 35/4 (1982), p.350 
632    See the Second Reading debate on what became the Criminal Justice Act 1982: Hansard, 
HCD, cols. 294-307, 20 January 1982 
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relations’ in 1971-72, and while their recommendations were less successful than the 
ones produced by the HAC in 1979-80, the general conclusion was the same; that 
police needed to establish better relationships with young  black people. The 1971-72 
recommendations included a number of small-scale suggestions for improving 
communications between police and the black community, but there were also much 
more contentious proposals on issues such as repeal of a Race Relations Act 1965 
section on incitement to ‘racial hatred’.633 The 1979-80 ‘sus’ law report, with its policy 
proposals, could certainly have been produced a decade before by the Race Relations 
Committee. In this respect the willingness of select committees to challenge the 
government and other public authorities on sensitive issues of both home and foreign 
policy was established well before 1979.634 It is interesting that the later ‘sus’ inquiry 
succeeded in amending the legal situation, whereas its earlier equivalent had failed to 
achieve such change. Two factors may have played a part in the Home Affairs 
Committee’s 1980s success; one was the higher media and public profile of the new 
Committee, which may have given it the advantage over the old Expenditure 
Committee when it came to exerting pressure on opponents of change, and the other 
was the series of riots, some involving large numbers of black youths, which drew 
sharper attention to the problems in the early 1980s.  
 
There were other cases where the work of post-1979 select committees made a 
difference in the Commons Chamber and sometimes beyond. But the impact could be 
                                                          
633     Report from the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Session 1971-72, 
Police/immigrant relations (471), pp. 74-5 
634     Police/immigrant relations in England and Wales. Observations on the report of the Select 
Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, 1973, Cmnd 5438. It is worth noting that media 
coverage of the 1971-72 inquiry including the report was substantial, although not as heavy as the 
coverage of  the 1979-80 Home Affairs Committee inquiry into ‘sus’ 
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complicated, and there could be unintended consequences or debate about whether the 
intention of the Committee had been reflected in the government response. For 
example in 1983 the government accepted a recommendation of the Education, 
Science and Arts Committee which would give Ministers the opportunity to fund 
developments in local authority schools, in a way that would, according to the 
government, ‘more appropriately … reflect in the financial mechanisms the balance 
of statutory responsibilities between central and local government’.635 Sir Keith 
Joseph, the Education Secretary, welcomed the proposal at Second Reading of a Bill 
that was, he said: ‘principally concerned with implementing that Select Committee 
recommendation’. But Giles Radice, the Opposition Education spokesman, disputed 
Sir Keith’s  account, saying that, while the Secretary of State quoted the Select 
Committee in his support, the Committee’s report ‘makes it clear that the kind of 
educational specific grant that they were recommending was for "pump priming", to 
use their phrase, or additional money. They were not considering a scheme such as 
that which the Secretary of State has put into the Bill’.636 Several Conservatives, 
including current or former members of the Committee, however, disagreed with 
Radice’s characterisation of that recommendation, and welcomed the Bill as reflecting 
the Committee’s view. In the event, Labour voted against the Bill, which nevertheless 
received its Second Reading and became law as the Education (Grants and Awards) 
Act 1984. This demonstrates how hard, and indeed controversial, it can be to try to 
trace select committee impact on policy; in this case the report appeared to be a pretext 
for the government’s preferred action rather than a separate influence on policy.  
 
                                                          
635    Hansard, HCD, col. 629, 14 November 1983  
636    Ibid., col.639 
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At other times a select committee could make recommendations on technical or 
second-order (though still substantial) policy issues, most of which would be taken up 
with alacrity by both government and opposition. Though there were disagreements 
on some points, this was generally the case with a Home Affairs Select Committee 
report on the Representation of the People Acts which was published in April 1983.637 
The main issues were the accuracy of the electoral register, the extension of the 
franchise to British citizens resident abroad, changes in absent voting arrangements, 
and an increase in the deposit required of a candidate at a parliamentary election, with 
a reduction in the threshold for forfeiture.638 The government praised the thoroughness 
of the Committee’s inquiry and accepted the bulk of the recommendations, stressing 
its own non-partisan attitude on the subject.639 The Chamber debate on the subject 
revealed a number of disputes between government and Opposition about aspects of 
the proposals, but no-one argued against the need for legislation. The outcome was the 
Representation of the People Act 1985, which covered many of the issues raised by 
the Select Committee. This appeared to be a vindication of the new departmental 
committee system and its capacity to tackle semi-technical, but still potentially 
contentious, issues in a fairly non-partisan way. Yet it is also perfectly possible to 
imagine this work having been carried out by a select committee before 1979. It is also 
important to recognise that direct select committee influence was usually exerted only 
through the promotion of specific amendments to legislation. None of these instances 
of successful committee action involved generalised or broad-brush criticisms of the 
trend of policy. Committees seemed to operate effectively where they worked with the 
                                                          
637   First report from the Home Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83 (32). The Government 
response was Cmnd 9140 of 1983-84 
638   Hansard, HCD, cols.1017-92, 27 June 1984 
639   Ibid., col.1082 
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flow of policy change and proposed moderate or small deviations in the direction of 
that flow.   
 
This was perhaps also the case with Next Steps Agencies, one of the most distinctive 
innovations of the Thatcher era, which gave greater autonomy to parts of departments, 
many of which had a primarily administrative or service role. The Treasury and Civil 
Service Committee gave strong support to the initiative, believing that it could help 
improve service quality and clarify responsibilities, and the Committee carried out 
regular monitoring of its development from the start. However, given doubts about the 
effect of the new agencies on ministerial accountability, not all select committees were 
effective in the late 1980s in scrutinising the work of the agencies. One writer in the 
mid-1990s said that Parliament was still ‘feeling its way in asserting its scrutiny rights 
over these new bureaucratic forms’.640   
    
There was therefore an air of realism among select committees about the extent of 
what they could achieve. The Procedure Committee report on the system in 1989-90 
appeared to be in no doubt that the departmental system in the 1980s had achieved 
great things, providing ‘a far more rigorous, systematic and comprehensive scrutiny 
of Ministers’ actions and policies than anything which went before’.641 However the 
report was less forthright when it looked at the evidence in more detail; summarising 
the thoughts of select committee chairmen on their effectiveness and in particular their 
influence during the decade, the report said: ‘In evaluating the extent of their influence 
on the government, many of the Select Committees were at pains in their evidence to 
                                                          
640   Barry Winetrobe, ‘Next Steps and Parliamentary Scrutiny’, in Philip Giddings (ed.), 
Parliamentary Accountability: A Study of Parliament and Executive Agencies (London: 
Macmillan, 1995),  p.47  
641    Procedure Committee 1989-90, pp. xxi 
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set limits on what might realistically have been expected of them’.642 The chairmen of 
the Energy, Agriculture and Transport Committees all said that limitations on 
resources prevented them matching the policy work of government departments.  
 
Select committee performance in dealing with major political issues in the 1980s 
These examples of policy impact and/or influence must be seen beside other cases in 
which 1980s select committees encountered mixed success in addressing some of the 
major issues of the day. This section examines the approach taken by select 
committees to a number of events and issues: economic policy in the early years of 
Thatcher’s administration; the Falklands conflict of 1982; gas privatisation; and the 
Westland helicopters affair of 1985 and 1986. 
Select committees: aspects of economic policy 
Treasury Ministers implementing the sometimes rigorous and austere economic 
policies of Mrs Thatcher’s Government were often irritated by the Treasury and Civil 
Service Select Committee (TCSC) during the 1980s. The Committee in fact spent 
much of its time looking at the details of expenditure and accountability to Parliament, 
in the manner of its direct pre-1979 predecessor the General Sub-Committee, but it 
inevitably attracted most attention and caused most ministerial annoyance when it 
addressed economic policy. Quite a few of the limited number of references to select 
committees in Cabinet papers for the period 1979 to 1984 concern complaints from 
one Chancellor of the Exchequer or other about the allegedly discourteous or 
unreasonable behaviour of the Committee. 
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The usual bone of contention between the Treasury and the Select Committee was the 
effectiveness of the government’s reliance on monetary targets and public expenditure 
restraint as key elements of economic policy.643 As noted in Chapter Five, select 
committees did not trouble the Cabinet’s minute-takers much during the first five or 
six years of the Thatcher Government. One exception came in April 1981 when the 
then Chancellor Sir Geoffrey Howe complained to his Cabinet colleagues that a TCSC 
report which was critical of the government had been agreed ‘because of absences by 
Conservative members’.644 Howe was dismissive of the quality of the report, which 
was ‘unlikely to do serious damage to the Government’ and which ‘did not reflect to 
the credit of the Committee’. Nevertheless the incident was ‘illustrative of the 
difficulties which had arisen, largely because of the attitude or absence of the 
government’s own supporters, in several of the Departmental Select Committees’.645 
The Prime Minister summed up the discussion by reiterating the government’s 
‘concern that its own supporters on Select Committees should attend all meetings and 
ensure that the Government’s views were adequately represented both in discussion 
and in any published reports’.646 Clearly the enthusiasm of Conservative members for 
the new Committee had its limits. 
 
Howe’s successor as Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, also had an abrasive relationship with 
the Treasury Committee. He had been Financial Secretary to the Treasury from 1979 
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to September 1981, then Energy Secretary until June 1983, when he took over as 
Chancellor from Howe. Lawson was exasperated by a number of TCSC actions, 
including the Committee’s failure (as he expresses it in his autobiography) to 
‘understand’ his arguments about the effects of the business cycle on the Public Sector 
Borrowing Requirement.647 Equally, Lawson defended his tight financial policies 
aimed at reducing inflation against criticism from the Treasury Committee. Lawson’s 
ire was directed particularly at the academic specialist advisers who were a feature of 
the work of the General Sub-Committee before 1979, but whose numbers expanded 
considerably after the establishment of the new Committee.648 Lawson has especially 
harsh words for the Committee’s argument in 1981 that the effect on employment of 
anti-inflation measures could be quantified, attacking the ‘mechanistic do-it-yourself 
formulae’ the Committee applied. The culprits were seen by Lawson as ‘Eastern 
seaboard academics in the United States’ - no doubt influential with the specialist 
advisers to the Treasury Committee. This dispute has to be seen in the context of the 
statement signed, also in 1981, by 364 leading economists attacking the Thatcher 
government’s policies.649 Lawson’s comment is that the statement’s timing was 
‘exquisite’ because from around the time it was published the economy began a 
‘prolonged phase of vigorous growth’ - thus undermining, in his view, the arguments 
of the experts.  
 
These rare demonstrations of Cabinet anxiety reveal the lack of confidence of a 
government still not sure that its economic strategy would work either financially or 
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electorally, and they also demonstrate the scope for select committees to play a role in 
the debate. With its five (admittedly part-time) economists, the TCSC could certainly 
deploy specialist intellectual firepower on a scale not open to other committees, but it 
may have been the headline-grabbing potential of committees that Howe, Lawson and 
the others in the Treasury feared more than their substantive policy impact. It was 
possible, with select committees, for governments to consider they had won the 
intellectual argument while losing the political battle.  
 
But the committees did not always have the media whip hand. The TCSC report was 
highly sceptical about the assumptions for economic growth and control of the money 
supply contained in the Budget. However, its impact was weakened by muddled 
presentation, with The Times noting the large numbers of Conservative Committee 
members ‘queuing to challenge the report’ at a chaotic Committee press conference 
and the Chairman, Edward du Cann, facing a ‘storm’.650 The Guardian was kinder to 
the report651 but in general Ministers had nothing much to worry about from its 
conclusions. Indeed it is clear that the prominent media profile of the new committees 
was not an unmixed blessing for the system; quite a high proportion of the post-1979 
media articles concerned the problems encountered by committees in achieving 
consensus and thereby maintaining their credibility.652  
 
The political significance of committees was again demonstrated by Lawson’s actions, 
as Energy Secretary, in relation to an Energy Select Committee inquiry into North Sea 
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oil in 1981 and 1982. Lawson notes that he went ‘to considerable lengths to cultivate’ 
the Conservative members of the Committee, to ensure that they rejected the idea that 
North Sea oil extraction should be deferred.653 His cultivation was successful, the 
Committee’s report giving the notion short shrift. But it would be wrong to conclude 
that this episode demonstrates that 1980s committees were acquiring an influence with 
Ministers which had never been available to predecessor committees; the example of 
the 1972 ministerial discussions with the Chairman of the Science and Technology 
Committee about its inquiry into research and development shows that ‘cultivation’ 
was nothing new. 
 
Particular problems arose from publication during the 1983 General Election 
campaign of a draft Treasury Committee report which was seen (and described by the 
Labour Opposition) as highly critical of  government policy.654  The fact that the 
Treasury Committee Chairman was Edward Du Cann, who was also Chairman of the 
‘1922’ Committee of Conservative backbenchers, baffled Howe, who said that ‘du 
Cann’s performance has remained hard to understand or explain’.655 The political 
impact of the 1980s Treasury Committee on both Lawson and Howe was clear: for 
example the index to Lawson’s autobiography contains 13 references to the 
Committee, and some of the passages are quite extensive, and acid in tone.656  It is 
interesting then to compare that with the absence of the Expenditure Committee from 
the index of the autobiography of his 1970s predecessor, Denis Healey.657 By this 
crude measure, the increased exposure of Ministers to the post-1979 Treasury 
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committee did have an effect on their thinking, or at least on their mood. It might also 
be that Lawson, a former journalist, was particularly sensitive to the media 
attractiveness of the new committee, as well as its ability to employ some of the 
academic critics of government policy. The informal but unbiddable power of 
publicity was perhaps more important than the formal but now largely theoretical 
power of the purse.658  
 
Nevertheless, it is hard to discern much actual select committee influence on the 
direction of economic and indeed industrial policy during the 1980s. Andrew 
Likierman of London Business School, himself an adviser to the Treasury Committee 
in the early 1980s, said in 1988 that: ‘the reports of the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee have provided good material for major economic debates, but the 
government has shown little inclination to respond to the committee's major policy 
suggestions. To have done so would have been to acknowledge failures in the central 
part of the government's economic strategy’.659 The Treasury Committee sometimes 
came to conclusions that were very much at odds with the government’s view, but 
realism usually characterised the approach of the select committees covering 
economic and financial issues - a fact noted by several of Drewry’s monitors. For 
instance, at a time when British industry was losing a considerable proportion of its 
output, the Industry and Trade Committee during the 1979-83 Parliament: 
deliberately avoided investigating the central policy questions of its 
associated departments such as those surrounding government industrial 
strategy, competition policy, protectionism, and so on. Rather than 
attempting theoretically-based analysis in such areas, the Committee believed 
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it could be more effective by examining particular industries or practical 
policy concerns’.660  
 
 In the early 1980s John Golding’s realism also led him, as Chairman of the 
Employment Committee, to avoid confrontation with government; he accepted that 
select committees ‘should not see themselves as alternative centres of policy-
making’.661 About the Energy Committee of the 1980s it was said that: ‘Evidence of 
an overt and direct effect upon policy-making is difficult to come by. Four of the 
Committee’s reports elicited specific responses during the [1979-83] Parliament, 
though most of these tended to be rather bland and negative.’662  Given that these key 
areas of economic policy were so controversial during Thatcher’s premiership, it is 
notable that, with occasional exceptions such as the TCSC report during the 1983 
Election, there was no real challenge to the direction of policy, and no substantial 
changes appear to have been made to the government’s approach as a result of select 
committee recommendations.  
 
 
 
The Falklands Conflict: Committees ‘going off at half-cock’? 
This section assesses the response of the select committee system to the 1982 
Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and their retaking by a British Task Force. 
The conflict, caused by a long-standing dispute about sovereignty over the Islands, 
was a crucial event for the Thatcher premiership, military victory establishing her as 
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the dominant political force for the rest of the decade. But the initial inattention of 
government, especially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to the possibility of 
invasion attracted considerable criticism and calls for a variety of inquiries. Hugo 
Young described the affair as ‘arguably the most disastrous lapse by any British 
government since 1945’.663 The Falklands was a test for the government, but it was 
also to be a test for the new committee system. 
The invasion took place on 2 April 1982. On 5 April, 1982, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee (FAC) resolved to ‘undertake, at an appropriate time, an inquiry into the 
events that led up to the invasion of the Falkland Islands and matters related thereto’.664 
But the appropriate time was a long way away. A Commons Chamber debate on 7 
April 1982 heard sceptical comments from Labour’s George Cunningham about the 
ability of the FAC to tackle such matters with discretion. Cunningham said that: 
The investigation should be conducted by a Committee of the House, but a 
small Committee specially created for its very special and demanding 
purpose. It should be composed of senior Members who have held senior 
office in relevant posts ... Let us not mince words. I do not want highly 
sensitive material to be going to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs’.665 
 
Meanwhile the government was moving to establish its own inquiry, and after 
consulting with the leaders of the opposition parties the Prime Minister announced on 
6 July the appointment of a Committee of Privy Councillors ‘To review the way in 
which the responsibilities of Government in relation to the Falkland Islands and their 
dependencies were discharged in the period leading up to the Argentine invasion of 
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the Falkland Islands on 2 April 1982’.666 The Inquiry was to be chaired by Lord 
Franks, a former Ambassador to the United States and Provost of Worcester College, 
Oxford, and its members included three other members of the House of Lords, Sir 
Patrick Nairne, who was a retired Permanent Secretary and a solitary MP, the former 
Labour Home Secretary Merlyn Rees. The Commons therefore was very much a junior 
partner in the inquiry, with the FAC nowhere to be seen.  
Two days later, on 8 July, a member of the FAC, Labour’s George Foulkes, criticised 
in the House the composition of the Franks Inquiry panel as being likely to take the 
side of the ‘Establishment’, and commented on the response to the issue from the 
Chairmen of his Committee (Sir Anthony Kershaw, Conservative) and of the Defence 
Committee (Sir Timothy Kitson, Conservative). Foulkes acknowledged the FAC’s 
decision to inquire ‘at an appropriate time’, but said he was surprised that: 
the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and the Chairman of 
the Defence Select Committee are not arguing that their Committees, which 
they chair with great distinction and experience, should deal with the matter 
... In the United States, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be 
dealing with the issue in public with the Executive appearing before it. We 
would be all the better for that.667 
 
But Foulkes’s call for public hearings by the two select committees received no 
support from his FAC colleague Anthony Grant, a Conservative. Summarising what 
some Members perceived as the shortcomings of the new system, Grant said that ‘the 
Falklands inquiry, composed as it is of Privy Councillors - whether one likes it or not 
- will have access to material that would not be available to our Select Committee ... 
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any inquiry by the Select Committee would inevitably go off at half-cock and would 
be much more second rate than what is proposed’.668 
Foulkes responded to this by saying that he had consulted the clerk to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee who had confirmed that ‘special arrangements have been made in 
the past for both the Defence and Foreign Affairs Select Committees to see and to read 
privileged, confidential and, in some cases, even more highly classified information 
as part of their exercise’.669 Foulkes was pointing out that the FAC did not lack the 
powers or procedure to do the job. Although the constitutional role of Commons 
committees was very limited compared with that of their Capitol Hill cousins, there 
was nothing to prevent an inquiry - apart from the absence of political will. Party 
allegiances here trumped commitment to scrutiny. The case for a select committee 
inquiry had in fact already been damaged by the intervention in the debate of Roy 
Jenkins, Leader of the Social Democratic Party, who raised the ghost of the 1913 
‘Marconi’ select committee, which, he said, had ‘by sheer partisanship, devalued the 
whole concept of Select Committees.670 Apart from Foulkes, very few other speakers 
in the debate mentioned select committees. The long-established suspicion of such 
committees as vehicles for scrutinising scandal and failure was still firmly in place, 
despite all the hopes invested in the new system.  
 
Nevertheless, there were Falklands-related inquiries by both the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Defence Committee. The FAC started taking evidence on its 
Falklands inquiry on 10 November 1982, more than seven months after the invasion, 
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and there was no public evidence session with a Minister until 21 February 1983, when 
Cranley Onslow, the FCO Minister of State, appeared.671 That was nearly a year after 
the invasion. This was part of a thorough programme of evidence-taking which took 
the Committee to the Falklands and New York, but the FAC were not able to agree a 
report before the House was dissolved on 9 May 1983. The Guardian ran an article on 
19 May 1983, in the middle of the General Election campaign, which claimed that, 
just before dissolution, the FAC had been ‘approaching a consensus in favour of some 
sort of leaseback arrangement with Argentina’ for the Islands (which would probably 
have seen sovereignty over the islands ceded to Argentina with Britain leasing them 
back, either without a time limit or for a limited number of years). But three 
Conservatives were said to have adopted ‘filibustering’ tactics and the attempt to 
produce a report was abandoned.672 This account would almost certainly have been 
prompted by briefing from frustrated Labour MPs, but there is no reason to doubt that 
it is broadly accurate; in the end, no Report appeared at the time, although there was a 
substantial leak of the contents of highly critical sections of a draft report during the 
Election campaign.673 Consensus appeared dead in this part of the new departmental 
committee system at least. 
 
There was a delay in the appointment of the new FAC after the General Election of  9 
June 1983, but the new Committee took more evidence before finally producing its 
Report in December 1984, over two-and-a-half years after the invasion of the 
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Falklands.674 The FAC were not able to come to a conclusion on the main diplomatic 
point at issue - the validity of the rival claims to the Islands by Britain and Argentina. 
However, the Committee concluded that the invasion had ‘seriously weakened’ the 
strength of Argentina’s claim and that the UK government’s opposition to any talks 
with Argentina about the sovereignty of the Islands was ‘no doubt prudent in the 
present situation’.675 At senior ministerial level, the impact of the report was minimal. 
The relevant Cabinet note was just six lines long and recorded the assessment of 
Baroness Young, Minister of State at the FCO, that the report ‘was not an entirely 
helpful document but could have been worse’. The Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, was absent. No other Minister appears to have made any remark. At such a 
distance from the events of the spring of 1982, Cabinet interest in the views of the 
Select Committee was non-existent.676  
Some media coverage judged that the Committee had come up with fairly bland 
conclusions. The Guardian claimed that the FAC had ‘ducked the issue of whether 
Britain or Argentina has the strongest legal claim to the Islands’.677 However, though 
the Report bore ‘all the hallmarks of a compromise between the Tory and Labour 
members ... it offers little comfort to Mrs Thatcher’ because the FAC judged that 
‘some sort of accommodation with Argentina is not only inevitable ... but also 
desirable’.  The Guardian’s editorial of the same day, headed ‘Oh fudge our help in 
ages past’, criticised the Report’s alleged inconsistencies, calling it ‘a ludicrous 
exercise in schizophrenia’ and full of ‘supreme illogic’. The Committee was said by 
the editorial to ‘lack the spunk (or suicidal impulse) to reach plain conclusions’.  The 
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Times ran a straightforward descriptive article on the Report678 but there was no 
editorial comment in that paper. Other papers such as the Financial Times made no 
mention of the Report at all. In terms of media coverage, this was not the FAC’s finest 
hour.  
In March 1985 the Commons, in an evening adjournment debate, considered the 
Report and the government’s White Paper which was its response.679 The Foreign 
Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, welcomed the bulk of the Report, telling the House that 
it was: 
encouraging that the Select Committee has taken the same view as the 
Government on so many of the subjects about which I have been speaking. 
The Committee's support fortifies us in our resolve both to fulfil our 
commitments to the islanders and to persevere in the search for better 
relations with Argentina.680  
The debate lasted less than three hours and, of the 13 backbench speakers, five were 
current members of the Committee. As the debate took place late on a Thursday, by 
which time, in the normal way of things, some Members may have departed for their 
constituencies, the poor turnout was hardly surprising. There were no protests at this 
scheduling. At the end of the debate there was no vote of any sort. Press coverage, as 
usual with evening debates, was very modest.681 
But by this time public and media interest in the bigger geopolitical and strategic issues 
associated with the Falklands had in any case faded, to be replaced in some quarters 
by a fascination with the sinking during the Falklands conflict of the Argentine 
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warship General Belgrano. The ship was said to have been sailing away from the 
warzone at the time of its sinking, an allegation which raised questions about the 
conduct of the conflict by Britain. In the same month that its tardy and rather tame 
Report on the key Falklands issues was neglected or derided by much of the media, 
the FAC held a series of high-profile hearings about the Belgrano incident. Documents 
provided by Tam Dalyell, a Labour Member (although not, significantly, a member of 
the FAC) who doggedly pursued the issue of the Belgrano over many years, prompted 
the Committee to take evidence from some of the main figures involved. Some of these 
sessions were broadcast live. Press comment about the hearings showed the level of 
interest in the case, for instance when John Nott, who had been Defence Secretary at 
the time, publicly disagreed with the account of Lord Lewin, then Chief of Defence 
Staff, about the rules of engagement that applied at the time.682 When Lewin admitted 
to giving misleading information to the Committee about the incident, interest was 
further encouraged. 
The frustrations of some select committee members are exemplified by the account of 
the long-standing Labour MP and former Nationalised Industries Committee 
Chairman Ian Mikardo, who joined the FAC in 1983, ‘specifically in order to try to 
persuade that Committee to carry out an in-depth investigation into the Falklands 
affair’.683 Mikardo describes the way he convinced the Conservative-majority 
Committee to inquire into the General Belgrano sinking. But, according to Mikardo, 
the inquiry was ‘hampered by the fact that the government were engaged in a cover-
up of the false information and the no-information which they had given to the House’ 
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around the time of the sinking. Eventually, the report was issued, according to 
Mikardo, heavily influenced by the Conservative members, ‘owing something to the 
spotlight of investigation and a lot to the manipulation of a whitewash-brush’.684 The 
Labour members ‘realised that the only way in which we could project our analysis of 
events would be to write a complete report, a minority report, of our own’.  The Labour 
draft report, detailing what Labour members claimed were the ‘untrue’ statements 
made by Ministers, was voted down, but published in the final record of 
proceedings.685 Press comment was mixed at best.686 The Guardian editorial 
concluded that ‘Because Foreign Affairs MPs split on party lines, their contribution to 
the pantheon of Belgranobilia doesn’t help anybody much’, while The Times believed 
that, despite the dissent expressed by the Labour minority, the thoroughness of the 
Committee’s inquiry and its failure to find any serious errors or grave deceptions by 
Ministers should lead to the affair being ‘left to the peace of the deep’. Overall, though, 
a select committee that cannot produce an agreed report must lose credibility and 
authority.  
The Falklands case demonstrates well that it was not always, and perhaps not often, 
the policy influence of a committee that constituted its chief political importance. 
While the FAC’s main Falklands Report of 1984, the product of lengthy consideration 
over more than two years, received hardly any serious notice, and was in fact the target 
of some derision, its hurriedly-arranged Belgrano hearings hit the headlines and some 
at least felt that the evidence sessions offered a kind of closure in a case that was seen 
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by some as illustrating the flaws in Mrs Thatcher’s approach to decision-making. The 
hearings focussed public attention on Parliament at a time when the Opposition was 
having difficulty making an impact on an increasingly confident government. Select 
committees could in this way offer an alternative and cross-party challenge to 
executive dominance, even when the events under scrutiny were in the fairly distant 
past. But the ability of the Committee to agree its own way forward was cast into some 
doubt by the failure to agree a single report on the Falklands. It is significant that the 
Belgrano hearings were prompted not by FAC members but by another backbencher 
blessed with unlimited persistence.  
The Defence Committee adopted a more focussed approach and was able to move 
more quickly on Falklands issues. By the end of July 1982 it had started taking oral 
evidence on its inquiry into ‘The Handling of Press and Public Information during the 
Falklands Conflict’, a subject about which there had been severe criticism from 
journalists and others frustrated by the unwillingness of the Ministry of Defence to 
take the media into its confidence. The report was published in December, just as the 
FAC began to take evidence on its own Falklands inquiry.687 The Committee 
concluded that ‘the basic goals of information policy during war time were met’ but 
criticised vetting of articles by the military as ‘inconsistent’ and attacked failures of 
communication between Downing Street and the MoD. The media reaction was 
generally positive.688 The Guardian said that the Committee had done ‘tolerably 
enough’ in ‘measuring and weighing some extraordinary grey areas’ in the complex 
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relationship between the media and the military. The Times found the Committee’s 
recommendations for controlling the flow of information in future conflicts ‘sensible’ 
and supported its judgements on a number of issues. The Ministry of Defence 
responded fairly quickly and positively to the detailed recommendations of the 
Committee, publishing its Observations in March 1983.689 Thus the Committee had 
gained the agreement of some of the main media and the Ministry within a few months. 
It had been a competent exercise in the creation of consensus where before there had 
been a fair amount of disagreement.  
The Defence Committee also considered The Future Defence of the Falkland Islands 
in another rapid inquiry. A report was agreed on 12 May 1983, the day before 
Parliament was dissolved, but it did not see the light of day until the middle of June, 
just after the re-election of the Conservatives. The report took a broad strategic view 
of the commitments to the Falklands at a time when the Cold War was continuing and 
the country’s other responsibilities were manifold. On a key point, it concluded ‘It is 
important that the commitment in the South Atlantic does not indefinitely absorb an 
unduly large part of scarce defence resources’ and confessed that: 
Had the decision as to the future defence of the Islands rested with us, we 
would have had the difficult task of reconciling the vast sums of money 
planned to be spent there with the restraints on expenditure applied elsewhere 
within the defence budget to meet equally important political obligations.690  
Media reporting was not extensive, with The Guardian grateful for the information 
gleaned by the Committee about the substantial cost of the Falklands garrison, but The 
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Times apparently less concerned about the spending.691 The fact that the Chairman of 
the Committee, Sir Timothy Kitson, had retired at the Election no doubt helped to 
lower the temperature and suppress media interest. The government responded in 
October 1983, saying that ‘Forces deployed to the South Atlantic remain committed 
to NATO’ while accepting that distance was a constraint on the speed of 
deployment.692 The MoD had clearly taken the Committee seriously and addressed its 
arguments, although the Ministry’s response was constrained by the political necessity 
(reinforced by Thatcher’s recent re-election) of maintaining a substantial garrison on 
the Islands to deter possible Argentine attacks. This was clearly a well-informed and 
well-considered report, but it had virtually no political influence or impact. The stakes 
were simply too high for a select committee to change or even modify the course of 
policy. 
The Falklands episode demonstrated that the new committees suffered the same sort 
of frustrations as the pre-1979 vintage, but also that Members continued to be adept at 
employing procedural devices to make their point against government. Contentious 
subjects, however, also continued to carry the risk of undermining the unity and 
therefore weakening the credibility of committees. A failure to agree a report, or the 
production and publication in the minutes of the Committee of what was in effect a 
substantial ‘minority report’ (although that is not a term countenanced by the House) 
could reveal divisions, harm a committee’s reputation and distract a committee from 
less controversial but possibly more influential work. The new committees were trying 
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to carry out the bigger policy tasks which were their responsibilities, but in many ways 
they continued to be as vulnerable to problems and frustrations as the old ones. 
The responses to the issues raised by the Falklands differed noticeably between the 
two committees. Foreign Affairs tried to take a broad view of the issue, in line with its 
clear responsibilities as one of the most distinctively policy-oriented of the new 
committees. The evidence suggests that the Foreign Affairs Committee struggled at 
times to adjust to this broad and demanding remit. Unlike some other post-1979 
departmental committees (including the Defence Committee), it could call on few 
recent precedents or guidelines for some of its inquiries. The sort of major diplomatic 
and strategic issues raised by the Falklands affair had rarely been addressed before by 
the House, or at least not in such detail. This was to some extent new territory for MPs 
and the evidence of the Falklands inquiries suggests that they were not completely at 
home there. On the other hand, the Defence Committee took the pragmatic route on 
the Falklands, looking back to examine the controversial media handling of the 
conflict by the Ministry of Defence and looking forward to assess the future defence 
needs of the Islands. In terms of credible reporting and recommendations, and political 
and media impact, the Defence Committee probably got it right. Direct influence on 
policy was another matter entirely.  
Gas privatisation 
This section looks at how the select committee system dealt with gas privatisation. 
Privatisation of nationalised industries became, after 1982, one of the hallmarks of the 
Thatcher premiership. Hundreds of thousands of jobs were moved from the public 
sector to the private sector during the decade, with companies such as British Telecom, 
British Petroleum, Enterprise Oil and Jaguar among the subjects of privatisation. In 
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some ways this could be seen as a diminution of Parliament’s power of the purse, as 
many billions of pounds in economic activity was moved out of the scope of the 
House’s control. Change on this scale had inevitable constitutional significance. To 
what extent did the new select committees monitor this highly significant development 
at the time, and did they have any influence on the formulation of the policy? 
 
In one sense, the broad political debate on public and private ownership was 
impoverished by the 1979 reforms, with the Nationalised Industries Committee a 
casualty of the changes.  The intention of the 1978 Procedure Committee had, 
however, been to preserve the work of the Nationalised Industries Committee, whose 
functions, it suggested, should in future ‘be undertaken by the appropriate 
departmentally-related committees; in the case of the nationalised industries, common 
problems should be considered by a joint sub-committee representing the select 
committees most directly concerned with the industries’.693 The Nationalised 
Industries Committee was duly abolished, but little happened to replace it; no joint 
sub-committee was ever established and in 1983 the Liaison Committee recommended 
that the power to do so itself be abolished.694 The attempt of the 1978 Procedure 
Committee to maintain co-ordinated scrutiny of nationalised industries was therefore 
unsuccessful. One significant result was that the work of one of the best-regarded of 
the pre-1979 committees came to an end without adequate replacement. More 
important is the fact that, instead of having machinery already in place to subject the 
government’s privatisation philosophy and policy direction to rigorous analysis, the 
select committee system had to respond in haste to proposals as they came up. Another 
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important point is timing; privatisations were not a major feature of the 1979-83 
Parliament, but they came thick and fast after 1983. From then on, the select committee 
system appears to have had difficulty keeping up.   
 
A significant measure of gas privatisation had already occurred in the early 1980s, 
with the privatisation of Wytch Farm in Dorset, the largest inshore gas field in Western 
Europe. In the summer of 1981 the government announced its intention to oblige the 
nationalised British Gas Corporation (BGC) to dispose of its interest in Wytch Farm. 
BGC was opposed to the sale of a very profitable asset, a spokesman saying: ‘We are 
bitterly disappointed. The reward for initiative, enterprise, hard work and success is to 
be told to “sell off”’.695 The sale was seen by many commentators as a test case for the 
government’s privatisation policies, which were then much less ambitious than they 
became later in the decade.696 Nevertheless a Directive for sale under the relevant Act 
was approved by Parliament in July 1981, and came into force on 13 October 1981.  
 
In July of 1981 the Energy Committee had announced that it would seek written 
evidence on Wytch Farm from the Department of Energy and the Corporation, ‘with 
a possible view to further, oral evidence at a later date’.697 Memoranda were provided 
by BGC and the Department, and published by the Committee in a report agreed in 
February 1982. Along with the Memoranda, setting out the very differing views of the 
government and the BGC, the Committee published a one-page report which noted 
the dispute but made no judgement as to the merits of the sale. The report went on ‘As 
                                                          
695   The Guardian, ‘British Gas is forced to sell oil interest’, 27 June 1981 
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697    First Report from the Select Committee on Energy, Session 1981-82, The Disposal of the 
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... Parliament has already come to a decision on the matter, and because of our other 
commitments, we do not wish at this stage to go beyond publishing the relevant 
evidence’. However, the Committee did say that ‘we think it right to stress the need to 
ensure that the sale produces the maximum return for the nation’.698 The Committee’s 
‘other commitments’ included a major inquiry into the key contemporary issue of 
North Sea oil depletion policy, so it would not be right to be too critical of its response 
on Wytch Farm, but it is hard to avoid noticing that the report was published late in 
the process and added very little to public enlightenment. There was little press 
coverage at the time of the report, and only the occasional minor reference to the 
Committee in Chamber debates on Wytch Farm in either 1981 or 1982. After a delay, 
the sale was completed in 1984.  
 
Very soon privatisation was being planned for the whole of BGC. The government 
announced on 7 May 1985 that it had decided to transfer ownership of BGC to the 
private sector.699 Only two members of the Energy Committee spoke during the 
Commons announcement - Robert Hayward and Peter Rost, both Conservatives who 
raised questions of detailed design of the privatisation rather than issues of principle. 
In July 1985, the Energy Committee, pursuing its earlier broader concerns, published 
a report which criticised the lack of ‘a coherent strategy for the development and 
depletion of the United Kingdom’s gas resources’. The Committee recommended that 
the government should publish a White Paper to set out a framework for that policy 
and urged that the coming privatisation proposals for BGC should ‘make plain how 
this national monopoly will be used to ensure the optimal development and use of our 
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indigenous gas resources’.700  This was a direct question, if not a challenge, to the 
government. The government failed to rise to the challenge. No such major document 
was produced until 48 hours before the Second Reading of the relevant Bill on 10 
December 1985. In that debate there were only 11 references to the Energy Committee 
in total, and only four mentions by non-committee members. The Committee had 
made little impact on gas privatisation up to now.   
 
In a report published in January 1986, the Committee called for stronger regulation of 
the privatised British Gas than that proposed by the government. The Committee’s 
general view was that ‘where there is a monopoly, or the threat of monopoly power, 
there should be regulation sufficient to provide a proxy for the normal disciplines of 
competition’.701 Accordingly, the Committee called on the government to ensure that 
the new regulator of the gas industry should have powers to scrutinise a wide range of 
the activities of gas companies and to require greater disclosure of information by 
companies than would be required in a truly competitive market.702 The report was 
clear: ‘Every effort must be made to establish the regulator as independent of 
commercial or political pressure’.703 The report also discussed process, and in 
particular the alleged failure of the government to consult the Committee and the 
House as a whole on the proposal to privatise the gas industry. The report lamented 
the failure of the government to take up the Committee’s recommendation in its July 
1985 report that a gas White Paper should be produced: ‘there seems no good reason 
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for omitting this pre-legislative stage’.704 The government’s response to that report705 
was criticised by the Committee because ‘it evades most of the strategic and long-term 
issues that the Committee raised’.706 Finally in this catalogue of ministerial 
indifference, there was the fact that ‘the meat of the government’s regulatory proposals 
were not made available to the House until ... late on 9 December 1985, less than 
twenty-four hours before  the Second Reading Debate [on the relevant legislation] was 
published’.707 The Report makes clear that the principle of privatisation was not at 
issue.708 Media coverage of the report focussed mainly on the Committee’s call for 
stronger post-privatisation regulation and on the concern of some MPs, including 
Conservative Members, that the proposals did little to encourage competition.709 
 
The government’s response, published in March 1986, set out the rationale behind gas 
privatisation and answered the Committee’s points.710 There were some concessions 
to the Committee’s recommendations, including one on the promotion of 
competition711 and another on allowing import of gas.712  However, the government 
rejected the Committee’s key proposal that the regulator should have a duty to promote 
competition in all the activities of British Gas.713 This was a detailed and respectful 
response to the Committee, but it came very late in the process of privatisation; the 
government’s approach throughout was characterised not by awareness of the 
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requirements of Parliament but by its determination to privatise gas in the way it 
wished to, and on a very tight timetable. The Committee’s views were one of many 
considerations, and were not given any particular priority.  
 
But the Committee’s members were not quite finished with gas privatisation. It may 
have been a feeling of being sidelined that inspired the majority of Committee 
members to combine to put down some amendments to the Bill at Committee Stage. 
Largely unsuccessful in exercising their role as a Committee influencing policy 
through the conventional means of inquiry and report, they stuck together to try to 
exert direct influence in the passage of legislation.714 The attempt was not successful, 
but it did show some esprit de corps and at least some sense of constitutional 
innovation.715 British Gas plc was incorporated as a public limited company shortly 
afterwards, on 1 April 1986. On 24 August of that year, the property, rights and 
liabilities of the British Gas Corporation, apart from British Gas 3 percent Guaranteed 
Stock which was held by the Treasury, were transferred to British Gas plc under the 
Gas Act 1986.  
 
Parliament, including its select committees, then went silent on the British Gas 
privatisation, except that the Public Accounts Committee kept under regular review 
whether value for money was achieved in the share sale, with questions raised on 
issues concerned with the financial implications of implementation such as the capital 
structure of the new company, the nature and phasing of share sales, and the 
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underwriting of the share offer.716 Thus the PAC, its work somewhat expanded by the 
National Audit Act of 1983 (effectively, to include value-for-money inquiries and not 
just, as before, purely financial investigations), was just as important in scrutiny of 
privatisation as the new Energy Committee, if not more so.  
 
Westland 
The Westland affair concerned the travails of Britain’s only large helicopter 
manufacturer, which was facing bankruptcy in the mid-1980s. The argument was 
whether the solution to Westland’s problems lay in partnership with an American 
company (favoured by the Westland Board and supported by Mrs Thatcher and the 
Trade and Industry Secretary Leon Brittan) or an arrangement with a group of 
European companies (preferred by the Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine). The 
affair saw not only dissension between Cabinet Ministers, but also the leaking to the 
media by a Department of Trade and Industry official of part of a (legally-privileged) 
letter from the Solicitor-General.  
 
The official Opposition made little impact in the affair. The attack on Thatcher’s 
handling of the affair mounted in the Chamber on 27 January 1986 by the Opposition 
Leader, Neil Kinnock, was seen as having been a failure.717 By way of contrast a 
government amendment passed after an earlier debate on the same issue had put the 
new committee system centre stage, recognising ‘the competence of departmental 
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Select Committees of the House of Commons to consider the issues raised by these 
[Westland] developments’.718 The robust questioning in oral evidence of Sir Robert 
Armstrong, now Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service, by Dr John 
Gilbert of the Defence Committee led to intense public interest.719 The Defence 
Committee’s inquiry was judged to have been ‘a much needed tonic for the select 
committee system’.720 Hugo Young called the Committee’s Fourth Report of that 
Session ‘the best record’ of the affair.721 It is thus not surprising that the Westland 
experience was seen by Hennessy as a ‘breakthrough’ for select committees.722 No 
fewer than three committees - Trade and Industry, Defence and Treasury and Civil 
Service - examined different aspects of the affair.723  
 
The committees’ inquiries were varied. The Trade and Industry Committee took 
evidence during most of 1986 on the sponsoring role of the Department of Trade and 
Industry on Westland. It concluded that there was a ‘lack of co-ordination on matters 
of major policy formulation between two departments of State’ and that it was 
‘disinclined to attach much credence’ to the evidence of one witness, the businessman 
Alan Bristow, whose conduct before the Committee it described as ‘unacceptable’.724 
There were also concerns about share dealings in Westland at the time of the affair. 
But the report came out late in the day, in March 1987, and received limited press 
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coverage.725 Though there had been substantial   press interest in the evidence sessions, 
the overall impact of the Trade and Industry Committee on the Westland Affair was 
limited. 
 
The Defence Committee produced a critical report on the government’s handling of 
the affair in July 1986, but it had had to work without important evidence. In particular 
it was prevented from taking evidence from named civil servants allegedly involved 
in the leak of the Solicitor-General’s letter. The government’s view was that, as Sir 
Robert Armstrong had carried out his own internal inquiry, an appearance before the 
Select Committee would amount to double jeopardy. The Committee did not accept 
that argument, but had to acquiesce in the government’s refusal to allow such evidence 
to be given.726 Gavin Drewry, writing shortly afterwards, observed that the current 
official guidance for civil servants on giving evidence to select committees - the so-
called ‘Osmotherly rules’ - insisted that officials must be constrained by collective and 
individual ministerial responsibility.727 That meant effectively that very little could be 
said to committees about the internal workings of departments. After negotiations 
between the government and the Committee, Sir Robert Armstrong, who had not been 
involved directly with many of the events, gave evidence instead of the civil servants 
closely involved. Armstrong could in no way provide the evidence required for the 
Committee to carry out a comprehensive forensic examination of the facts. Neither did 
the publication of the Defence Committee report in late July 1986 make big waves in 
Downing Street. Thatcher’s Press Secretary Bernard Ingham wrote to Nigel Wicks, 
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her Principal Private Secretary, that when he met the parliamentary journalists on the 
day of publication for his regular briefing of the ‘lobby’, there was ‘Remarkably little 
interest’ in the report from the small gathering of reporters. Thatcher’s biographer 
Charles Moore judges that, by the time the report came out, ‘The heat had gone out of 
the issue.’728  It was the last day before the House rose for its summer recess, and the 
beaches beckoned.  
 
The Sub-Committee of the Treasury and Civil Service Committee was inquiring into 
issues relevant to Westland at the same time as the Trade and Industry and Defence 
Committees. In particular, it was considering the accountability of civil servants to 
Parliament. There is an intriguingly detailed account of the way the Sub-Committee 
inquired into the Civil Service in the mid-1980s from Austin Mitchell, who chaired it 
at the time. The operation of the Civil Service as an institution was a subject which 
could not, by definition, properly be investigated by a single departmental committee. 
For one thing, the Service naturally crossed all departmental boundaries. The basic 
corporate management of the whole Service was in the 1970s and early 1980s divided 
between the Treasury and the Civil Service Department (abolished in 1981). In its 
inquiry the Treasury Committee Sub-Committee was not therefore acting as a 
departmental committee. And appropriately there had been a previous inquiry, in 
1976-77, into the Civil Service, carried out by the General Sub-Committee of the 
Expenditure Committee.729 The 1985-86 TCSC inquiry was thus not in any essential 
way a product of the 1979 reforms.  
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Mitchell recalled that the TCSC Civil Service inquiry ‘began almost accidentally’. 
Though the three ‘Westland’ committees liaised with each other, the Treasury 
Committee’s decision to investigate the Service at the time when the Defence 
Committee raised the issue of civil servants’ accountability to Parliament was a 
fortunate coincidence rather than anything planned. The Civil Service had played ‘a 
subordinate role to the [Committee’s] main preoccupation of economics and financial 
policy’ during the early 1980s. But Mitchell was ‘on the look out for a new enquiry 
subject in the summer of 1985’. An inquiry into the European Monetary System 
(EMS) was finishing and a look at the Civil Service was ‘likely to be less political and 
controversial than an EMS report that had strained committee unity to the maximum’. 
It was a topical subject because of ‘Ponting, GCHQ and the government’s own attitude 
to the Civil Service’.730 Nevertheless the subject did not arouse strong party political 
dissension like economic issues, the core of what made Thatcher’s policies 
controversial, and this made Civil Service matters ‘non-controversial enough for a pre-
election study’.731 Mitchell said that both Conservatives and Labour wanted an 
effective Civil Service. Eventually, in the summer of 1985, it was decided that the 
Sub-Committee should inquire into the Armstrong Memorandum setting out the duties 
and responsibilities of civil servants, and into the manpower requirements of the 
Service. The first witness, in November 1985, was Sir Robert Armstrong himself. 
There were two TCSC reports which challenged the government’s view that officials 
could only give very limited evidence to select committees, as they represented their 
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Ministers. But the government responded very negatively. One thing emerges straight 
away from the TCSC inquiry; the processes of inquiry selection had not been changed 
by the advent of the new departmental system; in many cases, the work programmes 
of committees in the 1980s, as before, owed more to the vagaries of political fashion 
and management of Members’ demands than to any overarching plan or strategy.  
  
We have already noted the very limited effect of the Defence Committee report on the 
work of the Number Ten press office. The impact of the Westland affair on the 
business of Cabinet, at first catastrophic, ended up being just as modest. The Cabinet 
Conclusions naturally have a long passage on the Cabinet meeting of 9 January 1986, 
which saw the resignation of Michael Heseltine amid considerable rancour.732 But 
there was no substantial mention of Westland in the Cabinet Conclusions after that, 
despite the high public profile in the spring of 1986. This may say more about Mrs 
Thatcher’s way of running her Cabinet than it does about the political salience of the 
Westland affair, but it is well worth noting. As we saw in Chapter Five, the Cabinet’s 
insouciance over Westland was part of a more general 1980s trend. 
  
How important was Westland in the development of the select committee system? 
There is no doubt that the affair brought select committee inquiry into the heart of 
government and its processes in a way that had not happened for many years. The 
forensic quality of some of the questioning and the clarity of the Defence Committee 
report were widely recognised. The Committee had stood up to the most dominating 
Prime Minister of the era and had won some important battles, not least for the public’s 
attention. The report, and to a limited extent the work  of the Treasury and Civil 
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Service Committee, showed that a select committee could acquire constitutional 
weight as an investigating body. Oliver and Austin concluded at the time that the 
Defence Committee inquiry was ‘a humbling experience for the government and the 
Committee was certainly more searching than the full House was or could have been 
... The new system of select committees is beginning to show its actual and potential 
worth’.733 Peter Hennessy records the revived media and parliamentary interest in the 
Westland fallout in the autumn of 1986, when the government attempted to, as 
Hennessy put it, ‘remove civil servants from beyond the reach of the select 
committees’, arguing in its response to the Defence Committee report that such 
committees were not suitable forums for ‘inquiring into or passing judgement upon’ 
their actions or conduct. This contention sparked ‘outrage’ in the House, and that was 
not confined to the opposition benches.734 The Westland affair also showed that some 
of the 1979 committees could collaborate to pursue different but complementary 
inquiries. The Defence Committee report records that it had been ‘careful to keep in 
close touch’ with the Trade and Industry Committee and with the Treasury and Civil 
Service Committee.735  
 
All this certainly raised the profile of select committees, but this impact needs to be 
set in context. As we have seen, the highly public furore over the attendance of 
significant witnesses had been foreshadowed ten years before in the Chrysler/Lever 
affair. Indeed, the continuity between the 1970s and 1980s is further underlined by the 
fact that the clerk of the Defence Committee at the time of Westland, Robert Rogers, 
had also been the clerk of the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of Expenditure at 
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the time of Chrysler/Lever.736  In addition, select committees possessed no real power 
to enforce attendance of named witnesses. The government’s refusal to allow specific 
civil servants to appear in the Westland affair, Oliver and Austin concluded, was 
among the factors that made the role of the Defence Committee, ‘rather less 
penetrating than it might have been’. Similar conclusions were reached by Chris 
Painter, who suggested that Westland demonstrated the inconsistency of the Thatcher 
Government’s application of constitutional conventions. While the Prime Minister 
(and Michael Heseltine) breached doctrines of both collective and individual 
ministerial responsibility in their conduct of the affair, these doctrines were quickly 
and determinedly deployed to block select committee attempts to question civil 
servants whose actions were central to their inquiries.737   
 
Ironically but unsurprisingly, the recalcitrant Prime Minister in 1986 was Margaret 
Thatcher, who as Leader of the Opposition in 1976 had advanced the radical 
proposition that requests to Ministers to appear before parliamentary Select 
Committees should be regarded as ‘mandatory’.738 The Westland episode suggests that 
little had changed for select committee powers in ten years. It is clear that committees’ 
scope for inquiry and powers to enforce their access to papers and persons had not 
essentially improved since Harold Wilson refused to allow Harold Lever to give 
evidence on Chrysler.739 Drewry concluded in 1987 that the 1979 reform of select 
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committees had ‘barely scratched the old constitutional orthodoxies’.740 The conflict 
between select committees and the government on the question of civil servants’ 
accountability had been sharpened by Westland, but by the end of the decade there 
appears to have been a clear winner - the government. Peter Hennessy, giving evidence 
to the 1989-90 Procedure Committee inquiry into select committees, filleted the 
principles ostensibly followed by government in relation to evidence-giving by civil 
servants before select committees and concluded that ‘If [government departments] 
literally stuck to this rule book, they would only be able to tell [select committees] 
only what was in Written Answers, oral questions, White Papers - and they could 
confirm the day of the week and the time of day’.741 It is also interesting to note the 
involvement of Sir Robert Armstrong in the various aspects of the Westland affair and 
the related inquiries undertaken at the time by select committees; he had of course 
been one of the small number of officials who in 1978 had warned of the possible 
constitutional effects of the new committees.742  
 
As a consequence of the Westland exchanges, the Procedure Committee of 1989-90 
was worried that, if it pressed for a change to the conventions on access, the outcome 
would be rules that ‘whilst superficially less restrictive, would then be applied 
rigorously and to the letter’.743 A few years later Peter Hennessy judged that on 
Westland the Defence Committee ‘had the Thatcher administration on the run. Yet, it 
failed to deliver the final coup de grace’.744 Tony Wright, who, as chair of two key 
committees, later played a distinguished part in the development of the system, refused 
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to see Westland as a watershed, judging that the Defence Committee inquiry 
demonstrated rather that ‘little could be glimpsed of the basis upon which policies 
were being made before the door was shut again and business as normal resumed’.745 
Constitutional understandings were not challenged. The failure of the select committee 
system to make any impression on this set of rules is testimony to the limited progress 
made following the Westland confrontations between departments and the 
committees.746 
 
The Westland Affair, by appearing to epitomise the arrogance of a government that 
had become over-used to exercising power, had made a huge impact on the 
consciousness of the political class and on the media, yet there was no sustained 
‘Westland effect’ on MPs’ participation in the Defence Committee or in the select 
committee system as a whole. Defence Committee had an 85 percent attendance 
average in 1985-86, but the General Election Session of 1986-87 saw an average of 
73 percent and the average remained at about that level to the end of the decade. By 
the late 1980s many percentage committee attendances had settled at an average in the 
low or mid 70s.747 This compared with average attendance rates of just under that 
figure on the equivalent committees in the late 1970s. Effectively the first ten years of 
the new committees had seen an average attendance increase of less than one member 
per select committee meeting, compared with that achieved by the unlamented 
Expenditure Committee and its irrationally-organised sub-committees. These figures 
                                                          
745    Wright, Citizens and Subjects, p. 47 
746   For a contemporary discussion of the frustrations suffered by committees see Andrew Gray 
and William I. Jenkins ‘Public Administration and Government’, Parliamentary Affairs, 40/3 
(1987), pp. 301-303. Media coverage emphasised the limitations of select committee powers, eg. 
The Times, ‘Civil servants face curbs on evidence after Westland’, 14 October 1986     
747   Michael Jogerst, Reform in the House of Commons: The Select Committee System (Lexington: 
University Press of Kentucky, 1993), p.195 
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confirm that Westland was not, in terms of its long-term impact on parliamentary 
scrutiny, quite the seismic event it at first appeared to be. 
 
Permanent secretaries and the new system 
The overall verdict of senior Whitehall figures on the first decade of the new 
departmental committees was mixed. The Treasury Permanent Secretary, Sir Douglas 
Wass, had expressed his misgivings about the possible results of the new system in 
1978, as noted in Chapter Four. But by 1983, when he delivered the BBC Reith 
Lectures, Wass had begun to take a more relaxed view of the committees in action. He 
recognised that ‘Whitehall’s instinctive prejudices’ had caused many civil servants 
‘including, I regret to say, myself’ to view the notion of departmental committees with 
concern.748 This was because of doubts over breaches of confidentiality and ‘because 
too we were apprehensive that officials under public examination would become 
politically exposed’. After three years or so of the departmental system, however, 
Wass acknowledged that ‘most of these fears have not been realised’.749 Civil servants 
had for instance not been pressed by committees on policy issues which were solely 
appropriate for Ministers. Good and useful work had been done by the new system, 
and Ministers and officials had ensured that, faced with the prospect of defending 
policies before departmental committees, they were ‘rigorous in formulating [their] 
justification for it’. He had seen this beneficial effect at work in the Treasury as they 
prepared for policy announcements.  
 
                                                          
748   Sir Douglas Wass, Government and the Governed: BBC Reith Lectures 1983 (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p.68 
749   Ibid., p.69 
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However, Wass felt that the actual performance of the new committees in scrutinising 
government had not been very impressive. The examination of witnesses had been 
‘superficial’ and officials had found it too easy to ‘stone-wall’ committees - refusing 
repeatedly to answer a question. There were signs of inadequate preparation and a 
tendency for some members to read out, without fully comprehending them, questions 
drafted by special advisers. Inappropriate behaviour by special advisers included using 
the committees ‘to assert a purely personal viewpoint, or to elicit information of value 
to themselves rather than to the committee’.750 It is clear from Wass’s remarks that the 
suspicion of the economists employed as advisers by the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee was not confined solely to Ministers.  
 
Sir Frank Cooper, who had been Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence until 
1982, said in 1987 that the new committees had produced much more factual 
information than previously and that ‘we are certainly better off with them than 
without them’.751  But Cooper noted that the Public Accounts Committee, where 
Permanent Secretaries appeared in their own role as Accounting Officers, played a 
much bigger role in the work of those most senior officials than departmental select 
committees. Senior reputations have always depended at least partly on performance 
before the well-briefed PAC. Cooper interestingly suggested that ‘middle-ranking 
officials quite like to appear in front of select committees, not least because one result 
is to put more factual information on the table than might otherwise be the case’. The 
impression is that officials who were leading on a policy sometimes actually enjoyed 
the chance to explain in public the rationale behind it. 752 It is also worth pointing out, 
                                                          
750   Ibid.,p.71 
751   Ibid.,p.17 
752   Contemporary Record, Spring 1987, p. 18 
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however, that there had been many select committee appearances by civil servants in 
the 1960s and the 1970s. Again, the somewhat expanded post-1979 system is clearly 
revealed as an evolutionary step rather than a radical leap. Whitehall, from Permanent 
Secretaries to junior liaison officers, therefore found the challenges posed by the new 
select committee relatively easy to overcome. 
 
Conclusion 
Select committees had a number of policy successes during the 1980s. These included 
the change to the ‘sus’ law, influence on the patriation of the Canadian constitution 
and important work on the Representation of the People Acts. The Westland Affair of 
1985-86 showed that committees could be effective forensic inquirers (thus 
contradicting the venerable post-Marconi assumption that select committees should 
not examine cases of failure and scandal). Expectations of the committees were raised 
during the 1980s and it is clear that committees were rather more likely to take on 
large and controversial topics than their 1970s predecessors.  
  
Yet, as Russell and Benton and others have recognised, the implementation of select 
committee recommendations can be a complicated process, with the intentions of the 
committee not always clearly defined or achieved. The 1980s saw a number of 
examples of that, including the contested interpretation of the Education Committee’s 
recommendations which surrounded the House’s consideration of the Education 
(Grants and Awards) Act 1984. The 1980s did not see a select committee golden age 
in which party contention was subordinated to cross-party agreement; on some 
subjects, it was politics as usual both on the committees and in the world outside.  On 
economic policy, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee managed to get under the 
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skin of Chancellors, but perhaps at the expense of being put in the political firing line 
and risking its credibility. By refusing to stick with ‘safe’ subjects, the Committee 
could and did make an impact with the media, but it seems to have had little if any 
influence on the direction of policy. Numbers of MPs serving on select committees 
rose slightly to begin with, but there was no sustained increase in attendance. Select 
committees were mentioned on the floor of the House of Commons more regularly 
than in the 1970s, but 1980s debates on committee reports did not attract many MPs.  
While Ministers now appeared much more often to give evidence, Cabinet and the 
Civil Service both took the new committees in their stride. The added value of the 
‘departmental’ committee structure was thus real but limited; it gave rationality and 
clarity to the system, and it probably encouraged committees to seek evidence from 
‘their’ Ministers, which helped to bolster ministerial accountability, and thereby to 
increase committee impact. But departmental committees as such did not contain any 
magic ingredient; they were effective partly because the committees of the 1960s and 
1970s had laid a sound foundation and in the process had emboldened MPs. The 1980s 
Foreign Affairs Committee inquired into a number of major international issues which 
could probably not have been considered by any of the 1970s Expenditure sub-
committees. But the FAC’s performance on the Falklands suggested that it was still 
coming to terms with its new and ambitious remit; the Defence Committee, 
maintaining the pragmatic focus of its Expenditure Committee predecessor, succeeded 
in its inquiries on both the Falklands and Westland with their specific concentration 
on limited issues. It was therefore still the case that committees were usually most 
effective when they were not too ambitious. The constitutional tectonic plates 
underlying select committees did not move much during the 1980s. 
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Conclusion:  Reform by Small Steps: Select Committees 1960 to 1990   
 
The subject of this thesis has been the development of investigatory select committees 
of the House of Commons in the twentieth century, with special focus on the period 
between 1960 and 1990. It has addressed the following main issues: how effectively 
select committees operated in both Whitehall and Westminster; how select committee 
reform was promoted, and who promoted it; and whether the reforms of 1979 made it, 
as has been claimed, a watershed year for select committees. 
 
The analysis in this thesis is original partly because it is based on a wider definition of 
the possible political and parliamentary roles of select committees than other studies. 
A number of writers have tried to assess the influence of committees on the policy 
debate, but this thesis, while not neglecting policy influence, also examines 
committees’ development as parliamentary institutions from 1960. It also tries to place 
select committee development more firmly in the context of political change during 
the period than has been the case with previous studies. Throughout, the thesis makes 
much greater use of statistics to support its argument than many previous studies of 
select committees. Above all, it casts doubt on some received wisdom about the course 
of select committee development in the twentieth century. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Standard Narrative 
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It is worth rehearsing at this point some of the main features of what might be 
described as the standard narrative about select committees in the second half of the 
twentieth century. This account underlies the thinking of many, though not all, of those 
who have written on select committees and whose views have been mentioned in this 
thesis.  
 
Firstly, the narrative is heavily, though not always consciously, influenced by the 
recommendation in the 1918 Haldane report for parliamentary committees to 
scrutinise the work of individual departments. The Haldane vision of a comprehensive 
coverage of Whitehall by departmentally-related committees came to be seen as the 
gold standard for reform. Second, there is a focus on the personality of Richard 
Crossman, who is widely regarded as the main force behind the select committee 
reforms of the mid-1960s. The travails of the Agriculture Committee and some other 
‘Crossman era’ committees are then assessed as proof that the 1960s reforms were a 
failed experiment, an ultimately futile attempt to reach the Haldanian ideal.753  
 
Next, the Expenditure Committee of the 1970s is viewed in this standard narrative as 
failing either to control spending or to provide a comprehensive range of opportunities 
for MPs to scrutinise policy and administration. Meanwhile, the conditions for true 
reform are judged to have developed in the 1970s as increasingly unbiddable 
backbenchers of both main parties flexed their muscles in the voting lobbies.754 The 
1978 Procedure Committee recommendations on select committees were, on this 
view, well timed to take advantage of the rebellious aftermath of the Heath, Wilson 
and Callaghan Governments. The comprehensive coverage of the post-1979 select 
                                                          
753   The arguments for this point of view are summarised on pp.77-78 above 
754   See p.156 above 
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committees, fulfilling a long-held demand for a comprehensive approach to scrutiny, 
is thought of as having helped to produce a rise in activity, with reports, visits and 
specialist advisers growing rapidly in number. Policy achievements such as the 
changes to the ‘sus’ law and FAC’s influence on the Canadian constitution ‘patriation’ 
debate are considered by some to be distinctive products of the new system. According 
to this narrative, the Westland affair of 1985-86 demonstrated that the departmental 
committees had come of age and were able to hold a confident and assertive 
government effectively to account. The fulfilment in 1979 of the Haldane vision of 
parliamentary committees mirroring all departments, it is suggested, brought a new 
vigour to scrutiny and perhaps began to strengthen Parliament in its dealings with 
government. This standard narrative is by no means wrong on every point, but the 
evidence in this thesis does strongly suggest that it needs substantial modification.     
  
Setting the scene: House of Commons select committees up to 1960  
Chapter One sets the scene, tracing the broad outlines of select committee history up 
to 1960, using a combination of secondary sources and primary sources including 
Hansard, and both formal and informal Cabinet papers. This Chapter identifies three 
broad categories of investigatory parliamentary committee which apply to all periods 
of history: 
• Committees which inquire into government scandal or failure; 
• Committees which examine the propriety and/or efficacy of public spending;  
• Committees which scrutinise policy and administration. 
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The Chapter notes that the House of Commons was a house of committees from a very 
early date. This was not a simple development; in his history of procedure Campion 
describes backbench scepticism and suspicion towards the work of some select 
committees in the early modern era, seen as packed with men put there by the King or 
the Queen. Suspicion of such groups, gathered in small rooms away from the 
transparency of the Chamber, continued to be a feature of parliamentary opposition to 
committees well into the twentieth century. Michael Foot, a fierce opponent of select 
committees as Leader of the House in 1978, was in that respect a new Elizabethan.  
 
But despite these doubts there is plenty of evidence of a relatively vigorous and well-
populated non-partisan sphere of parliamentary action on select committees during the 
centuries before 1900. The Victorian architects of the new Palace of Westminster 
indeed recognised the importance of committees by providing the new building with 
two corridors of committee rooms. The establishment in 1861 of the Public Accounts 
Committee was promoted by the great statesman William Gladstone and epitomised 
the mid-Victorian attitude to committee scrutiny of public spending. There were many 
references to select committees in the Chambers of both Houses in the mid-nineteenth 
century. 
   
However, the virtues and achievements of the often powerful and respected select 
committees of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were apparently 
forgotten by many in the early and mid twentieth century. Judging by the figures for 
select committee activity, Members’ interest in committees was much reduced. The 
fate of the Marconi committee, riven by party feeling, seemed to exemplify the 
weaknesses of all committees dealing with alleged misbehaviour; their vulnerability 
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to party-politicking, their inability to achieve consensus on issues that mattered. The 
period between 1913 and 1950 was dominated by two World Wars, and the consequent 
growth of government resources and activity. During the World Wars select 
committees were indeed seen by senior Ministers as useful sounding boards on a range 
of complex and contested matters. But after both Wars select committees appear to 
have faded from the picture.  
 
The twentieth-century decline in parliamentary interest in select committees is all the 
more baffling because the heavyweight Haldane report of 1918 set out proposals for 
committees to examine the policy and administration of individual departments - 
something very similar to the committee system as reformed in 1979. From the 1920s 
onwards the Labour Party, which had been the only one of the two major parties even 
to consider select committees as a cornerstone of parliamentary reform, began to see 
them as possible threats to the success of a radical legislative programme. The 1945 
Attlee Government embraced social and industrial legislation as an engine of change 
and showed impatience with any notion that Parliament’s main function was to act as 
a check on the executive. There were few complaints by backbenchers of any party as 
select committees atrophied. 
 
By the early 1950s, of the three types of committee identified, the ‘failure and scandal’ 
committee which had been a substantial part of the early history of parliamentary 
investigation had virtually disappeared, and ‘policy and administration’ committees 
were also rare; only the ‘power of the purse’ committees continued to operate with 
some regularity. But seasoned observers such as Campion could argue that even the 
respected machinery of the Public Accounts Committee had all but seized up. 
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Parliament and its financial committees were widely regarded for much of the first 
half of the twentieth century as failing to do their essential job of questioning the 
government’s use of public money. The need for expert assistance to committees had 
been recognised on occasions by reform-minded individuals during the early twentieth 
century, but little had been done to equip them with what they needed. Where it was 
provided, help often came from Whitehall and was seen by at least some Ministers as 
usefully enabling government to ‘steer’ the activities of committees.  
 
The years between 1930 and 1960, however, did see the development of a view among 
some commentators and a few politicians that committees were the most sensible place 
for scrutiny of certain aspects of policy and administration. However the backbench 
bodies that seem to have emerged most strongly during that period were not all-party 
select committees run by the House, but party subject committees. In a sense, then, 
Haldane’s vision of a Parliament matching the organisation (if not the resources) of 
Whitehall first came closest to realisation in a party context. Even when they came 
from prominent figures such as Lloyd George, suggestions for a systematic expansion 
of all-party select committees tended in the first half of the twentieth century to fall 
foul of government and political scepticism and apathy, and especially the opposition 
of the whips. Debates on select committee reports were rare and ill-attended. The 
number of select committees remained tiny and their remits were usually limited to 
the constitutionally ‘safe’ subject of budgetary or other financial matters. The 
Procedure Committee of 1958-59, in (narrowly) failing to recommend a committee to 
examine the extremely sharp current issues around colonial policy, epitomised the 
triumph of the government over the scrutineer. The debate on those 1958-59 Procedure 
Committee proposals demonstrated that objections to select committee policy scrutiny 
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came both from those who believed that a policy issue should be left for Ministers (or 
officials on Whitehall committees) to consider, because they had the necessary 
knowledge of the subject, and from those who felt that an issue was too important to 
be taken off the floor of the House. This was a deadly combination for the idea of 
select committee scrutiny. The standard narrative, by pivoting the argument on the 
reforms of 1979, fails to reflect the extent to which apathy had affected the attitudes 
of the political class to select committees by 1960.  
 
But it is also clear that the years between about 1920 and 1960 constituted a highly 
unusual period in the history of the House of Commons. Ironically, at precisely the 
period when government was becoming ever more active and ever more expensive, 
the Commons largely gave up on committees, thus turning their back on one means of 
scrutinising that burgeoning activity. This is not the main theme of the thesis, but it 
may be that Members did not feel able to challenge departments because of the growth 
of government; the small band of generalists in the House, both Members and clerks, 
perhaps felt unable to match the well-resourced and sometimes specialist analysis of 
the Civil Service, and gave up the fight. 
 
 
 
Three decades of select committee change, 1960-1990  
The rest of the thesis concentrates on the period between 1960 and 1990, a time of 
much change for select committees.   
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Chapter Two uses Prime Ministers’ and Cabinet papers as well as Hansard to describe 
the gradual growth of political interest in select committees after 1960. The diaries of 
Richard Crossman, Leader of the House of Commons when a number of new select 
committees were appointed in the mid-1960s, are also used, along with records of 
media coverage.   
 
Chapter Three traces the development of the Expenditure Committee during its brief 
lifetime of nine years from about 1970, and notes the work of other committees 
including a number appointed to examine specific policy issues. Making particular use 
of Cabinet papers, and of the internal working papers of some committees as well as 
media articles and interviews with clerks who served committees at the time, the 
Chapter puts select committee development into the context of a turbulent political 
period.   
 
Chapter Four employs a range of primary sources to illuminate the process by which 
the new system of departmentally-related select committees was proposed and 
introduced in the late 1970s. The sources include Cabinet and Prime Ministers’ papers 
and Cabinet Office papers concerning the consideration of the proposals by Whitehall. 
Media articles are used to demonstrate the effectiveness with which the Procedure 
Committee of 1978 promoted its reforms to the public.     
  
Chapter Five examines the statistical evidence on the activity and impact of the new 
select committees in their first decade from 1979, looking at the sessional returns made 
by committees to the House as well as Cabinet papers and media coverage. 
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Comparisons are drawn between the figures for committee work in the 1970s and the 
equivalent figures under the new dispensation in the 1980s.  
 
Chapter Six contains case studies which illustrate the work of departmental select 
committees during the 1980s. Sources include committee reports and government 
responses to them, Hansard and media coverage. 
 
The next sections consider the broad research issues raised in the thesis: committee 
effectiveness, the nature of reform and reformers, and whether 1979 was the key year 
for reform.  
 
A. How effectively did select committees operate in both Whitehall and 
Westminster? 
The effectiveness of House of Commons select committees in the early 1960s was 
limited. These committees engaged only modest numbers of Members, held few 
meetings and published few reports. The Estimates Committee, the main committee 
scrutinising government, was theoretically restricted to financial matters, although in 
fact members often used the estimates to raise questions of administration and indeed 
policy.  
 
But the 1960s saw a significant change in the social and educational make up of the 
House of Commons. The influx of Members with skills in the arts of persuasion and 
analysis is one of the most likely explanations for the 1960s trend towards a more 
committee-based House. As government became more involved in national economic 
and social life, there was also a belated acknowledgement that Parliament had to catch 
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up, with a particular emphasis on the role of the ‘specialist’ committee of MPs in 
testing the performance and assumptions of Whitehall. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Two’s analysis of Cabinet papers, senior Ministers started to notice select committees; 
politicians such as Wilson and Crossman began to take these committees seriously as 
forming a distinct parliamentary institution, rather than a series of unconnected and 
temporary collections of MPs. Many politicians of the 1960s captured the scientific 
spirit of the age in treating reform as an ‘experiment’ - Parliament not perhaps blazing 
in the white heat of constitutional progress but with the test tube at least undergoing a 
gentle warming. The exciting but rather tentative nature of the committee experiment 
also suited both Parliament (which, as noted, had too few resources to staff all 
committees and had to have help from Whitehall) and the Executive. They were 
fragile, but most of the Crossman-era committees survived in some form, partly 
because the environment for such committees was becoming more benign. That 
environment was reflected in the catalogue of small but significant procedural changes 
identified by the clerk Clifford Boulton in Parliamentary Affairs in the autumn of 
1969. More public evidence sessions, more generous committee travel opportunities 
and the appointment of a senior clerk who would be able to argue in the House 
administration for the needs of committees were all helpful.  
 
These relatively small but practical forward steps, all taken during the 1960s, were 
important in helping to install, or re-install, select committees as an accepted and 
effective part of the machinery of the House.  By the end of the 1960s the idea of select 
committee scrutiny, if not entirely yet the reality, was firmly entrenched in 
Westminster. It is especially striking to contrast the 1960s Cabinets’ (albeit grudging) 
acceptance of select committee activity with the Morrisonian dismissal of the 1940s 
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and the Butlerian disdain of the 1950s. Above all, the Commons was now ready to 
become once more a House of committees. Yet the standard accounts of select 
committee history pay little attention to such evidence, preferring to emphasise, for 
example, the failure of the Agriculture Committee to survive government disapproval 
in the late 1960s.  
 
The 1968-69 Procedure Committee made proposals to tie select committee scrutiny to 
the emerging, more sophisticated system of long term expenditure control and 
planning that was being introduced in Whitehall. It is intriguing and instructive to 
recall that at the time of the publication of that report in 1969, newspapers carried very 
similar headlines to the ones which greeted the publication of the 1978 Procedure 
Committee report that is seen today as such a watershed, with much optimistic talk of 
a change in the relationship between Parliament and government.755 The result of the 
Procedure Committee recommendations was the Expenditure Committee which 
started its work in the early 1970s. However, the hopes in the headlines were not fully 
realised, as they would not be after the 1978 report. Investigatory select committees 
continued to suffer from a number of weaknesses during the 1970s. For example, the 
coverage of government activities was very patchy, with employment and foreign 
policy issues and some home affairs issues for example rarely examined.  Although 
the remit of the Expenditure Committee allowed it, surprisingly few Ministers gave 
evidence to select committees. There was very little examination of legislation by the 
committees who might be expected to have specialist or detailed knowledge of the 
relevant issues; this inevitably limited the policy impact of such committees. 
Departments often failed to respond in timely fashion to committee reports, again 
                                                          
755   See above, pp. 125-26 
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reducing their potential impact. The number of reports per year was often small - 
sometimes just one or two per session. Analysis of estimates or other aspects of 
government spending or budgeting was rare. 
 
The structure and operation of the 1970s Expenditure Committee were not conducive 
to the growth of a committee esprit de corps. For example, a sub-committee could 
work hard on a report for many weeks only to see it amended by the whole Expenditure 
Committee, most of whose members had not been present at evidence sessions. 
Staffing was felt to be inadequate, with a particular shortage of specialist advice. There 
was little select committee follow-up to past reports, so Departments could feel free 
to neglect recommendations even where they had accepted them. Too many debates 
on select committee reports were held on the adjournment or on ‘take-note’ motions, 
limiting their impact with other Members and allowing departments to avoid making 
any commitments. For some debates, attendance was in single figures. These 
shortcomings were noted from time to time during the decade as the high hopes of 
1969 for the Expenditure Committee were seen to remain unfulfilled. Academic 
interest in select committees of this period has been slight, but where it exists it has 
often been dismissive. Ann Robinson laments the failure of the Expenditure 
Committee to have any real impact on public spending, though her work reveals that 
the Committee did examine a substantial number of policy issues.  
 
But not all 1970s committees were equal. In some senses, the structure of the 
Expenditure Committee sub-committees, covering two or more departments, meant 
that the Expenditure Committee was the direct forerunner of the true departmental 
committees of the 1980s. It is also interesting that the ‘non-departmental’ (or, to use 
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the term beloved of New Labour in the 1990s, ‘cross-cutting’) Nationalised Industries 
Committee, concentrating during the whole of its life from 1956 to 1979 on a number 
of issues about management, finance and governance, did rather better, in the opinion 
of many in the political classes at least, than the ‘quasi-departmental’ Expenditure 
Committee of the 1970s. This success may have been due to the political salience of 
nationalised industries at a time when a large part of British heavy industry was in 
public ownership, but the Committee also filled a recognised gap in accountability; 
without the Committee it would have been difficult or impossible for Parliament to 
hold to account the managers of these large concerns. The examples of the 
Nationalised Industries Committee, the Public Accounts Committee and indeed the 
Science and Technology Committee all demonstrate that a committee did not need to 
have a ‘departmental’ remit to be successful. Indeed, even after 1979, some 
‘departmental’ committees actually covered two or even more departments, so the new 
‘departmental’ system was in some respects not so different from the old. 
 
Despite the problems, it is clear from the evidence that substantial progress towards 
more effective select committees had been made between 1960 and 1979. A Member 
who, for instance, had been first elected in 1959 and who left the House in 1979 would 
have seen a very significant change in the amount of select committee activity. As 
institutions, select committees, including the sub-committees of Expenditure, were 
much stronger and considerably more active than they or their equivalents had been 
twenty years before. Reports of the 1970s often contained substantial conclusions and 
recommendations on policy issues, and the figures in Chapter Three indicate that select 
committees during the 1970s found some success in having recommendations 
accepted.  
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But the thesis also argues that the effectiveness of committees as institutions should 
not be judged solely or mainly on their influence in the policy process. The political 
weight of committees should perhaps rather be assessed on the amount of time and 
effort expended on them by MPs, on the resources that were devoted to them, and on 
whether MPs and Ministers and the world outside generally took any notice of their 
work. This thesis finds that there had been increases in committee resources and 
(noticeably) references in the Chambers of both Houses. There was no overwhelming 
call for reform of the select committee system in the mid or late 1970s. This was 
perhaps partly because reasonable progress had been made on select committees in the 
past 20 years - perhaps too slow to be widely noticed, let alone celebrated, but 
nevertheless real and sustained. By focusing on 1979, the standard narrative misses 
these important if workaday developments.   
 
Taken together and placed in a broader historical context, this evidence reveals a 
House that by the mid-1970s was becoming more and more used to investigatory 
committee work, with proportions of Members involved in such a committee regularly 
reaching late Victorian levels for the first time in a century, with sometimes as many 
as 40 percent of all MPs (and of course a higher proportion of backbenchers) active in 
a select committee of some kind. By the beginning of 1979, the investigatory select 
committees of the House of Commons covered most areas of government activity. 
Members were now prepared to turn up to meetings more frequently, with a small but 
important group attending 20 or more in a Session, probably the most important aspect 
of this progress. Committees were now a consistent feature of parliamentary life. 
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Chapter Two notes one of the main shortcomings of the 1960s ‘Crossman’ 
committees, as identified by the Procedure Committee of 1968-69 - that there was 
uncertainty about whether they would last beyond the end of the current parliamentary 
session. The Parliament-long select committees of the late 1970s were therefore an 
improvement, helping to embolden members and certainly aiding the medium-term 
planning of committee business. The Lever and British Steel financial forecast cases 
demonstrated that select committees recognised their rights to gather evidence and 
publicly challenge government and its associated bodies. Select committee evidence 
was generally taken in public in the 1970s - a clear advance on the situation in the 
1950s. This all helped to institutionalise committees and fix them in the public eye, 
causing a minor but not insubstantial movement in favour of Parliament in its conflict 
with the Executive. The sheer scale of some 1970s inquiries was impressive - for 
example the 800-plus pages of evidence and appendices gathered by the Race 
Relations and Immigration Committee for its inquiry into Education in the early 
1970s. In this way a considerable volume of information about government activities 
was being gathered from a wide variety of official witnesses and others.  
 
The lack of a pre-1979 committee to consider foreign affairs was certainly a blatant 
omission; however some committees showed considerable energy and assertiveness 
in tackling one of the biggest foreign policy issues of the twentieth century - the 
implications of the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1973. 
On occasions, it even took them across the Channel to Brussels where committees 
showed self-confidence in questioning the UK’s new European partners. The contrast 
between Whitehall’s stern resistance to the Agriculture Committee’s wish to visit 
Brussels in 1967, and its facilitation of the Expenditure Sub-Committee visit in 1973, 
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shows how far officialdom had moved in the intervening years to recognise the role 
of Parliament in scrutinising the Executive.  And despite its transience, the ad hoc 
committee on Cyprus (1975-76) pressed for powers to do its job properly.  These were 
clear signs of MPs’ confidence in the rights of committees. 
    
The public reach of 1970s select committees was however not broad or deep. There 
was still little discussion of select committee reports in the chambers of either House 
of Parliament, and media coverage was still relatively modest, although on occasions 
the work of a committee such as that on abortion or Cyprus could make big headlines. 
But in the circumstances of the time, the committees’ fairly low public profile was 
hardly surprising. At a time when the government’s life was regularly threatened by 
defeat on the floor of the Commons, the efforts of select committees, often consensual 
and constructive, were not overwhelmingly the stuff of headlines. The excitement of 
close Commons votes, especially after Labour came to power in 1974, was such that 
much of the House’s more considered and consensual activity appeared simply dull; 
yet it is clear that the work of committees frequently touched on highly important 
issues. 
 
 
 
B. How was reform promoted and who promoted it? 
Richard Crossman, whose name became most closely associated with the mid-1960s 
reforms, was important in promoting the new committees, but the evidence presented 
in Chapter Two shows that much of the work and thinking had already been done 
when he took up his post as Leader of the House in August 1966. Labour-supporting 
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intellectuals and politicians, from Haldane himself 756 to Jowett and from Laski to 
Crick, had long advocated committee reform. It is also clear that Harold Wilson had 
done quite a lot of thinking about select committees several years before he gave 
Crossman the chance to make reform happen. Anthony Howard was therefore 
probably right in saying that Crossman’s claim to being ‘the godfather of the 
Commons Specialist Committee system is a little tenuous’.757 The origins go back to 
before the Crossman era.  
 
The demand for reform of British institutions in the post-Suez climate could not help 
but affect attitudes to Parliament. Chapter Two argues that major steps towards more 
effective scrutiny were made during the early 1960s, with 1964 a crucial year in the 
history of select committees. Wilson’s Stowmarket speech, in which he advocated 
more active committees, set a tone on the political front, and the formation of the Study 
of Parliament Group brought together an alliance of reformist academics and clerks 
that would be highly significant for the future. The 1964-65 Procedure Committee 
raised the profile of reform, maintained some media interest and generally kept up the 
momentum towards stronger committees. The growing calibre of the members of the 
Procedure Committees of the 1960s itself demonstrated that service on select 
committees was worthwhile. The 1964-65 Procedure Committee vote against the 
cross-party institutional conservatism of the senior Labour figure Michael Foot and 
the Conservative former Chief Whip Martin Redmayne was important in maintaining 
progress on select committees. 
 
                                                          
756    Haldane was Lord Chancellor and Leader of the House of Lords in the Labour Government of 
1924 
757   Anthony Howard, Crossman: The Pursuit of Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), pp. 282-
83 
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There is also a more general point; few MPs have been persistent parliamentary 
reformers; the vagaries of election and the fact that constituents often care little about 
such matters are usually enough to deter enthusiasm for procedural change. John P. 
Mackintosh and Tony Wright were rare exceptions. On the other hand, the permanent 
staff of the Commons played an important and hitherto little-noticed part in the 
development of select committees during the twentieth century. While not all clerks 
were natural reformers, the substantial interventions in the reform debate of two of the 
leaders, the Clerks of the House, Campion and Fellowes, are notable as showing the 
way House officials made the case for reform. The public and semi-public activism of 
such clerk-reformers had two main effects on the parliamentary reform debate: it gave 
reform ideas some practical credibility, and it provided the campaign for change with 
some continuity, the long careers of clerks allowing them to continue to press and 
develop proposals over many years. But the clerks also helped to make sure that select 
committee reform in the second half of the twentieth century was both gradual and 
generally acceptable. The success of the Study of Parliament Group in maintaining the 
profile of reform from the 1960s onwards also demonstrates the power of alliances 
between practitioners and academics, many of whom also gave evidence to 
committees.      
 
The thesis also analyses the impact on committees of the turmoil which affected the 
world of British politics, including Parliament, in the 1970s. During the decade, select 
committees, without publicising it much, were among the few parliamentary 
institutions to be reasonably removed from the contemporary partisan turbulence. In 
contrast to the divisive debates in the wider political environment, the parliamentary 
reform climate of the 1970s was much less radical and polemical than that of the 
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1960s, when root-and-branch change was often in the air. The reforming Procedure 
Committee report of 1978 reflected that, combining a vigorous public promotion of 
reform with a sotto voce indication of the deeper truth - that the new departmental 
committees would be based firmly on existing procedure and would differ only to a 
limited extent from the range of committees that had existed since the mid- 1960s. The 
Report was therefore written and promoted to appeal to two audiences. To those MPs 
and clerks who were eager for change, and to some academic and media 
commentators, it was sold as a major reform, the historic completion of a 60-year 
process which began with Haldane. It was they who would tell the story in years to 
come, which is perhaps why some corrective is now needed to restore a sense of 
proportion to our assessment of the reforms and their political and constitutional 
implications. To government Ministers and some in the higher reaches of the Civil 
Service, on the other hand, the Procedure Committee’s proposals were portrayed as 
select committee business as usual, though given a more rational basis that spread the 
burden of departmental responses more equitably. The verdict of Whitehall on the 
Procedure Committee reform proposals was clear; the reforms proposed were 
evolutionary and in some ways indeed conservative. The last point is another that does 
not come through clearly, if at all, in standard accounts which see 1979 as the key date. 
  
The collaborative Barlas-Bancroft meeting of April 1979 demonstrated that the 
reforms were a balanced package that was completely in line with traditional 
parliamentary gradualism. In the event what finally emerged in the summer of 1979 
was a watered-down version of already fairly conservative proposals. The government 
rejected or failed to implement fully proposals where they risked upsetting the balance 
of power and influence between Parliament and the government. The House in 1979 
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was left in effect with the Stevas-Hunt reforms, a more coherent, rational and better-
resourced version of the Expenditure Committee, which Whitehall could and did 
easily live with. The way Whitehall and Westminster managed (and sometimes 
collaboratively staffed) the select committee scrutiny process over this 30 years of 
change, with former or seconded civil servants as clerks and committee members 
sometimes meeting Ministers over ‘sherry and sausage rolls’, reveals a legislature and 
an Executive co-operating in Judge’s ‘exceptional constitutional mixture’.  
 
In this respect an important move came with the establishment in the late 1970s of the 
House of Commons Commission, which for the first time gave the House control over 
its own expenditures. Select committees, with their regional and international visits, 
staffing needs and lengthy reports, could be expensive and that could cause friction. 
One example of such friction had come in 1968, when the Treasury, which at that time 
had a direct role in determining the level of spending on committees, was accused by 
the Clerk of the House, Sir Barnett Cocks, of interfering with decisions about the level 
of committee staffing.758 From 1978 onwards, that could no longer happen. Liberated 
from this influence of the Treasury on their own operations, the select committees of 
the 1980s were thus able to spend what they believed was required, as long as they 
could persuade their own colleagues that it was necessary. Numbers of reports, 
advisers and visits all increased from 1979, and the fact of parliamentary financial 
autonomy must have been a contributory factor in that.  
  
 
                                                          
758   The Chancellor of the Exchequer had a seat on the relevant body. See H.V.Wiseman, ‘The 
New Specialised Committees’ in The Commons in Transition, p. 209. Since the establishment of 
the Commission, the House has usually followed the general lines of Whitehall spending restraint. 
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C. Was 1979 a watershed year for select committees? 
The reforms of 1979 were clearly important in the development of select committees. 
The continued existence in the twenty-first century of the ‘departmental’ committee 
structure, arrived at after the failure of a series of twentieth century reorganisations to 
establish a settled pattern of committees to examine spending, administration and 
policy, is itself evidence of success. Instead of undergoing regular upheavals and 
reorganisations, departmental committees were and are stable. This has offered clear 
advantages: relationships between departments and committees can be built up, 
agendas can be planned and issues followed through.759 The new system also brought 
large numbers of Ministers to the select committee witness table for the first time for 
many years. This was a significant improvement on the situation in the 1960s and 
1970s, exposing the Executive to a new level of scrutiny and strengthening 
accountability. The new committee structure from 1979 specifically gave shape to the 
system and matched available resources to responsibilities better than previous 
systems. Corporate memory was retained, so the committees of the 1980s and after 
were therefore fully and securely permanent institutions whereas before 1979 their 
‘permanence’ was conditional.    
 
However, a long-term perspective is always useful when assessing the historical 
importance of change, especially in an institution as conservative as Parliament. There 
were good reasons why select committee activity grew from the mid-1960s onwards, 
notably a change in the social make up and professional status of the House of 
Commons. There was also some encouragement from senior figures in both the Labour 
Government of 1964 to 1970 and the Conservative Government of 1970-74. For 
                                                          
759    Most committees now have programme planning meetings or seminars at the beginning of 
each Parliament, and often at the beginning of each Session 
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example, contrasting the dismissive words about select committee scrutiny uttered by 
Herbert Morrison in the 1940s and the encouragement given to reform by Richard 
Crossman in the 1960s says a great deal about how far Labour moved towards 
acceptance of reform. Equally, setting the negativity of the 1950s Rab Butler against 
the gentler attitudes of the early-1970s William Whitelaw indicates a moderate 
warming towards committee inquiry in the Conservative high command.  
 
Philip Norton suggests that the origins of the 1979 select committees lay at least partly 
in the 1970s atmosphere of backbench dissent. Interesting questions might be raised 
on this point.760 To what extent does the tendency to dissent work itself out in select 
committees? Are committees arenas where such dissent is encouraged, or are they 
better seen as mechanisms for managing dissent, where unhappiness can be expressed 
in ways that are relatively harmless to the objectives of the front benches? These would 
be fruitful subjects for further study. However, the evidence in this thesis suggests that 
the select committees of 1979 had a longer gestation than is proposed by Norton; the 
dissent of the 1970s, though important, was perhaps less decisive than he contends. 
One indication lies in the composition and actions of successive Procedure 
Committees from 1960 onwards. Even the tentative 1958-59 Procedure Committee 
had shown signs - soon snuffed out in a narrow party-lines vote - of wanting a 
specialist committee on the sensitive issue of colonial affairs. But the 1960s saw two 
strong Procedure Committees moving in the same reformist direction as Crossman in 
advocating more and better committee scrutiny. The cadre of reformers active on the 
1977-78 Procedure Committee was therefore following an already established 
tradition; the make-up of that Committee was in itself tribute to the growing ability of 
                                                          
760   The debate about the reasons for the 1970s growth in backbench dissent is summarised in 
Rush, The Role of the Member of Parliament Since 1968, pp. 176-79  
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mid-century Parliaments to stand up for themselves, despite attempts by the whips to 
ensure that committees were studded with loyalists. The small-scale, step-by-step 
nature of 1960s and 1970s progress, enshrined in the densely-packed pages of the 
volume of Standing Orders, was easily missed by academics, but it was none the less 
important. The absence of drama was, and is, a key feature of much reform of 
Parliament.761  
 
This changing political climate may have helped select committees put some 
constitutional stakes into the ground during the 1970s, on such matters as the provision 
of sensitive defence information to select committees, and committee rights to call for 
evidence from the Minister they wanted. Some important issues about the powers and 
privileges of parliamentary committees had therefore been raised. These are points 
which have not been fully explored in previous accounts. And 1979 brought no 
fundamental strengthening of select committee powers. The new departmental 
committees often struggled, like the pre-1979 ones, to garner information from 
sometimes unwilling officials.  
 
Numbers are also very important. If 1979 had in fact brought a fundamental change, 
the figures relating to select committee activity among MPs, to committee impact on 
the work of the Chambers of both Houses of Parliament, and to the work generated by 
committees in Whitehall, would all have shown a clear, substantial and sustained 
increase after 1979. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that there was only 
a limited and halting increase in some of the key measures. For instance, the figures 
make it clear that it was already commonplace for officials to appear before select 
                                                          
761   Gavin Drewry calls this ‘the traditional, incrementalist philosophy of parliamentary reform’. 
Gavin Drewry, ‘Reports of Committees’ The Modern Law Review, 42/1, (1979), p. 83 
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committees well before 1979, and that the increase in numbers of official appearances 
after that date, though noticeable, was not large. Numbers of committee reports 
certainly increased substantially in the 1980s, but as a measure of the impact of select 
committees on the lives of members, the tally of reports should not be seen as perfect. 
The vast majority of the time of a modern select committee is given over to oral 
evidence, and the involvement of many members in report drafting is minimal.  
 
So the 1979 reforms, launched with a fanfare, were in retrospect less a spectacular 
démarche than a sensible reorganisation. It is worth reflecting, also, on whether a 
committee system based on a departmental structure necessarily provides a more 
rational, planned and effective format for scrutiny than other approaches, such as that 
adopted by the cross-cutting Nationalised Industries Committee. Firstly, some 
Departments can be rather chaotic, dominated by sudden changes of policy direction 
imposed by pressing political necessity rather than logical thought - the Home Office 
perhaps being a case in point. In those circumstances a committee which tries to ‘mark’ 
the department will have to respond quickly to events rather than planning its work 
coherently. Some order might also be imposed by the House obliging departmental 
select committees to carry out ‘core tasks’ - for example scrutinising each year the 
annual report of its department by means of an evidence session with the Minister 
and/or the Permanent Secretary, or inquiring each year into the performance of at least 
one public body sponsored by the Department. This requirement is actually now in 
place, but it was only imposed from 2002 onwards. In the 1980s, then, the 
departmental link did little in itself to give intellectual coherence to the work of select 
committees. The departmental structure was in any case probably not that important 
to most MPs; they have always been less interested in the rules and frameworks that 
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underpin the systems of scrutiny than in having the chance to hold Departments to 
account. MPs are also less likely to be interested in the work of a whole Department 
than in particular topics; for example, in policing, or immigration, rather than the work 
of the Home Office as a whole.762 For the bulk of MPs, the ‘departmental’ nature of 
the new committees therefore probably mattered little. 
 
The Haldane approach to reform suggested that scrutiny based on departmentally-
related committees should be a distinctive and indeed essential component of the 
machinery of Parliament, matching the departments of state. The ‘Haldanian’ reforms 
of 1979 indeed gave the scrutiny system a stability and confidence it had previously 
lacked, and provided an important base for the better organisation of investigatory 
work. Norton and Hennessy and others who have argued for the constitutional 
importance of the departmental committees are in one sense right to celebrate them; 
they were far more active, influential and widely known than the select committees of 
the late 1950s. But without the other advances which came during the 1960s and 
1970s, notably ‘permanent’ committee composition, a somewhat clearer sense of 
committee powers to call for persons and papers, and public evidence sessions, the 
introduction of a departmental structure would have made little difference.  
 
There was a fair amount of continuity in the work of select committees before and 
1979; Ann Robinson traces connections between the inquiries carried out in the 1979-
83 Parliament by the new Treasury and Civil Service Committee and those undertaken 
by its predecessor. She said that reports on ‘Both Monetary Policy and Efficiency and 
                                                          
762    This may especially have been the case in the 1970s and 1980s when the responsibilities of 
Departments like Environment and the Home Office were even more miscellaneous than they now 
are 
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Effectiveness in the Civil Service were  ... grand-children of reports from the 
Expenditure Committee’.763  The committees themselves also showed signs of 
continuity.  The former Overseas Development Committee of pre-reform days lived 
on fairly confidently in an FAC Sub-Committee, which in the 1979-83 Parliament was 
responsible for no fewer than nine out of the 21 reports completed by the FAC. Four 
members of the old Overseas Development Committee in fact joined the FAC. With a 
mixture of Conservative and Labour members, the Sub-Committee was in its way a 
symbol of the survival of consensus, often arguing in favour of aid, in contradiction to 
the more extreme tenets of Thatcherism. Some indeed felt the new system of 
committees was not intrinsically different from the old. Dr Edmund Marshall, who 
was Chairman of the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the Expenditure 
Committee from 1976 to 1979 and a member of the Home Affairs Committee in the 
1979-83 Parliament, said in 2013 that the new committees were ‘merely a cosmetic 
exercise’ which had changed little.764 There were also continuities in committee 
staffing before and after 1979, with some of the ex-civil servants who worked on 
committees in the previous era staying on.  In 1979 David Hubback, who had been 
Clerk to the General Sub-Committee of Expenditure, became Clerk to its direct 
successor, the Treasury and Civil Service Committee. John Marnham, having served 
the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of Expenditure, became Clerk of the new (or 
revived) Agriculture Committee. The new parliamentary committee system therefore 
was maintained partly on support from old civil servants.  
 
                                                          
763    Ann Robinson, ‘The Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee’ in Drewry, The New Select 
Committees, 1989, p.273 
764   Author’s interview with Dr. Edmund Marshall  
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Performance also showed continuities; the reform of 1979 emphatically did not 
eliminate the ‘patchiness’ complained of by the 1978 Procedure Committee. In some 
cases the post-1979 committees struck out on a new path, while in others the continuity 
with the 1970s was much more marked. The performance of select committees, in fact, 
remained inconsistent, a point apparent from the 1983 and 1989 volumes edited by 
Drewry. Except in a few cases such as Westland, the new pattern never came to 
resemble a system of committees. The Liaison Committee never truly liaised between 
committees to increase the overall effectiveness of scrutiny in the House of Commons; 
there were occasional reports surveying performance but no attempt to make the whole 
greater than the sum of its parts. Committees, now enjoying a Parliament-long 
existence and therefore freedom from the political pressures that brought about the 
demise of the Agriculture Committee in the late 1960s, were certainly able to set their 
own programmes and to pursue their own inquiries. This did help to promote a new or 
renewed sense of assertiveness in individual committees; but it did nothing for the 
overall coherence of parliamentary scrutiny.  
 
Despite the boost given by the high-profile Westland hearings, the figures for 
members’ attendance at select committees do not suggest a widespread growth in 
MPs’ involvement in committee work after the middle of the decade. This may have 
had less to do with any lack of interest in their work than with a growth in the number 
of alternative activities to fill their days. Philip Norton, in a memorandum to the 1989-
90 Procedure Committee, praised the performance of the new committees. But he also 
listed a number of pressures which were making it more difficult for MPs to find time 
for select committees; these included the growing demands of constituency work, 
especially letters from constituents, increasing amounts of legislation, more 
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parliamentary questions, and the demands for scrutiny of European Community 
measures.765 The wider Commons and Lords saw no great rise in the number of 
Chamber debates on select committee subjects. References in Hansard continued to 
be generally records of superficial points and process questions rather than deep 
consideration of a committee’s arguments and evidence.  
 
The fact that there were fewer Cabinet discussions about select committees in the first 
few years of the 1980s than in the equivalent period of the 1970s may have come about 
because, with the new departmental committees, issues that had previously required 
Cabinet consideration were now managed by departments. Dealing with select 
committees had, by the mid-1980s, apparently become ‘business as usual’ for 
government departments, and especially for Ministers. The enthusiasm of Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Ministers and officials for the idea of a foreign affairs 
committee in 1977 suggests that forward-thinking departments could even then see 
the potential value to departmental objectives of a stable and permanent parliamentary 
point of contact. Institutionally, the introduction of departmental committees may have 
been an advance for parliamentary scrutiny; they quickly became accepted as an 
essential part of the landscape in both Westminster and Whitehall, and could get 
answers direct from Ministers. But the very low-key nature of most of the encounters 
they had with government showed how few political waves most select committees 
were making at the highest level.  
 
In its gradual enhancements of select committees in the second half of the twentieth 
century, the House was returning to a norm. The dip in committee activity seen in the 
                                                          
765   Procedure Committee 1989-90, Vol. II, p. 141 
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early and mid-twentieth century, and especially between 1920 and 1960, was probably 
an aberration in the history of Parliament, indicating a dramatic and atypical loss of 
confidence in the House’s ability to press detailed questions on government. During 
the 1960s, that began to be reversed, and the process continued in the 1970s. The 
statistical pattern is in some ways remarkably consistent over many years; over 40 
percent of MPs sat on select committees of all kinds for much of the nineteenth century 
and the very early twentieth, but between the wars and in the 1950s the proportion fell 
to 30 percent or under, before rising to 40 percent again for almost every year of the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The advent of departmental select committees made 
remarkably little difference to this fairly stable picture of committee participation. The 
intention of the supposedly revolutionary Procedure Committee was initially to place 
a mere 15 extra MPs on to committees.   
  
There is another point which casts some doubt on the value supposedly added by the 
post-1979 system. Oddly, the debate on select committees has taken a very different 
turn from that on government. Much fairly recent writing about government has 
argued that ‘departmentalism’ is one of the key reasons for poor performance and lack 
of coordination in Whitehall.766 This includes a Labour Government White Paper of 
1999 and Making Government Work, produced in March 2001 by the (quintessentially 
non-departmental) Public Administration Select Committee.767 A recent study by King 
and Crewe notes the number of times in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries that 
policy failures have been caused by the tendency of disparate parts of government to 
                                                          
766   For a discussion of New Labour’s espousal of such coherence in government, see D. Kavanagh 
and D. Richards, ‘Departmentalism and joined-up government’, Parliamentary Affairs, 54/1 
(2001), pp. 1-18 
767  Modernising Government, 1999, Cm 4310. Seventh Report from the Public Administration 
Select Committee, Session 2000-01, Making Government Work: The emerging issues (94), pp. vi - 
ix 
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act like ‘sovereign states, with each department and agency having its own history, 
outlook and interests, sometimes co-operating with other departments, sometimes 
competing with them and much of the time carrying on independently of them, as 
though their bureaucratic neighbours did not exist’.768  
 
Parliament, including its select committees, did too little in the 1980s to challenge this 
solipsistic individualism of Whitehall departments. One clerk with experience of 
select committees both before and after 1979 said later that ‘one of the inherent vices 
of the departmentally-related select committee system is that the committee sees the 
world through departmental goggles’. This departmental ‘capture’, the clerk said, 
tended to encourage the ‘pretensions’ of a department, which might see itself as 
‘directing that entire sector of national life’, which would be a ‘nightmare’. The 
evidence in this thesis indeed shows that Whitehall had long possessed the capacity to 
achieve ‘capture’; the existence of 36 departmental liaison officers in 1949 
demonstrates that government departments had been for many years alive to the need 
to monitor and if necessary guide committees, and even to provide staff. The arrival 
of departmentally-related committees in 1979 therefore caused barely a ripple on the 
surface of the Whitehall waters; the anxieties of officials like Wass and Armstrong 
were rapidly shown to be baseless. Whitehall could cope with the new committees, 
because they did not challenge the status quo. 
 
Another select committee shortcoming persisted into the 1980s - a failure to follow up 
issues that came up during inquiries. One civil servant told Flegmann in 1984 of 
departmental committees at times ‘opening the cupboard but not noticing the 
                                                          
768  Anthony King and Ivor Crewe, The Blunders of our Governments (London: Oneworld, 2013), p. 
305  
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skeleton’.769 So it was no surprise that some assessments at the end of the first decade 
of departmental select committees were less than enthusiastic. Tony Wright suggested 
in 1994 that although they had much ‘useful work’ to their credit, the 1979 
departmental committees had ‘certainly not redressed the balance of the constitution’. 
This was because with ‘a dominant executive and a legislature disciplined by 
partisanship’ the doctrine of ministerial responsibility ‘sets the limit on any serious 
exploration of the policy options’.770 Wright here concurs with those critics of the 1979 
reforms, like Judge, who believe that the effects of such internal reforms would always 
be limited by the constitutional realities of the ‘Queen in Parliament’, the close 
intertwining of government and legislature. In the mid-1990s Peter Hennessy, while 
applauding the departmental committees as ‘a huge enterprise, a new sub-estate (if not 
quite a full estate) of the realm’, nevertheless called for further strengthening, 
including support from the financial experts of the National Audit Office (already 
provided for the Public Accounts Committee), better information for committees and 
an agreement that committees should examine both legislation and expenditure 
plans.771 Michael Ryle, one of the leading clerk-reformers, gave a downbeat 
assessment of the policy influence of select committees in 1989, when a book he 
jointly wrote with Professor J.A.G. Griffith contained this: ‘Select committees have 
not made a general impact on government policies. Nor can it be said that departments 
today are making policy decisions in a distinctly different way from that of 10 years 
ago because of the existence of the departmentally-related committees’.772 This 
                                                          
769    Vilma Flegmann, Public Expenditure and the Select Committees of the Commons, p. 37 
770    Wright, Citizens and Subjects, p. 47 
771   Peter Hennessy, The Hidden Wiring, pp. 154, 158 
772   J.A.G.Griffith and Michael Ryle, with M.A.J. Wheeler-Booth, Parliament: Functions, Practice 
and Procedures (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1989), p. 430  
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evidence reinforces the impression that the reform of 1979, although an advance, was 
not a step change in terms of committee performance and culture.  
 
A key parliamentary area largely untouched by select committees or select committee 
culture during the 1980s was legislation. One of several challenging recommendations 
of the 1977-78 Procedure Committee that were not really implemented during the 
1980s was that the House should use select committee methods of scrutiny in 
committee stages of Bills. In theory at least this would have enabled evidence to be 
taken to enhance the consideration of legislation and improve the final policy product. 
This would have been one way of making the work of committee and Chamber merge, 
but that happened only rarely. The whips of the 1980s never allowed the select 
committee culture of cross-party consensus to jeopardise the passage of crucial Bills. 
Whatever their structure, and however impressive the specialist intellectual firepower 
at their disposal, committees that are effectively restricted to analysing, post hoc, 
policy and administration rather than debating legislation will always be onlookers 
rather than players in the great game of politics. The departmental committees of the 
1980s made very little difference to that basic fact of parliamentary life. Therefore the 
strictures of David Judge against what he calls ‘timorous’ internal reforms are at least 
partly justified.773 To use the language of Sir Derek Walker-Smith in 1976 - without 
direct influence on legislation, select committees were still in the 1980s a ‘shadow’ of 
what they could have been.774 
                                                          
773    Judge lists a series of Acts ‘with profound constitutional significance’ that became law during 
the 1980s, ‘all revealing minimal parliamentary impact’ of any sort, including influence from select 
committees. These Acts included the legislation that introduced the highly controversial 
community charge, almost universally known as the poll tax. See Judge, The Parliamentary State, 
p. 215   
774   The use of select-committee style evidence sessions during the committee stage of Bills 
increased from 2006 onwards with the institution of Public Bill Committees. One writer has 
suggested that the legislative process has been ‘revitalised’ by this change. Jessica Levy, ‘Public 
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The frustrations felt by Norman St John-Stevas and others after ten years of the 
departmental committees reflected a lack of tangible influence and a feeling that 
credibility was still limited. Constituency work had become a bigger burden on MPs 
during the 1980s and party and all-party groups had remained significant forums for 
discussion of policy. It must therefore be doubted that reform of 1979 actually 
constituted such an ‘important clawback in terms of the relative influence of the 
legislature and the executive’ to use Peter Hennessy’s term. It is also clear that the 
hopes of those who pressed for a close relationship between select committees and the 
Chamber of the Commons, in particular for regular debates on reports, were not 
realised. During the 1980s the whips continued to be relatively uninterested in what 
happened in committee rooms. This left committees free to grow in confidence, to 
challenge departments and to reach vigorously out to the world beyond Westminster 
and Whitehall. But committees never had much influence over the rest of the House. 
The parallel lines of development - select committees and the House as a legislature - 
stretched into the distance. In a sense, the fears of a two-track House, expressed by 
Sydney Irving in February 1979, had been realised.  
 
Despite such shortcomings, however, some progress had been made. The 
improvements to select committees from 1960 to 1990 had somewhat strengthened 
Parliament in its constitutional relationship with government, and by the end of the 
1980s the committees had become established parts of the parliamentary landscape. 
Their role could no longer be ignored or dismissed out of hand, as it had in the 1950s. 
But changes to process, powers and procedure were only part of the reason for 
                                                          
Bill Committees: An Assessment. Scrutiny Sought; Scrutiny Gained’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63/3 
(2010), pp. 534-544 
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progress. The influential twentieth-century economist J.M. Keynes noted the 
importance in the financial marketplace of what he called investors’ ‘animal spirits’ - 
feelings which inspire action whether it is rational to act or not.775 Similar feelings can 
pervade the political marketplace, and the ‘animal spirits’ associated with the 1979 
reforms were distinctive and new, giving an unspecific and perhaps ill-founded but 
nevertheless pervasive sense that MPs could now make a difference. Vilma Flegmann 
found in 1984 that MPs ‘believe that Governments now frequently wait for [select] 
committees to express their views before final decisions are made’, although she gives 
no examples of such influence on government behaviour.776 The existence of such 
feelings, justified or not, may be related to the fact that 1979 also saw the arrival at 
Downing Street of Margaret Thatcher. Firstly, the new committees seemed to offer an 
opportunity for backbenchers to challenge the growing executive dominance of the 
assertive new Prime Minister. Second, the rhetoric of Stevas gave the committee 
reforms a radical air that matched the radicalism of Thatcher herself.  Rhetorically, 
then, the 1979 reforms were highly appropriate to an age of change. But at the same 
time the committees appeared, rightly or wrongly, to offer a return to a possibly 
imagined earlier age when Parliament’s backbenchers were confident challengers to 
government. 
 
During the 1980s, a significant number of Members therefore came to feel that the 
departmental committees belonged to them, and to Parliament. In the context of Mrs 
Thatcher’s emergence as a determined and executive-minded Prime Minister, the 
committees offered a pleasing contrast, and one that was well worth applauding. But 
                                                          
775   For a discussion of the origin of the term, see ‘Correspondence’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 6/3 (1992), pp. 207-212  
776   Vilma Flegmann, Public Expenditure and the Select Committees of the Commons, p.32 
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it was in truth something more fundamental that was being celebrated: the step-by-
step, 30-year advance of select committees from their 1950s nadir to the (relatively) 
sunlit uplands of 1990.    
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APPENDIX A 
Numbers of meetings held by investigatory committees in selected policy areas, 
selected Sessions 1971-72 to 1981-82 
 
Session  Subject Area  Number of 
meetings  
Number of 
reports  
1971-72 Environment and Home 
Office Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
27 1 
 Race Relations and 
Immigration Committee 
28 1 
 Defence and External 
Affairs Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
38 3 
 Public Expenditure Sub-
Committee (General) 
(Expenditure Committee) 
18 3 
Total of meetings and 
reports for relevant 
committees 
 111 8 
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED 
Session  Subject Area  Number of 
meetings  
Number of 
reports  
1975-76 Education Arts and Home 
Office Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
30 1 
 Race Relations and 
Immigration Committee 
29 0 
 Violence in the Family 23 1 
 Defence and External 
Affairs Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
33 7 
 Cyprus 7 1 
 Overseas Development 24 2 
 General Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
39 3 
Total of meetings and 
reports for relevant 
committees 
 185 15 
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED 
 
Session  Subject Area  Number of 
meetings  
Number of 
reports  
1976-77 Education Arts and Home 
Office Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
29 1 
 Race Relations and 
Immigration Committee 
18 1 
 Defence and External 
Affairs Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
27 3 
 Overseas Development 26 2 
 General Sub-Committee 
(Expenditure) 
35 2 
 
Total of meetings and 
reports for relevant 
committees  
 135 9 
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APPENDIX A CONTINUED 
 
Session  Subject Area  Number of 
meetings  
Number of 
reports  
1981-82 Home Affairs Committee 36 7 
 Home Affairs: Sub-
Committee on Race 
Relations and Immigration 
Committee 
22 n/a 
 Defence Committee  40 2 
 Foreign Affairs Committee 36 5 
 Treasury and Civil  Service 
Committee  
35 6 
 
 Treasury and Civil  Service 
Committee Sub-Committee  
25 n/a 
Total of meetings and 
reports for relevant 
committees 
 193 20 
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APPENDIX B 
Witness appearances before investigatory committees covering four key policy 
areas, 
1970-79 
‘General’ Sub-Committee issues – Treasury and related matters, eg tax credits, 
Civil List and Corporation Tax 
Session Ministers Other 
members of 
Commons or 
Lords 
Civil Servants  Outside 
witnesses 
1970-71 0 2 18 4 
1971-72 1 0 31 4 
1972-73 0 2 50 47 
1973-74 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 1 5 5 
1974-75 3 0 68 165 
1975-76 1 0 32 11 
1976-77 0 5 51 43 
1977-78 1 1 62 0 
1978-79 1 0 5 8 
Totals 7 9 322 287 
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APPENDIX B CONTINUED 
 
Defence issues (covered by Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee) 
Session Ministers Other members 
of Commons or 
Lords 
Civil Servants 
Inc. military 
Outside 
witnesses 
1970-71 1 0 94 0 
1971-72 1 0 104 1 
1972-73 1 0 23 1 
1973-74 0 0 69 0 
1974 0 0 5 0 
1974-75 0 0 57 1 
1975-76 6 0 92 20 
1976-77 1 0 6 0 
1977-78 0 0 86 2 
1978-79 1 0 21 11 
Totals 11 0 557 36 
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APPENDIX B CONTINUED 
 
Foreign Affairs (covered by Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of 
Expenditure Committee and Select Committee on Overseas Development – and 
in one case by Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of Expenditure on  South 
African workers) Figures also include witnesses for ad hoc committee on 
Cyprus  
 
Session Ministers Other members 
of Commons or 
Lords 
Civil Servants  Outside 
witnesses 
1970-71 0 0 0 0 
1971-72 0 0 16 0 
1972-73 0 0 12 15 
1973-74 0 5 39 108 
1974 0 0 12 5 
1974-75 0 0 20 0 
1975-76 4 0 48 40 
1976-77 1 0 37 9 
1977-78 7 0 84 71 
1978-79 2 0 11 12 
Totals 12 5  279 260 
   
 
350 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B CONTINUED 
 
Home Affairs (covered by various Sub-Committees of Expenditure Committee, 
the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration and various ad hoc 
committees) 
Session Ministers Other members 
of Commons or 
Lords 
Civil Servants 
Inc. Staff of 
Prisons 
Outside 
witnesses 
1970-71 0 0 0 0 
1971-72 0 0 4 217 
1972-73 0 0 0 0 
1973-74 0 0 0 0 
1974 0 0 6 26 
1974-75 0 1 8 40 
1975-76 0 0 0 0 
1976-77 0 0 37 25 
1977-78 2 3 107 77  
1978-79 0 0 0 0 
Totals 2 4 162 385 
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APPENDIX C 
Select Committees: Mentions in Lords and Commons Chambers 
  Decade References to  ‘select committee’, Lords and Commons Chambers 
1800s 174 
1810s 224 
1820s 352 
1830s 1583 
1840s 1772 
1850s 3493 
1860s 5554 
1870s 5276 
1880s 5724 
1890s 4910 
1900s 5324 
1910s 4154 
1920s 3607 
1930s 4672 
1940s 3981 
1950s 4970 
1960s 7401 
1970s 14041 
1980s 21058 
1990s 23063 
Source: Hansard 1803-2005777 
                                                          
777    Hansard 1803-2005 http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ [Accessed February 2015] 
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